Download Free The Dilemma Of Toxic Substance Regulation Book in PDF and EPUB Free Download. You can read online The Dilemma Of Toxic Substance Regulation and write the review.

In this provocative study, John Mendeloff shows that federal programs which set standards for toxic substances have twin dilemmas. The new standards that they establish are usually too strict and costly to justify the benefits they confer. But, at the same time, the slow pace of standard-setting means that many serious hazards are never addressed at all. Mendeloff argues that more extensive, but less strict, rulemaking could make both industry and workers better off and that changes in legislation are required to break the current stalemate. Mendeloff looks at workplace risks regulated, and not regulated, by OSHA. He discusses the thorny issue of how much our society should value the prevention of occupational disease deaths. His innovative investigation of "underregulation" brings together diverse data to show that moderate reductions in current exposure levels would often be beneficial. Regulating Toxic Substancesmakes a major contribution to our understanding of how regulation works by demonstrating that the strictness with which standards are set is a major cause of the slow pace. Administrative rulemaking procedures offer opportunities for those concerned about the reasonableness of standards - judges and other public officials, as well as the affected industries - to try to block or delay them. An important implication is that less strict standards would not necessarily reduce overall protection and might increase it. In a major discussion of regulatory reform, Mendeloff analyzes such alternatives to standard-setting as information and liability strategies and such generic changes in regulatory procedures as regulatory budget and regulatory negotiation. Finding that neither provides a sufficient response to the overregulation-underregulation problem, he proposes a three-step legislative package that could be applied at OSHA and other standard-setting agencies. John Mendeloff is a policy analyst affiliated with the Program in Science, Technology, and Public Affairs at the University of California, San Diego. This book is seventeenth in the series Regulation of Economic Activity, edited by Richard Schmalensee.
The number of substances potentially dangerous to our health and environment is constantly increasing. The papers in this volume examine the concurrent rise of pollutants and the regulations designed to police their use.
This casebook provides a political, economic, and scientific context for toxic substance and hazardous waste law, along with key toxics statutes. The text of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act; the Toxic Substances Control Act; and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act are included, and different approaches to toxics regulation are suggested.
Justice requires that we tolerate the chance of such errors and that we resist the temptation to demand the most science intensive evaluation of each substance in order to protect individuals better from mistakes of undercompensation and underregulation. The role of science in the control of toxic substances is an important public philosophical issue, yet until now has received little discussion by philosophers. Regulating Toxic Substances addresses this subject in a way that speaks both to a well-informed public and to experts in several disciplines, including philosophy, risk assessment, environmental and tort law, environmental studies, and public health policy.
The Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) creates an adverse selection problem with regard to the manufacture of chemicals since neither the testing of chemicals nor the production of safer chemicals is generally required or rewarded by the regulatory system. As a result, better tested and safer chemicals enjoy few, if any competitive benefits in the marketplace. At the same time, the adverse selection created by existing regulation is locked into place by a strong political block of manufacturers who enjoy the benefits of under-regulation and the lower chance of penalties in the market and through tort litigation. To address this intransigent problem, I propose a competition-based mechanism for generating incentives for testing and chemical safety through an adjudication process by which manufacturers can petition EPA to have their chemicals certified as superior to inferior chemicals or chemical mixtures. If a competitor establishes there are measurable and significant differences between their product and a competitor product with regard to health or environmental consequences, EPA may not only certify this environmental superiority relative to the inferior chemical through its labeling authorities, but in some cases might restrict the use of the inferior chemical or even ban it entirely. After considering how a competition-based approach to toxic substances regulation could work under TSCA, I conclude by considering how this approach applies to other problematic areas of toxics regulation, including the regulation of pesticides, nanotechnology, drug, and other pollution control problems.
Assessment of New Chemical Regulation Under the Toxic Substances Control Act