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This report summarizes the research conducted in a project entitled "The Effectiveness of U.S. Military Training Activities in Promoting Internal Defense and Development in the Third World." This report assesses the effectiveness, utility, and advisability of U.S. training of foreign militaries in internal defense and development (IDAD) skills. Among the project's conclusions are the following: training in IDAD skills has only a marginal effect on a foreign military's behavior; with the end of the Cold War, the United States can nonetheless show more discretion in determining which countries will receive IDAD training; such discretion will be particularly important given the overall decrease in U.S. foreign military training and the need to maximize the effects of such training worldwide; training in foreign internal defense (FID) or IDAD skills should be complemented by education in the theories underlying democratic development such as is being provided through the expanded IMET (IMET-E) program.
Training foreign militaries continues to be considered one of the most cost-effective and successful means of achieving a broad range of American political and military goals in the developing world. In some host nations, U.S. military training places particular emphasis on those skills that are relevant to internal defense and development (IDAD), either as a means of countering insurgency-as in Honduras and El Salvador-or simply to foster economic development, as in Senegal. There is no 'IDAD package' of courses offered by the U.S. military, however; there is no 'IDAD skills training' per se. There are simply courses-such as engineering, communications, transportation, and medical courses-that may be relevant to a foreign nation's IDAD strategy and that may or may not be provided in deliberate support of such a strategy.
Drawing on interviews with trainers, U.S. Embassy personnel, and an extensive review of peridicals and books, the author concludes that a causal relationship between U.S. training efforts and improvements in human rights and other values is difficult, if not impossible, to establish.
This publication, “Foreign Internal Defense (Joint Publication 3-22),” establishes joint doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States involved in or supporting foreign internal defense (FID). It discusses how joint operations, involving the application of all instruments of national power, support host nation efforts to build capability and capacity to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Foreign internal defense (FID) is the participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization, to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to their security. The focus of US FID efforts is to support the host nation's (HN's) internal defense and development (IDAD), which can be described as the full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and protect itself from the security threats. While historically, the United States provided notable, and largely unconditional, assistance to friendly foreign nations following World War II (Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan), FID as conducted today has its genesis in the post-Vietnam era when US policy shifted to emphasize that the United States would assist friendly nations, but would require them to provide the manpower and be ultimately responsible for their own national defense. It is important to frame the US FID effort within the context of the US doctrine it supports and to understand how it fits into the HN IDAD program. US military support to FID should focus on assisting an HN in anticipating, precluding, and countering threats or potential threats and addressing the root causes of instability. Emphasis on internal developmental programs as well as internal defense programs when organizing, planning, and executing military support to US FID activities is essential. Although the FID operation is considered military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence, FID may include or support operations from across the range of military operations to support the HN's IDAD strategy. Accordingly, US military operations supporting FID provide training, materiel, advice, or assistance to local forces executing an IDAD program, rather than US forces conducting IDAD military missions for the HN. Military officials often have greater access to, and credibility with, HN regimes that are heavily influenced or dominated by their own military. However, the characteristics of FID involve the instruments of national power beyond the military instrument (diplomatic, informational, and economic) through which sources of US power (such as financial, intelligence, and law enforcement) can be applied to support an HN IDAD program. This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the joint activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in operations and provides the doctrinal basis for interagency coordination and for US military involvement in multinational operations while conducting or supporting FID. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes joint doctrine for operations, education, and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall objectives. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the joint staff, commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of these commands, the Services, and defense agencies in support of joint operations.
This report summarizes the research conducted in a project entitled "The Effectiveness of U.S. Military Training Activities in Promoting Internal Defense and Development in the Third World." It presents the results of two case studies in which the role of U.S. international military education and training (IMET) in foreign internal defense and development (IDAD) is assessed, as well as more general observations regarding IMET's role in IDAD. The report concludes that IMET is an inexpensive means of exposing foreign militaries to the U.S. political system and military culture and, although such exposure may not translate into direct influence, it can provide a common language for negotiations (literally and figuratively). The role of IMET in promoting IDAD, however, is limited as well as controversial. A more direct approach is the relatively new expanded-IMET (IMET-E) program, which provides education and training to foreign military and civilian personnel in the basic elements of democratic reform and human rights. Unfortunately, nations must pay for IMET-E courses out of their general IMET allocations, which are small and, in many cases, being reduced. This may breed resentment and frustration among recipient nations and their militaries (thus to some extent obviating the positive political effects), and will further burden the small budget of the IMET program. IMET and IMET-E therefore should both receive adequate funding, especially given the relatively few dollars required.
Product Description: The proceedings from the Combat Studies Institute's 2006 Military History Symposium presents historical research, analysis and policy recommendations on the topic of Security Assistance and the training of indigenous forces.
After a decade and a half of war in Iraq and Afghanistan, US policymakers are seeking to provide aid and advice to local governments' counterinsurgency campaigns rather than directly intervening with US forces. This strategy, and US counterinsurgency doctrine in general, fail to recognize that despite a shared aim of defeating an insurgency, the US and its local partner frequently have differing priorities with respect to the conduct of counterinsurgency operations. Without some degree of reform or policy change on the part of the insurgency-plagued government, American support will have a limited impact. Using three detailed case studies - the Hukbalahap Rebellion in the Philippines, Vietnam during the rule of Ngo Dinh Diem, and the Salvadorian Civil War - Ladwig demonstrates that providing significant amounts of aid will not generate sufficient leverage to affect a client's behaviour and policies. Instead, he argues that influence flows from pressure and tight conditions on aid rather than from boundless generosity.
This study examines the results of U.S. assistance to the internal security forces of four repressive states: El Salvador, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Efforts to improve the security, human rights, and accountability of security forces appear more likely to succeed in states transitioning from repressive to democratic systems. In addition, several factors are critical for success: the duration of assistance, viability of the justice system, and support and buy-in from the local government (including key ministries).