Download Free The Economics Of Interdependence Book in PDF and EPUB Free Download. You can read online The Economics Of Interdependence and write the review.

Does growing economic interdependence among great powers increase or decrease the chance of conflict and war? Liberals argue that the benefits of trade give states an incentive to stay peaceful. Realists contend that trade compels states to struggle for vital raw materials and markets. Moving beyond the stale liberal-realist debate, Economic Interdependence and War lays out a dynamic theory of expectations that shows under what specific conditions interstate commerce will reduce or heighten the risk of conflict between nations. Taking a broad look at cases spanning two centuries, from the Napoleonic and Crimean wars to the more recent Cold War crises, Dale Copeland demonstrates that when leaders have positive expectations of the future trade environment, they want to remain at peace in order to secure the economic benefits that enhance long-term power. When, however, these expectations turn negative, leaders are likely to fear a loss of access to raw materials and markets, giving them more incentive to initiate crises to protect their commercial interests. The theory of trade expectations holds important implications for the understanding of Sino-American relations since 1985 and for the direction these relations will likely take over the next two decades. Economic Interdependence and War offers sweeping new insights into historical and contemporary global politics and the actual nature of democratic versus economic peace.
The claim that open trade promotes peace has sparked heated debate among scholars and policymakers for centuries. Until recently, however, this claim remained untested and largely unexplored. Economic Interdependence and International Conflict clarifies the state of current knowledge about the effects of foreign commerce on political-military relations and identifies the avenues of new research needed to improve our understanding of this relationship. The contributions to this volume offer crucial insights into the political economy of national security, the causes of war, and the politics of global economic relations. Edward D. Mansfield is Hum Rosen Professor of Political Science and Co-Director of the Christopher H. Browne Center for International Politics at the University of Pennsylvania. Brian M. Pollins is Associate Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University and a Research Fellow at the Mershon Center.
This book explores one of the most important current topics in international relations: whether trade diminishes or enhances conflict. Mark J. C. Crescenzi adopts an original perspective, arguing that the 'exit costs' confronting states - how hard it would be for them to replace the trade they are threatening to cut - determines the credibility of the threat and the effect of such trade on the likelihood of political conflict.
How globalized information networks can be used for strategic advantage Until recently, globalization was viewed, on balance, as an inherently good thing that would benefit people and societies nearly everywhere. Now there is growing concern that some countries will use their position in globalized networks to gain undue influence over other societies through their dominance of information and financial networks, a concept known as "weaponized interdependence." In exploring the conditions under which China, Russia, and the United States might be expected to weaponize control of information and manipulate the global economy, the contributors to this volume challenge scholars and practitioners to think differently about foreign economic policy, national security, and statecraft for the twenty-first century. The book addresses such questions as: What areas of the global economy are most vulnerable to unilateral control of information and financial networks? How sustainable is the use of weaponized interdependence? What are the possible responses from targeted actors? And how sustainable is the open global economy if weaponized interdependence becomes a default tool for managing international relations?
Soviet scholars have apparently stayed clear of meaningful analysis of such touchy subjects as interdependence and conflict in the relationship between economics and politics. Very little has been published on this issue—no surprise in a system that controls centrally both politics and the economy, with an emphasis on rapid economic development. The absence of meaningful Soviet research led the Federal Institute for East European and International Studies in Cologne to sponsor an international interdisciplinary conference on the subject. Contributions to the resulting book cover three main areas. The first includes the impact of traditional Russian political culture on contemporary Soviet economic thinking and behavior, the rank of economic aims in the priority system of Soviet politics, and the function of economic institutions in the implementation of political aims. The second concerns the role of political lobbies in the economy and repercussions of economic change for Soviet politics. Foreign economic relations and the USSR's foreign policy make up the third area. The concluding discussion reviews the state of international research and identifies areas for future study.
These eleven essays written over the past fifteen years continue and develop Richard Cooper's central theme of interdependence, reflecting his experience in government in the Council of Economic Advisers and as Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs. They focus in particular on the opportunities and constraints for national economic policy in an environment where goods, services, capital, and even labor are increasingly mobile. The first four chapters are informal, discursive treatments of economic and foreign policies in the face of growing interdependence among nations. The remaining chapters cover such specialist topics as optimal regional integration, the integration of world capital markets, the impact of greater interdependence on the effectiveness of domestic economic policy, the comparison of monetary and fiscal policy under fixed and flexible exchange rates, currency evaluation in developing countries, and the appropriate size and composition of a developing country's external debt. A concluding chapter surveys the preceding essays in terms of coordinating macroeconomic policymaking in an interdependent world economy. Richard N. Cooper is Maurits C. Boas Professor of International Economy at Harvard University.
"Abstract: With the rapid rise of China and the relative decline of the United States, the topic of power transition conflicts is back in popular and scholarly attention. The discipline of International Relations offers much on why violent power transition conflicts occur, yet very few substantive treatments exist on why and how peaceful changes happen in world politics. This Handbook is the first comprehensive treatment of the subject of peaceful change in International Relations. It contains some 41 chapters, all written by scholars from different theoretical and conceptual backgrounds examining the multi-faceted dimensions of this subject. In the first part, key conceptual and definitional clarifications are offered and in the second part, papers address the historical origins of peaceful change as an International Relations subject matter during the Inter-War, Cold War, and Post-Cold War eras. In the third part, each of the IR theoretical traditions and paradigms in particular Realism, liberalism, constructivism and critical perspectives and their distinct views on peaceful change are analyzed. In the fourth part papers tackle the key material, ideational and social sources of change. In the fifth part, the papers explore selected great and middle powers and their foreign policy contributions to peaceful change, realizing that many of these states have violent past or tend not to pursue peaceful policies consistently. In part six, the contributors evaluate the peaceful change that occurred in the world's key regions. In the final part, the editors address prospective research agenda and trajectories on this important subject matter. Keywords: Peaceful Change; War; Security; International Relations Theory; Sources of Change; Systemic Theory; Realism; Liberalism; Constructivism; Critical Theories"--
From biology to economics to information theory, the theme of interdependence is in the air, framing our experiences of all sorts of everyday phenomena. Indeed, the network may be the ascendant metaphor of our time. Yet precisely because the language of interdependence has become so commonplace as to be almost banal, we miss some of its most surprising and far-reaching implications. In Interdependence, biologist Kriti Sharma offers a compelling alternative to the popular view that interdependence simply means independent things interacting. Sharma systematically shows how interdependence entails the mutual constitution of one thing by another—how all things come into being only in a system of dependence on others. In a step-by-step account filled with vivid examples, Sharma shows how a coherent view of interdependence can help make sense not only of a range of everyday experiences but also of the most basic functions of living cells. With particular attention to the fundamental biological problem of how cells pick up signals from their surroundings, Sharma shows that only an account which replaces the perspective of “individual cells interacting with external environments” with one centered in interdependent, recursive systems can adequately account for how life works. This book will be of interest to biologists and philosophers, to theorists of science, of systems, and of cybernetics, and to anyone curious about how life works. Clear, concise, and insightful, Interdependence: Biology and Beyond explicitly offers a coherent and practical philosophy of interdependence and will help shape what interdependence comes to mean in the twenty-first century.
Monetary Policy in Interdependent Economies provides the first comprehensive overview of the implications of using game theory to analyze interactions among national monetary policymakers. It synthesizes the pessimistic view of sovereign policymaking that results from the analysis of one-shot games with the optimistic view derived from the analysis of quid pro quo strategies in repeated games. Good outcomes, the authors conclude, require coordination among noncooperative policymakers, and that sometimes policymakers, must be forced to cooperate. They suggest two roles for supranational institutions such as the International Monetary Fund: the IMF can provide a forum where noncooperative policymakers, can work to achieve good outcomes, and it can police agreements among cooperative policymakers Canzoneri and Henderson take clear stands on controversial issues and make recent advances in game theory accessible by using a single unified framework to explain a wide range of concepts. They begin by analyzing one-shot interactions between two policymakers, In subsequent chapters they extend their analysis to allow for more policymakers, and coalitions, for repeated interactions among policymakers, and for the possibility of time inconsistency. Matthew B. Canzoneri is Professor of Economics at Georgetown University. Dale W. Henderson is Assistant Director, Division of International Finance, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.