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The development of U.S. Army nuclear doctrine—policies, plans, procedures, tactics, and techniques—since World War II, its impact on Army forces, and its role in future wars is the subject of this policy-oriented analysis. The definition of Army nuclear doctrine advanced by the author clearly implies a distinction between policy for the employment of nuclear weapons as determined by the president and the role adduced by the Army. Dr. Rose suggests that developments—both nuclear and conventional—in U.S. Army tactical doctrine have been more responsive to political preferences held by national authorities than to the real nature of the potential threat and rigors of the nuclear battlefield. Further, he argues that the type of war preparations favored by U.S. political authorities over the last fifteen years and the type of war for which the Soviet Union is preparing differ markedly, making the U.S. Army poorly prepared for a major war.
The development of U.S. Army nuclear doctrine--policies, plans, procedures, tactics, and techniques--since World War II, its impact on Army forces, and its role in future wars is the subject of this policy-oriented analysis. The definition of Army nuclear doctrine advanced by the author clearly implies a distinction between policy for the employment of nuclear weapons as determined by the president and the role adduced by the Army. Dr. Rose suggests that developments--both nuclear and conventional--in U.S. Army tactical doctrine have been more responsive to political preferences held by national authorities than to the real nature of the potential threat and rigors of the nuclear battlefield. Further, he argues that the type of war preparations favored by U.S. political authorities over the last fifteen years and the type of war for which the Soviet Union is preparing differ markedly, making the U.S. Army poorly prepared for a major war.
Between 1991 and 1993, the Army formulated a fighting doctrine recast to fit the power demands of a new strategic world. This new power-order replaced the Army's earlier "AirLand Battle" doctrine, first issued in 1982. This monograph addresses several questions revolving around the rapid replacement, less than 2 years after its success in the desert war, of a recognized and successful fighting doctrine. Discusses the roots of U.S. Army doctrine and the antecedent developments leading to the Army's recasting of its key battle doctrine. Examines the mechanism of the process of change, the effects of the new doctrine and how it was implemented.
This important report analyzes the impact of nuclear weapon on the doctrine and force structure of the U.S. Army during the Early Cold War (1947-1957). It compares these impacts with those that occurred on the U.S. Air Force and Navy during that time. Nuclear weapons brought a new aspect to warfare. Their unprecedented economy of destructive power changed the way nations viewed warfare. For the Army, nuclear weapons presented a dual challenge. The Army faced a U.S. security policy centered on the massive use of these weapons; the Army also struggled to understand how these weapons would be utilized on the battlefield. The nation's security policy of large scale strategic nuclear bombardment of the Soviet Union favored the Air Force and to a lesser degree the Navy. The Army viewed this policy as single minded and purposely limiting the nations options to all out nuclear war or deference to another national will. In all the Army faced an internal struggle to incorporate these weapons and an external struggle to retain a useful position within the U.S. Defense establishment during this period.This compilation includes a reproduction of the 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community.I. The Army Before Last: Military Transformation and the Impact of Nuclear Weapons on the U.S. Army in the Early Cold War * A. Introduction * B. Current Military Transformation * C. The Nuclear Revolution * D. The Military Services And Nuclear Weapons * E. Thesis and Design * II. The Nuclear Revolution and The United States Air Force and Navy * A. Introduction * B. Revolutions * C. Defining the New Threat 1947-1955 * D. Policy to War Plan * E. Decisive Air Power * F. The Strategic Air Command * G. Early Cold War Naval Power * H. Bomber and Supercarrier * I. Conclusion * III. The Army's Atomic Force Structure * A. Introduction * B. The Korean Conflict * C. Army Nuclear Forces * D. Conflicts * E. Conclusion * IV. The Army's Atomic Age Doctrine * A. Introduction * B. Soviet Early Cold War Strategy * C. Countering The Threat * D. Atomic Doctrine And Units * E. Conclusion * V. Conclusion * A. Introduction * B. The Comparisons - Then and Now * C. The Impacts * D. ConclusionThe current U.S. military is essentially the product of the combat lessons of World War II and the preparations to fight the Soviet military during the Cold War. Tactics, techniques and equipment refined during both of those wars led to the victory in Desert Storm as well as the success of the peacemaking and peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Kosovo. Ongoing efforts throughout the 1990's to capitalize on emerging information technologies enhanced the forces that defeated the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001 and ousted Saddam Hussein in Operation Iraqi Freedom two years later. The Army is always changing, by improving its weapons systems, altering its force structure, or refining its doctrine and tactics. This process always involves the interaction of recent combat experience, budget realities, and the exploitation of a new technology. Any change in an institution such as the Army is a skilled balance of risk versus reward. The early Cold War represented a comparably intense period for military change. Before the Second World War, the American army and navy had been primarily hemispheric defense forces. The challenge of defeating both Germany and Japan required a massive land force for Europe and an equally large naval force for the vast Pacific theater. Furthermore, World War II saw an exceptional growth of military technology including improved mechanization, radios, jet engines, and, most significantly, the atomic bomb.
From the author of the classic The Wizards of Armageddon and Pulitzer Prize finalist comes the definitive history of American policy on nuclear war—and Presidents’ actions in nuclear crises—from Truman to Trump. Fred Kaplan, hailed by The New York Times as “a rare combination of defense intellectual and pugnacious reporter,” takes us into the White House Situation Room, the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s “Tank” in the Pentagon, and the vast chambers of Strategic Command to bring us the untold stories—based on exclusive interviews and previously classified documents—of how America’s presidents and generals have thought about, threatened, broached, and just barely avoided nuclear war from the dawn of the atomic age until today. Kaplan’s historical research and deep reporting will stand as the permanent record of politics. Discussing theories that have dominated nightmare scenarios from Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Kaplan presents the unthinkable in terms of mass destruction and demonstrates how the nuclear war reality will not go away, regardless of the dire consequences.
From Lexington and Gettysburg to Normandy and Iraq, the wars of the United States have defined the nation. But after the guns fall silent, the army searches the lessons of past conflicts in order to prepare for the next clash of arms. In the echo of battle, the army develops the strategies, weapons, doctrine, and commanders that it hopes will guarantee a future victory. In the face of radically new ways of waging war, Brian Linn surveys the past assumptions--and errors--that underlie the army's many visions of warfare up to the present day. He explores the army's forgotten heritage of deterrence, its long experience with counter-guerrilla operations, and its successive efforts to transform itself. Distinguishing three martial traditions--each with its own concept of warfare, its own strategic views, and its own excuses for failure--he locates the visionaries who prepared the army for its battlefield triumphs and the reactionaries whose mistakes contributed to its defeats. Discussing commanders as diverse as Dwight D. Eisenhower, George S. Patton, and Colin Powell, and technologies from coastal artillery to the Abrams tank, he shows how leadership and weaponry have continually altered the army's approach to conflict. And he demonstrates the army's habit of preparing for wars that seldom occur, while ignoring those it must actually fight. Based on exhaustive research and interviews, The Echo of Battle provides an unprecedented reinterpretation of how the U.S. Army has waged war in the past and how it is meeting the new challenges of tomorrow.
In late 1945, it became clear that the Soviet Union was an aggressive power. American military planners began to develop strategies to deal with the frightening possibility of a war with the Soviet Union. This work examines those plans.