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The effects of financial contagion during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) have been extensively studied in the finance literarure. One of the key issues is the devastating effect of the crisis on wealth and asset prices. However, one key difference between this crisis and other crises in the past was the resilience (immunity) or the short term effect of the crisis on emerging markets. Dooley and Hutchison (2009) were the first ones to find evidence in support of the decoupling hypothesis of emerging markets during the early phases of the crisis. Since then the hypothesis have been tested by other researchers (for recent surveys see: Beirne and Gieck, 2014; Koksal and Orhan, 2013).
The Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2009 has highlighted the resilience of the financial markets and economies from the developing world. This title investigates and assesses the impact and response to the crisis from an emerging markets perspective including asset pricing, contagion, financial intermediation, market structure and regulation.
Contents: (1) Recent Developments and Analysis; (2) The Global Financial Crisis and U.S. Interests: Policy; Four Phases of the Global Financial Crisis; (3) New Challenges and Policy in Managing Financial Risk; (4) Origins, Contagion, and Risk; (5) Effects on Emerging Markets: Latin America; Russia and the Financial Crisis; (6) Effects on Europe and The European Response: The ¿European Framework for Action¿; The British Rescue Plan; Collapse of Iceland¿s Banking Sector; (7) Impact on Asia and the Asian Response: Asian Reserves and Their Impact; National Responses; (8) International Policy Issues: Bretton Woods II; G-20 Meetings; The International Monetary Fund; Changes in U.S. Reg¿s. and Regulatory Structure; (9) Legislation.
What can the international community do to prevent financial contagion?
Financial crises often transmit across geographical borders and different asset classes. Modeling these interactions is empirically challenging, and many of the proposed methods give different results when applied to the same data sets. In this book the authors set out their work on a general framework for modeling the transmission of financial crises using latent factor models. They show how their framework encompasses a number of other empirical contagion models and why the results between the models differ. The book builds a framework which begins from considering contagion in the bond markets during 1997-1998 across a number of countries, and culminates in a model which encompasses multiple assets across multiple countries through over a decade of crisis events from East Asia in 1997-1998 to the sub prime crisis during 2008. Program code to support implementation of similar models is available.
No sooner had the Asian crisis broken out in 1997 than the witch-hunt started. With great indignation every Asian economy pointed fingers. They were innocent bystanders. The fundamental reason for the crisis was this or that - most prominently contagion - but also the decline in exports of the new commodities (high-tech goods), the steep rise of the dollar, speculators, etc. The prominent question, of course, is whether contagion could really have been the key factor and, if so, what are the channels and mechanisms through which it operated in such a powerful manner. The question is obvious because until 1997, Asia's economies were generally believed to be immensely successful, stable and well managed. This question is of great importance not only in understanding just what happened, but also in shaping policies. In a world of pure contagion, i.e. when innocent bystanders are caught up and trampled by events not of their making and when consequences go far beyond ordinary international shocks, countries will need to look for better protective policies in the future. In such a world, the international financial system will need to change in order to offer better preventive and reactive policy measures to help avoid, or at least contain, financial crises.
This volume documents and explains the remarkable resilience of emerging market nations in East Asia and Latin America when faced with the global financial crisis in 2008-2009. Their quick bounceback from the crisis marked a radical departure from the past, such as when the 1982 debt shocks produced a decade-long recession in Latin America or when the Asian financial crisis dramatically slowed those economies in the late 1990s. Why? This volume suggests that these countries' resistance to the initial financial contagion is a tribute to financial-sector reforms undertaken over the past two decades. The rebound itself was a trade-led phenomenon, favoring the countries that had gone the farthest with macroeconomic restructuring and trade reform. Old labels used to describe "neoliberal versus developmentalist" strategies do not accurately capture the foundations of this recovery. These authors argue that policy learning and institutional reforms adopted in response to previous crises prompted policymakers to combine state and market approaches in effectively coping with the global financial crisis. The nations studied include Korea, China, India, Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil, accompanied by Latin American and Asian regional analyses that bring other emerging markets such as Chile and Peru into the picture. The substantial differences among the nations make their shared success even more remarkable and worthy of investigation. And although 2012 saw slowed growth in some emerging market nations, the authors argue this selective slowing suggests the need for deeper structural reforms in some countries, China and India in particular.
"The recent global financial crisis was the first in recent history that was triggered by problems in the financial system of the mature economies. Existing work on financial crisis in emerging market countries, however, almost exclusively focus on the role of financial frictions in the domestic economy. In contrast, they propose a two-country DSGE model to investigate the transmission of a global financial crisis that originates from financial frictions in the rest of the world. They find that the scale of financial spillovers from the global to the domestic economy and trade openness are key determinants of the severity of the financial crisis for the domestic economy. Their results also suggest that the welfare ranking of alternative monetary policy regimes is determined by the degree of financial contagion, the degree of trade openness as well as the scale of foreign currency denominated debt in the domestic economy."--Abstract.
This paper studies the interconnectedness of the global financial system and its susceptibility to shocks. A novel multilayer network framework is applied to link debt and equity exposures across countries. Use of this approach—that examines simultaneously multiple channels of transmission and their important higher order effects—shows that ignoring the heterogeneity of financial exposures, and simply aggregating all claims, as often done in other studies, can underestimate the extent and effects of financial contagion.The structure of the global financial network has changed since the global financial crisis, impacted by European bank’s deleveraging and higher corporate debt issuance. Still, we find that the structure of the system and contagion remain similar in that network is highly susceptible to shocks from central countries and those with large financial systems (e.g., the USA and the UK). While, individual European countries (excluding the UK) have relatively low impact on shock propagation, the network is highly susceptible to the shocks from the entire euro area. Another important development is the rising role of the Asian countries and the noticeable increase in network susceptibility to shocks from China and Hong Kong SAR economies.