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The 1986 article by Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver D. Hart titled "A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration" has provided a framework for understanding how firm boundaries are defined and how they affect economic performance. The property rights approach has provided a formal way to introduce incomplete contracting ideas into economic modeling. The Impact of Incomplete Contracts on Economics collects papers and opinion pieces on the impact that this property right approach to the firm has had on the economics profession.
"The process by which securities are traded is very different from the idealized picture of a frictionless and self-equilibrating market offered by the typical finance textbook. This book offers a more accurate and authoritative take on this process. The book starts from the assumption that not everyone is present at all times simultaneously on the market, and that participants have quite diverse information about the security's fundamentals. As a result, the order flow is a complex mix of information and noise, and a consensus price only emerges gradually over time as the trading process evolves and the participants interpret the actions of other traders. Thus, a security's actual transaction price may deviate from its fundamental value, as it would be assessed by a fully informed set of investors. The book takes these deviations seriously, and explains why and how they emerge in the trading process and are eventually eliminated. The authors draw on a vast body of theoretical insights and empirical findings on security price formation that have come to form a well-defined field within financial economics known as "market microstructure." Focusing on liquidity and price discovery, the book analyzes the tension between the two, pointing out that when price-relevant information reaches the market through trading pressure rather than through a public announcement, liquidity may suffer. It also confronts many striking phenomena in securities markets and uses the analytical tools and empirical methods of market microstructure to understand them. These include issues such as why liquidity changes over time and differs across securities, why large trades move prices up or down, and why these price changes are subsequently reversed, and why we observe temporary deviations from asset fair values"--
Arbitrage, State Prices and Portfolio Theory / Philip h. Dybvig and Stephen a. Ross / - Intertemporal Asset Pricing Theory / Darrell Duffle / - Tests of Multifactor Pricing Models, Volatility Bounds and Portfolio Performance / Wayne E. Ferson / - Consumption-Based Asset Pricing / John y Campbell / - The Equity Premium in Retrospect / Rainish Mehra and Edward c. Prescott / - Anomalies and Market Efficiency / William Schwert / - Are Financial Assets Priced Locally or Globally? / G. Andrew Karolyi and Rene M. Stuli / - Microstructure and Asset Pricing / David Easley and Maureen O'hara / - A Survey of Behavioral Finance / Nicholas Barberis and Richard Thaler / - Derivatives / Robert E. Whaley / - Fixed-Income Pricing / Qiang Dai and Kenneth J. Singleton.
Global Production is the first book to provide a fully comprehensive overview of the complicated issues facing multinational companies and their global sourcing strategies. Few international trade transactions today are based on the exchange of finished goods; rather, the majority of transactions are dominated by sales of individual components and intermediary services. Many firms organize global production around offshoring parts, components, and services to producers in distant countries, and contracts are drawn up specific to the parties and distinct legal systems involved. Pol Antràs examines the contractual frictions that arise in the international system of production and how these frictions influence the world economy. Antràs discusses the inevitable complications that develop in contract negotiation and execution. He provides a unified framework that sheds light on the factors helping global firms determine production locations and other organizational choices. Antràs also implements a series of systematic empirical tests, based on recent data from the U.S. Customs and Census Offices, which demonstrate the relevance of contractual factors in global production decisions. Using an integrated approach, Global Production is an excellent resource for researchers, graduate students, and advanced undergraduates interested in the inner workings of international economics and trade.
Judging by the sheer number of papers reviewed in this Handbook, the empirical analysis of firms' financing and investment decisions—empirical corporate finance—has become a dominant field in financial economics. The growing interest in everything "corporate is fueled by a healthy combination of fundamental theoretical developments and recent widespread access to large transactional data bases. A less scientific—but nevertheless important—source of inspiration is a growing awareness of the important social implications of corporate behavior and governance. This Handbook takes stock of the main empirical findings to date across an unprecedented spectrum of corporate finance issues, ranging from econometric methodology, to raising capital and capital structure choice, and to managerial incentives and corporate investment behavior. The surveys are written by leading empirical researchers that remain active in their respective areas of interest. With few exceptions, the writing style makes the chapters accessible to industry practitioners. For doctoral students and seasoned academics, the surveys offer dense roadmaps into the empirical research landscape and provide suggestions for future work.*The Handbooks in Finance series offers a broad group of outstanding volumes in various areas of finance*Each individual volume in the series should present an accurate self-contained survey of a sub-field of finance*The series is international in scope with contributions from field leaders the world over
May 1998 On average, performance contracts do not improve productivity in China's state enterprises and may even reduce it. But when they contain all the right features-managerial bonds, profit orientation, higher wage elasticity, and lower markup ratios-performance contracts can boost a firm's productivity growth rate by an estimated 10 percent. Performance contracts are widely used to reform state-owned enterprises. By June 1994, there were 565 such contracts in 32 developing countries, used principally to reform large utilities and other monopolies, and roughly another 103,000 in China, where they are also used to reform state manufacturing enterprises. A performance contract is a written agreement between the manager of a state enterprise (who promises to achieve specific targets in a certain time frame) and government (which-usually-promises to award achievement with a bonus or other incentive). Performance contracts are a variant of the pay-for-performance or incentive contracts often used to motivate managers in the private sector. In the public sector, they are viewed as a device to reveal information and motivate managers to exert effort. Shirley and Xu analyze China's experience with performance contracts in more than 400 state enterprises. China is a good place for such a study because no country has ever used them on such a scale or with such a variety of enterprises (mostly in the competitive sector). China also uses many different kinds of contracts, with different targets (more profit-, tax-, or output-oriented). Shirley and Xu find that performance contracts * On average, do not improve productivity in China's state enterprises and may even reduce it. * Are ineffective in competitive firms as well as monopolies. * Do more harm when they provide only weak incentives and when they do not reduce information asymmetry. They find no connection between variables for commitment and the effects of performance contracts. Design matters. When performance contracts contain all the good features-profit orientation, higher wage elasticity, and lower markup ratios-the firm's productivity growth rate could increase as much as 10 percent. The Chinese government was serious about implementing performance contracts, and used measures considerably more radical than other countries used, hailing the contract system as the official national mode for reforming state enterprises. But most of the contracts have had little or no effect on growth rates and the observed frequency of contracts with good provisions is exceedingly low. Perhaps the political economy of incentive contracts in government settings merits further study. Political considerations may preclude the design of incentive contracts for government actors that could produce the sort of productivity gains some private firms have achieved. One observer (Byrd 1991) points out that the central government gave local governments a good deal of discretion in implementing performance contracts and local governments had a tendency to adopt the lowest common denominator, a bare-bones performance contract. This paper-a product of the Development Research Group-is part of a larger effort in the group to understand state enterprises. The authors may be contacted at [email protected] or [email protected].
This book provides a framework for thinking about economic instiutions such as firms. The basic idea is that institutions arise in situations where people write incomplete contracts and where the allocation of power or control is therefore important. Power and control are not standard concepts in economic theory. The book begins by pointing out that traditional approaches cannot explain on the one hand why all transactions do not take place in one huge firm and on the other hand why firms matter at all. An incomplete contracting or property rights approach is then developed. It is argued that this approach can throw light on the boundaries of firms and on the meaning of asset ownership. In the remainder of the book, incomplete contacting ideas are applied to understand firms' financial decisions, in particular, the nature of debt and equity (why equity has votes and creditors have foreclosure rights); the capital structure decisions of public companies; optimal bankruptcy procedure; and the allocation of voting rights across a company's shares. The book is written in a fairly non-technical style and includes many examples. It is aimed at advanced undergraduate and graduate students, academic and business economists, and lawyers as well as those with an interest in corporate finance, privatization and regulation, and transitional issues in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and China. Little background knowledge is required, since the concepts are developed as the book progresses and the existing literature is fully reviewed.
This book uses economic theory to argue that worker-controlled firms are rare due to market failures rather than inherent organizational defects. The book will be of interest to scholarly researchers, graduate students, and advanced undergraduates in economics, especially in industrial organization, labor economics, comparative economics, organizational economics, and finance.
Corporate finance is the area of finance that studies the determinants of firms' values, including capital structure, financing, and investment decisions. Although there are several excellent texts in corporate finance, this is the first to focus on the theoretical foundations of the subject in a consistent and integrated way at the Ph.D. level. In addition to a textbook for advanced graduate students, it can also serve as a general reference to researchers and sophisticated practitioners. The material presented is carefully selected with an eye to what is essential to understanding the underlying theory, ensuring that this text will remain useful for years to come. The book is divided into three parts. The first section presents the basic principles of valuation based on the absence of arbitrage, including a discussion of the determinants of the optimal capital structure based on the seminal results of Modigliani and Miller. The second section discusses the implications of agency problems and information asymmetries to capital structure, giving particular attention to payout policy and to debt contract design. The concluding portion presents different ways of restructuring capital, including going public, going private using stock repurchases or leveraged buyouts, and mergers and acquisitions. Each chapter includes exercises that vary in difficulty, with suggested solutions provided in an appendix. This book will assuredly be the standard doctoral- and professional-level explication of corporate finance theory and its appropriate applications.