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[Includes 4 maps and 3 figures] This latest Leavenworth Paper is a case study in the wartime evolution of tactical doctrine. Previous publications of the Combat Studies Institute have examined the peacetime development of doctrine and have increased our knowledge of how doctrine has been applied. With the publication of Captain Lupfer’s study, “The Dynamics of Doctrine,” the Combat Studies Institute adds another dimension to the history of the processes of doctrinal change. Besides providing a summary of German infantry tactics of the First World War, this study offers insights into the crucial role of leadership in facilitating doctrinal change during battle. It once again reminds us that success in war demands extensive and vigorous training calculated to insure that field commanders understand and apply sound tactical Principles as guidelines for action and not as a substitute for good judgment. It points out the need for a timely effort in collecting and evaluating doctrinal lessons from battlefield experience. Finally, this study reminds us of yet another fundamental lesson from the past-that tendencies toward accepting the battlefield as a routine can be a deadly error. Altering previously accepted tactics in the middle of a struggle, as the author points out, is a very urgent and serious matter. As members of the Profession of Arms, we must be sensitive to the demands of change, visionary in our examination of their implications, and creative in our adaptation of combat organizations, tactics, and techniques.
Includes over 50 maps plans and illustrations. In this Research Survey, Major Timothy A. Wray provides an excellent survey of the intricacies of employing defensive tactics against a powerful opponent. Using after-action reports, unit war diaries, and other primary materials, Major Wray analyzes the doctrine and tactics that the Germans used on the Eastern Front during World War II. At the end of World War I, the Germans adopted the elastic defense in depth and continued to use it as their basic doctrine through the end of World War II. However, because of limitations caused by difficult terrain, severe weather, manpower and supply shortages, Soviet tactics, and Hitler’s order to stand fast, German commanders were unable to implement the Elastic Defense in its true form. Even so, innovative and resourceful unit commanders were able to adapt to the harsh realities of combat and improvise defensive methods that saved the German armies from complete annihilation. U.S. Army unit commanders on the future battlefield, while battling a motivated and aggressive force, will also face hard battlefield conditions. Therefore, these commanders, in applying the AirLand Battle tenets of initiative, depth, agility, and synchronization, will have to demonstrate the same type of innovativeness and resourcefulness as the Germans did in Russia. To operate on the AirLand Battlefield, U.S. soldiers must depend on sound doctrine and the ability to execute it intelligently. All Army officers will benefit from Major Wray’s new and vital assessment of how German doctrine was modified by the test of war.
A comprehensive, illustrated history of World War I, its causes, impact on global politics and economy, military and political strategies, and the legacy it left behind.
Includes The Americans in the First World War Illustration Pack - 57 photos/illustrations and 10 maps The analysis of the impact of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) in the Great War has fallen into two competing camps. The first believes that the AEF was the war winning factor in coalition warfare. The opposite view holds that the AEF itself had no true impact, but rather it was the industrial might and the manpower potential of the United States (US) that was the key element to victory. The caveat to both views was that the AEF did not have enough time in combat to truly show its martial ability. This thesis attempts to analyze the combat effectiveness of the AEF by comparing its experience with that of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) in 1916. The rate of change in the ability of the AEF to adapt to modern warfare will be shown to be slightly higher than that of the BEF of 1916. By November 1918, the AEF was not completely tactically combat effective, but it had dramatically improved from where it started and clearly demonstrated the potential to continue to improve at the same pace.
This study investigates the German spring offensive of 1918 to determine how the Germans achieved tactical success, yet failed to reach their strategic objective. The study covers the development of new German infantry tactics during limited offensive operations and conduct of the “elastic defense” on the western front It investigates the development of artillery tactics on the eastern front, and the incorporation of these artillery and infantry tactics into larger scale offensives at Caporetto. The study describes the preparation of both the infantry and artillery units for the “Michael” offensive. The relationship between the infantry and artillery tactics combined with the British defense is the key to determine the causes for success and failure. The German tactical system used in “Operation Michael” was a brilliant adaptation to the lethality of the World War I battlefield. The German techniques were superb tools for conducting a breakthrough of a defensive zone. However, the lack of German mobility following the breakthrough foiled the German strategic goal to envelop the British Army. German techniques and lessons learned in this offensive have direct application to U.S. Army infiltration doctrine.
This thesis will use a comparative study of the German Storm trooper battalions and the Canadian trench raiders in order to examine the dynamics of the World War I battlefield, the role of military culture in adaptation in order to acknowledge and act on the requirements of battlefield innovation. The purpose is to determine what key factors contributed to the tactical effectiveness of specialized assault units on the Western Front. The military cultures of these armies comprised the logical and innovative principles that were fundamental in the tactical effectiveness of these elite assault units by making revolutionary developments in force structure, institutional support, personnel selection, decentralized leadership, and training on small-unit tactics and advanced weaponry. Did these tactics create similar or different effects for each army? What factors did these armies use to organize and employ these assault units? To answer these questions, several areas will be examined: (1) force structure, (2) institutional support, (3) personnel selection, and (4) training on decentralized leadership, small unit infiltration tactics, and advanced weaponry. Both armies had different backgrounds and situations. The German Army’s Sturm battalions represented an army-wide institutionalization of organization, selection and technique. The Canadian Corps’ trench raiders were based on the Canadian Corps’ homogeneous structure that separated itself from the BEF in developing its own doctrine, training schools, organization, and tactical innovations.
The new edition of The Cambridge Illustrated History of Warfare offers an updated comprehensive account of Western warfare, from its origins in Classical Greece and Rome, through the Middle Ages and the early modern period, down to the wars of the twenty-first century in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria.
During the First World War, the British army's most consistent German opponent was Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria. Commanding more than a million men as a General, and then Field Marshal, in the Imperial German Army, he held off the attacks of the British Expeditionary Force under Sir John French and then Sir Douglas Haig for four long years. But Rupprecht was to lose not only the war, but his son and his throne. In Haig's Enemy, Jonathan Boff explores the tragic tale of Rupprecht's war--the story of a man caught under the wheels of modern industrial warfare. Providing a fresh viewpoint on the history of the Western Front, Boff draws on extensive research in the German archives to offer a history of the First World War from the other side of the barbed wire. He revises conventional explanations of why the Germans lost with an in-depth analysis of the nature of command, and of the institutional development of the British, French, and German armies as modern warfare was born. Using Rupprecht's own diaries and letters, many of them never before published, Haig's Enemy views the Great War through the eyes of one of Germany's leading generals, shedding new light on many of the controversies of the Western Front. The picture which emerges is far removed from the sterile stalemate of myth. Instead, Boff re-draws the Western Front as a highly dynamic battlespace, both physical and intellectual, where three armies struggled not only to out-fight, but also to out-think, their enemy. The consequences of falling behind in the race to adapt would be more terrible than ever imagined.
Historians have portrayed British participation in World War I as a series of tragic debacles, with lines of men mown down by machine guns, with untried new military technology, and incompetent generals who threw their troops into improvised and unsuccessful attacks. In this book a renowned military historian studies the evolution of British infantry tactics during the war and challenges this interpretation, showing that while the British army's plans and technologies failed persistently during the improvised first half of the war, the army gradually improved its technique, technology, and, eventually, its' self-assurance. By the time of its successful sustained offensive in the fall of 1918, says Paddy Griffith, the British army was demonstrating a battlefield skill and mobility that would rarely be surpassed even during World War II. Evaluating the great gap that exists between theory and practice, between textbook and bullet-swept mudfield, Griffith argues that many battles were carefully planned to exploit advanced tactics and to avoid casualties, but that breakthrough was simply impossible under the conditions of the time. According to Griffith, the British were already masters of "storm troop tactics" by the end of 1916, and in several important respects were further ahead than the Germans would be even in 1918. In fields such as the timing and orchestration of all-arms assaults, predicted artillery fire, "Commando-style" trench raiding, the use of light machine guns, or the barrage fire of heavy machine guns, the British led the world. Although British generals were not military geniuses, says Griffith, they should at least be credited for effectively inventing much of the twentieth-century's art of war.
For decades, military historians have argued that the introduction of the rifle musket-with a range five times longer than that of the smoothbore musket-made the shoulder-to-shoulder formations of linear tactics obsolete. Author Earl J. Hess challenges this deeply entrenched assumption. He contends that long-range rifle fire did not dominate Civil War battlefields or dramatically alter the course of the conflict because soldiers had neither the training nor the desire to take advantage of the musket rifle's increased range. Drawing on the drill manuals available to officers and a close reading of battle reports, Civil War Infantry Tactics demonstrates that linear tactics provided the best formations and maneuvers to use with the single-shot musket, whether rifle or smoothbore. The linear system was far from an outdated relic that led to higher casualties and prolonged the war. Indeed, regimental officers on both sides of the conflict found the formations and maneuvers in use since the era of the French Revolution to be indispensable to the survival of their units on the battlefield. The training soldiers received in this system, combined with their extensive experience in combat, allowed small units a high level of articulation and effectiveness. Unlike much military history that focuses on grand strategies, Hess zeroes in on formations and maneuvers (or primary tactics), describing their purpose and usefulness in regimental case studies, and pinpointing which of them were favorites of unit commanders in the field. The Civil War was the last conflict in North America to see widespread use of the linear tactical system, and Hess convincingly argues that the war also saw the most effective tactical performance yet in America's short history.