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This volume explores the essence of German military professionalism as exemplified by the nineteenth century Prussian German Staff. The study focuses on the most important Prussian military reformer--Gerhard Johann David von Scharnhorst, who in 1801 founded the Militarische Gesellschaft (Military Society) in Berlin. The Gesellschaft became the focal point for the transformation of the Prussian army from a robotic war machine into a modern fighting force that was instrumental in defeating Napolean in 1813 and in 1815. The author examines the following elements of this military society: its membership; the specifics of its agenda; the intellect, imagination, and habits of thought, reflection, and objective analysis of its members; Scharnhorst's particular contributions.
Clausewitz is often quoted but more often misunderstood. On Clausewitz presents his central ideas about war and politics - such as war as an instrument of policy, the concept of Absolute War, friction and the fog of war - in a clear and systematic fashion. It also presents the man, his life and the military and intellectual environment in which he produced his great work On War . A final section considers Clausewitz's relevance to the rapidly changing nature of war today.
This book is a collection of essays that provide historical insight, lessons learned from experience, and illustrations of strategy in practice. Designed as a primer for mid-career military professionals, On Strategy culls the expertise of a diverse group of strategists who represent the brightest minds of the field. They offer a succinct breakdown and instruction on how to think and act strategically at every level. It is a comprehensive and useful book that connects foundational theory to contemporary complexities.
Originally setting out to write the very book that he would have wanted to own as a young infantryman, the author penned On Tactics as a remedy for navigating the chaotic and inchoate realm of tactical theory. Challenging centuries-old conventional wisdom regarding the principles of war, tactics, and the roles of strategy, doctrine, experiential learning, and military history, Friedman's work offers a striking synthesis of thinking on tactics as well as strategy. Part One of the book establishes a tactical system meant to replace the Principles of War checklist. First, the contextual role of tactics with regards to strategy and war will be established. This will necessarily lean on major strategic theories in order to illuminate the role of tactics. This section will be formed around the Physical, Mental, and Moral planes of battlefield interaction used by theorists such as J.F.C Fuller and John Boyd. Each plane will then be examined in turn, and many of the classic Principles of War will be discussed along with some new ones. It will present some standard methods that tacticians can use to gain an advantage on the battlefield using historical examples that illustrate each concept. These "tactical tenets" include maneuver, mass, firepower, tempo, surprise, deception, confusion, shock, and the role of the moral aspects of combat. Finally, Part One will circle back around by discussing the role of tactical victory- once achieved- in contributed to a strategy. Part One is short by design. It is intended to be both compelling and easily mastered for junior non-commissioned officers and company grade officers, while still rich enough to be interesting to both specialist and non-specialist academics. It is a book meant not just for bookshelves but also for ruck sacks and cargo pockets. Part Two builds on Part One by exploring concepts with which the tactician must be familiar with such as the culminating point of victory, mission tactics and decentralized command and control, offensive and defensive operations, and the initiative. Part Three will conclude the book examining implications of the presented tactical systems to a variety of other issues in strategic studies.
While many scholars agree that Clausewitz's On War is frequently misunderstood, almost none have explored his methodology to see whether it might enhance our understanding of his concepts. This book lays out Clausewitz's methodology in a brisk and straightforward style. It then uses that as a basis for understanding his contributions to the ever growing body of knowledge of war. The specific contributions this study addresses are Clausewitz's theories concerning the nature of war, the relationship between war and politics, and several of the major principles of strategy he examined. These theories and principles lie at the heart of the current debates over the nature of contemporary conflict. They also underpin much of the instruction that prepares military and civilian leaders for their roles in the development and execution of military strategy. Thus, they are important even in circles where Clausewitz is only briefly studied. While understanding On War is no more a prerequisite for winning wars than knowledge is a requirement for exercising power, Clausewitz's opus has become something of an authoritative reference for those desiring to expand their knowledge of war. By linking method and concept, this book contributes significantly to that end.
The volume considers Clausewitz's timeless On War against the background of actual armed conflict. With scholars from a range of disciplines and countries, it throws new light on a classic text and contemporary issues.
Carl von Clausewitz's major theoretical work, On War, has retained its freshness and relevance since it first appeared 160 years ago. Clausewitz was also a wide-ranging, innovative historian--his acerbic history of Prussia before 1806 became an underground classic long before it could be published--and a combative political essayist, whose observations on the affairs of Germany and Europe combine social egalitarianism with a nearly Bismarckian Realpolitik. In this companion volume to On War, the editors bring together Clausewitz's political writings and a selection of his historical works--material that is fascinating in its own right, important as a commentary on his theories of war, and a valuable source for understanding European ideas and attitudes during and after the Napoleonic era. None of these works has previously appeared in English, with one exception, which was published in a corrupt, censored text that has now been restored to its original form. The editors have contributed introductions for the historical and for the political parts of the volume, as well as brief introductions to the individual selections. Their analyses and the texts themselves reveal Clausewitz to be an exceptionally independent observer both of the past and of his own times, whose outlook is distinguished by an unideological pragmatism and a keen sense of the possibilities and shortcomings of state power. Originally published in 1992. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.
Blending detailed contextual analysis with issues in modern-day international relations this book provides a major new analysis of the theory of Clausewitz and its relevance to contemporary society. This book argues that Clausewitz developed a wide-ranging political theory of war by reflecting on the success, the limitations, and the failure of Napoleon's method of waging war, a theory, which is still relevant in light of contemporary conflict. This new interpretation is the result of reflecting on Clausewitz's theory in light of the new developments and lays down the foundation of a general theory of war by concentrating on Clausewitz's historical analyses of war campaigns. For the first time analysis of three paradigmatic military campaigns is placed at the centre of understanding surrounding Clausewitz's 'On War': The author argues that the limitations of Napoleon's strategy, as revealed in Russia and in his final defeat, enabled Clausewitz to develop a general theory of war. This book is a project of the Oxford Leverhulme Programme on the Changing Character of War.
The Holy Roman Empire survived for over 1,000 years--and its institutions, ideas, and political divisions haunt Europe still. Starting with Charlemagne's coronation on Christmas day 800, and ending with the illegal suspension of the Empire by Francis II in 1806, this ambitious and comprehensive history examines the status of the Emperor, meaning of kingship and leadership, the Empire's structure, internal conflicts, and shifting centers of power, and ever present ideal of a united Europe. The Holy Roman Empire survived for over 1,000 years--and its institutions, ideas, and political divisions haunt Europe still. Starting with Charlemagne's coronation on Christmas day 800, and ending with the illegal suspension of the Empire by Francis II in 1806, this ambitious and comprehensive history examines the status of the Emperor, meaning of kingship and leadership, the Empire's structure, internal conflicts, and shifting centers of power, and ever present ideal of a united Europe.
For nearly two centuries, On War, by Carl Phillip Gottfried von Clausewitz (1780-1831), has been the bible for statesmen and military professionals, strategists, theorists, and historians concerned about armed conflict. The source of the famous aphorism that "war is an extension of politics by other means," it has been widely read and debated. But, as Jon Sumida shows in this daring new look at Clausewitz's magnum opus, its full meaning has eluded most readers-until now. Approaching Clausewitz's classic as if it were an encoded text, Sumida deciphers this cryptic masterwork and offers a more productive way of looking at the sources and evolution of its author's thought. Sumida argues that On War should be viewed as far more complete and coherent than has been supposed. Moreover, he challenges the notion that On War is an attempt to explain the nature of armed conflict through the formulation of abstract theories. Clausewitz's primary concern, Sumida contends, was practical instruction of the military and political leadership of his country. To achieve this end, Clausewitz invented a method of reenacting the psychological difficulties of high command in order to promote the powers of intuition that he believed were essential to effective strategic decision-making. In addition, Sumida argues that Clausewitz's primary strategic proposition is that the defense is a stronger form of war than the offense. This concept, Sumida maintains, must be understood in order to make sense of Clausewitz's positions on absolute and real war, guerrilla warfare, and the relationship of war and policy/politics. Sumida's pathbreaking critique is supported by examination of the Prussian officer's experience during the Napoleonic Wars, previous major theoretical and historical scholarship on Clausewitz and his writing, and modern philosophical and scientific works that have much in common with Clausewitz's creative guide to the consideration of strategic practice. A major study of intellectual and military history, Sumida's book provides a provocative and above all readily comprehensible treatment of a previously inaccessible classic. It will surely become essential reading for all military professionals and serious students of military thought.