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We analyze a unique data set of publicly traded firms based in six Latin American countries to study the joint effect of ownership concentration and composition on dividend policy. We find that when ownership concentration is high, and the largest investor is identified as an individual, firms tend to pay fewer dividends, consistent with individual investors extracting benefits from minority shareholders. However, if the largest shareholder is based in a common-law country, the dividend paid is significantly higher. Finally, the higher the ownership of the second-largest shareholder, the firms decrease the dividends, suggesting a monitoring role of a large shareholder.
'Investor Protection and Corporate Governance' analyzes the impact of corporate governance on firm performance and valuation. Using unique datasets gathered at the firm-level the first such data in the region and results from a homogeneous corporate governance questionnaire, the book examines corporate governance characteristics, ownership structures, dividend policies, and performance measures. The book's analysis reveals the very high levels of ownership and voting rights concentrations and monolithic governance structures in the largest samples of Latin American companies up to now, and new data emphasize the importance of specific characteristics of the investor protection regimes in several Latin American countries. By and large, those firms with better governance measures across several dimensions are granted higher valuations and thus lower cost of capital. This title will be useful to researchers, policy makers, government officials, and other professionals involved in corporate governance, economic policy, and business finance, law, and management.
Corporate Payout Policy synthesizes the academic research on payout policy and explains "how much, when, and how". That is (i) the overall value of payouts over the life of the enterprise, (ii) the time profile of a firm's payouts across periods, and (iii) the form of those payouts. The authors conclude that today's theory does a good job of explaining the general features of corporate payout policies, but some important gaps remain. So while our emphasis is to clarify "what we know" about payout policy, the authors also identify a number of interesting unresolved questions for future research. Corporate Payout Policy discusses potential influences on corporate payout policy including managerial use of payouts to signal future earnings to outside investors, individuals' behavioral biases that lead to sentiment-based demands for distributions, the desire of large block stockholders to maintain corporate control, and personal tax incentives to defer payouts. The authors highlight four important "carry-away" points: the literature's focus on whether repurchases will (or should) drive out dividends is misplaced because it implicitly assumes that a single payout vehicle is optimal; extant empirical evidence is strongly incompatible with the notion that the primary purpose of dividends is to signal managers' views of future earnings to outside investors; over-confidence on the part of managers is potentially a first-order determinant of payout policy because it induces them to over-retain resources to invest in dubious projects and so behavioral biases may, in fact, turn out to be more important than agency costs in explaining why investors pressure firms to accelerate payouts; the influence of controlling stockholders on payout policy --- particularly in non-U.S. firms, where controlling stockholders are common --- is a promising area for future research. Corporate Payout Policy is required reading for both researchers and practitioners interested in understanding this central topic in corporate finance and governance.
This study investigates the relationship between dividends and ownership structure for a panel of 330 large quoted UK firms. Controlling for unobserved firm-specific effects, results indicate a negative relationship between dividends and ownership concentration. Ownership composition also matters, with a positive relationship observed for shareholding by insurance companies, and a negative one for individuals. These results are consistent with agency models in which dividends substitute for poor monitoring by a firm's shareholders but can also be explained by the presence of powerful principals who are able to impose their preferred payout policy upon firms.
Dividends are not only a signal about a firm's prospects under asymmetric information, but they can also act as a corporate governance device to align the management's interests with those of the shareholders. Dividend Policy and Corporate Governance is the first comprehensive volume on the relationship between dividend policy and corporate governance, and examines in detail empirical studies and current theories. Reviewing the interactions between dividend policy and other corporate governance mechanisms, it compares results for the UK and the US with those for other countries such as France, Germany, and Japan, and provides new empirical evidence on corporate governance in continental Europe and its impact on dividends. Focusing on one of the main representatives of this system, Germany, it highlights major differences between the dividend policies of German firms and those of UK or US firms. Conventional wisdom states that German dividends are lower than UK or US dividends, yet on a published-profits basis the exact converse is true. In addition, the authors demonstrate a link between corporate control structures and dividend payouts, report evidence that the existence of a loss is an additional determinant of dividend changes, and demonstrate that the tax status of the controlling shareholder and the firm's dividend payout are not linked. The conclusions reached in this book have important implications for the current debate on corporate governance, making it invaluable for academics, finance professionals, regulators, and legal advisors.
Dividends And Dividend Policy As part of the Robert W. Kolb Series in Finance, Dividends and Dividend Policy aims to be the essential guide to dividends and their impact on shareholder value. Issues concerning dividends and dividend policy have always posed challenges to both academics and professionals. While all the pieces to the dividend puzzle may not be in place yet, the information found here can help you gain a firm understanding of this dynamic discipline. Comprising twenty-eight chapters—contributed by both top academics and financial experts in the field—this well-rounded resource discusses everything from corporate dividend decisions to the role behavioral finance plays in dividend policy. Along the way, you'll gain valuable insights into the history, trends, and determinants of dividends and dividend policy, and discover the different approaches firms are taking when it comes to dividends. Whether you're a seasoned financial professional or just beginning your journey in the world of finance, having a firm understanding of the issues surrounding dividends and dividend policy is now more important than ever. With this book as your guide, you'll be prepared to make the most informed dividend-related decisions possible—even in the most challenging economic conditions. The Robert W. Kolb Series in Finance is an unparalleled source of information dedicated to the most important issues in modern finance. Each book focuses on a specific topic in the field of finance and contains contributed chapters from both respected academics and experienced financial professionals.
Presents research on corporate governance from a number of countries across the world, including the United States, Spain, Malaysia, Israel and others. This title examines many important corporate governance mechanisms, such as board characteristics, ownership structure, legal protection of shareholders, and annual general meetings.
Numerous studies analyze the impact of ownership concentration and shareholder identity on dividend payout probabilities. In this paper, we seek to provide additional information about the importance different ownership proxies have for dividend payments. Because the importance of those proxies varies with the classification techniques applied, we use both traditional and machine learning techniques. We examine the dividend payout behavior of German issuers, which is considered rather flexible in terms of its distribution frequencies and dividend yields compared to international practice. Our sample period covers the years 2007 to 2014. Despite considerable differences in the classification techniques applied, we find that previous years' dividend payments, corporate profitability and firm size are consistently the most important firm-specific determinants of dividend payout probabilities. Only the largest shareholders with equity stakes that are either between 25% and 50% or above 50% rank among the most important variables. The impact is non-linear. When controlling for shareholders' identities, we find that both financial institutional and managerial ownership are especially important. Taking the location of institutional investors into account, only foreign financial investors influence payout probabilities.
Advances in Financial Economics Vol. 16 contains a set of empirical papers by a set of global scholars who examine corporate governance and market regulation from a variety of perspectives.
Written by an international team of authors, this book provides the first systematic account of the control of corporate Europe based on voting block data disclosed in accordance with the European Union's Large Holdings Directive (88/627/EEC). The study provides detailed information on the voting control of companies listed on the official markets in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and, as a benchmark comparison, the United States. The authors record a high concentration of control of corporations in many European countries with single blockholders frequently controlling more than fifty per cent of corporate votes. In contrast, a majority of UK listed companies have no blockholder owning more than ten per cent of shares, and a majority of US listed companies have no blockholder with more than six per cent of shares. Those chapters devoted to individual countries illustrate how blockholders can use legal devices to leverage their voting power over their cash-flow rights, or how incumbents prevent outsiders from gaining voting control. It is shown that the cultural and linguistic diversity of Europe is (almost) matched by its variety of corporate control arrangements.