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The project to replace the 46 Fire and Rescue Services' local control rooms across England with nine purpose-built regional control centres linked by a new IT system has been a comprehensive failure. The Department for Communities and Local Government acted to cut its losses by terminating the contract in December 2010, seven years after it had begun, but at least £469 million will have been wasted, with no IT system delivered and eight of the nine new regional control centres remaining empty and costly to maintain. The Department tried to impose a national control system, without having sufficient mandatory powers and without properly consulting with the Fire and Rescue Services. The Department rushed the start of the project, failing to follow proper procedures. Ineffective checks and balances during initiation and early stages meant the Department committed itself to the project on the basis of broad-brush and inaccurate estimates of costs and benefits and an unrealistic delivery timetable, and agreed an inadequate contract with its IT supplier. The Department under-appreciated the project's complexity, and then mismanaged the IT contractor's performance and delivery. The Department failed to provide the necessary leadership to make the project successful, over-relying on poorly managed consultants and failing to sort out early problems with delivery by the contractor. The Department is now trying to minimise the future cost of the project by subsidising Fire and Rescue Services to use the Regional Control Centres.
FiReControl was an ambitious project with the objectives of improving national resilience, efficiency and technology by replacing the control room functions of 46 local Fire and Rescue Services in England with a network of nine purpose-built regional control centres using a national computer system. The project was launched in 2004, but following a series of delays and difficulties, was terminated in December 2010 with none of the original objectives achieved and a minimum of £469 million being wasted. The Department attempted, without sufficient mandatory powers, to impose a single, national approach on locally accountable Fire and Rescue Services who were reluctant to change the way they operated. There were no basic project approval checks and balances - decisions were taken before a business case, project plan or procurement strategy had been developed and tested. The result was hugely unrealistic forecast costs and savings, naève over-optimism on the deliverability of the IT solution and under-appreciation or mitigation of the risks. Fundamentals of project management were absent: the centres were constructed and completed whilst there was considerable delay in even awarding the IT contract, let alone developing the essential IT infrastructure. There was a high turnover of senior managers although none have been held accountable for the failure. The IT contract went to a company with no direct experience of supplying the emergency services. £84.8 million is now earmarked to meet the project's original objectives, to improve resilience, efficiency and interoperability within the Fire and Rescue Service but there is no certainty this will provide value for money.

FiReControl

Great Britain: Parliament: House of Commons: Communities and Local Government Committee

Published: 2010

Total Pages: 196


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The Government's programme to replace 46 local fire and rescue service control rooms with nine purpose-built regional control centres has been inadequately planned, poorly executed, and badly managed. Given the investment of public funds already committed, and the benefits that will accrue, the MPs conclude that the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) should press ahead with the FireControl project so long as Ministers can agree urgently a viable project plan that will see the project go live by a target date of mid-2011 and in which the main stakeholders can have confidence. The excessive cost of abandoning the project - an extra £8 million more than it will cost to complete - indicates the Department should continue with the project so long as it also: examines alternatives and provides assurances that FiReControl represents the best viable option for the future of Fire and Rescue Services; resolves its contractual dispute with EADS and implements a viable project plan; addresses the shortcomings in its management of the project; consults fully with FRS staff and professionals to define end-user requirements; provides assurances that the safety and security of the Olympic Games will not be compromised by the roll-out of new Regional Control Centres. DCLG should urgently to draw up and consult on contingency plans for any further failures in the FiReControl programme to ensure ongoing safe and effective fire and rescue services cover across the whole country.
The contributors to this book mount a robust defence of the concept and practice of public service at a crucial time for its future. They question the ill-conceived assumptions behind the endless programmes of reform imposed by successive governments, often on the basis of advice from people with no direct experience of working in the public sector. With cuts in public spending by the coalition government and “austerity” programmes being imposed in Britain and abroad, the book could not be more timely in its reminder of the core purpose of public service. After a long period of denigration of the public sector, here is the voice that has not been heard clearly through these decades of reorganisation: "I know what my job is and I want to do it as well as I can. Indeed I would love my work if I could get one day's peace to get on with it. But I am beset at every turn by unintelligible, time wasting and fruitless management initiatives, constant change, ill-judged targets, wrong-headed 'commercial' exemplars and continuous and misguided restructuring. I have to watch as, instead of my 'customers' (actually patients, pupils, taxpayers) getting a better deal from me, the only beneficiaries seem to be those who can lobby for special treatment." The book contains accounts of public service by people of varying backgrounds and ages who work both inside and outside of the public sector. They share an allegiance to the value and purpose of working for the common good and an enthusiasm for getting things right and for the opportunity to recount their experience through this book.
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Why does policy succeed or fail? Nick Raynsford, a former MP, Minister and campaigner, tells us how it looks from the front line of policymaking. Based on his vast personal experience at the very heart of government and the voluntary sector, Raynsford explores what works and what doesn’t in making and implementing policy and legislation. He gives an ‘insider’s view’ on a range of events. some not previously made public, including the botched 1980s reform of Housing Benefit, the vacuum left by the 1986 abolition of the Greater London Council, the ill-fated 2002 Fire Service strike and subsequent reform programme, and fitful regeneration in the Thames Gateway in the 2000s. Bringing it right up-to-date, he explores various devolution plans leading up to the so-called ‘Northern Powerhouse’. Offering solutions as to how obstacles in policymaking and implementation can be overcome which will help to restore trust and much-needed confidence in government and the political process, this is a fascinating bridge across the policy and practice divide.