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The current and future roles, missions, and capabilities of U.S. military land power: hearing before the Subcommittee on Airland of the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, One Hundred Eleventh Congress, first session, March 26, 2009.
The current and future roles, missions, and capabilities of U.S. military land power: hearing before the Subcommittee on Airland of the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, One Hundred Eleventh Congress, first session, March 26, 2009.
Divisive debates over the future force structures of the U.S. Armed Forces have continued despite the Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions for the Armed Forces (May 1995) and the more recent reports of the Quadrennial Defense Review (May 1997) and the National Defense Panel (December 1997). Part of the reason for the bitter nature of these debates is due to parochial partisanship. Part is due to a lack of clear understanding of the individual components of military power or of their collective interrelationships. This latter conclusion may be particularly true for land power. Responsibility for this misunderstanding does not always fall at the feet of outside observers. No official definition or general articulation of land power currently exists. And, because land power is self-evident to most who wear Army or Marine Corps green, they see little need to explain land power to a broader audience. But, if national leaders are to have a fuller under- standing of land power, its central role in the growing interdependence of military power, or the policy options that land power's versatility brings to security policy planning and execution, then such explanations are imperative. To help fill this conceptual gap, the author offers a definition of land power to meet the demands of the 21st century. While defining land power is his primary purpose, he also places land power within the overarching context of total military power. Additionally, he highlights the growing interdependence among the components of national power.
The U.S. military does not believe its soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines should be engaged in combat with adversaries on a "level playing field." Our combat individuals enter engagements to win. To that end, the United States has used its technical prowess and industrial capability to develop decisive weapons that overmatch those of potential enemies. In its current engagement-what has been identified as an "era of persistent conflict"- the nation's most important weapon is the dismounted soldier operating in small units. Today's soldier must be prepared to contend with both regular and irregular adversaries. Results in Iraq and Afghanistan show that, while the U.S. soldier is a formidable fighter, the contemporary suite of equipment and support does not afford the same high degree of overmatch capability exhibited by large weapons platforms-yet it is the soldier who ultimately will play the decisive role in restoring stability. Making the Soldier Decisive on Future Battlefields establishes the technical requirements for overmatch capability for dismounted soldiers operating individually or in small units. It prescribes technological and organizational capabilities needed to make the dismounted soldier a decisive weapon in a changing, uncertain, and complex future environment and provides the Army with 15 recommendations on how to focus its efforts to enable the soldier and tactical small unit (TSU) to achieve overmatch.
The Department of Defense (DoD) cannot long ignore the inadequacy of much of the current force for nontraditional challenges lurking on the strategic horizon. In the face of the next large scale unconventional challenge when the President turns to the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) for options, the SecDef must have the right force available to respond effectively. Senior landpower leaders in particular should reorient on a new unconventional balance point for force optimization. They should anticipate that there will be changes in the U.S. approach to defenserelevant and defense-specific challenges around the world. As a consequence, they should act proactively to help the SecDef identify and build capabilities for the new balance point during the upcoming Quadrennial Defense Review. Doing so will enable DoD to better account for contemporary strategic conditions with minimum future institutional disruption. This monograph arrives at the following conclusions. * The contemporary strategic environment is marked by a new unconventional status quo. Four characteristics define this new normal. First, unconventional threats of "purpose" and "context" dominate the defense operating space. Second, internal and external threats to foreign interests will commingle in future land-centric contingencies. Third, hybrid combinations of purposeful and contextual threats will be commonplace. And, finally, fourth, traditional military power-employed in isolation-will be increasingly less useful. Combined, these indicate that "fighting and winning America's wars" will mean something quite different to senior land force leaders in the future. U.S. landpower fulfils two roles in this new unconventional operating space. It delivers decisive lethal and nonlethal military effects and enables effective employment of important nonmilitary capabilities and resources like aid, development assistance, consequence management, and preliminary reconstruction. * Armed stabilization may be the next most common and most important major combat operation (MCO) for DoD land forces. More broadly among the many targets available for land force optimization in the coming years, the most prudent course is one that pursues an unconventional revolution in mission and capabilities.
Though the end of the Cold War brought a decrease in the likelihood of global war and significant reductions in U.S. military force levels, demands placed on remaining American military forces increased rather than subsided. Over the past decade, American political leaders have used military forces much more frequently to achieve national policy objectives. Most of the post-Cold War deployments fall under the general heading of smaller-scale contingencies (SSCs), but their cumulative effect has placed considerable burdens on the Army, in particular. In this study, Dr. Conrad Crane analyzes the role of land-power in the 170 SSCs conducted during the last decade. He disaggregates such contingencies into engagement, enhanced deterrence, hostility, and stabilization phases, and discusses the military's role in each one. Though cruise missiles and aircraft have been the primary policy tool for actual hostilities, the Army has been the predominant service in the other phases, especially for stabilization. He points out that no major foreign policy objectives have been achieved from major theater deployments during the last decade without some form of significant long-term Army involvement in the region after the crisis has been resolved. Nonetheless, there have been many flaws in the Army's performance during the stabilization phase of these SSCs. Using historical examples and unit after-action reports, Dr. Crane points out recurring problems in planning, execution, and force structure for such missions. He concludes that despite the desires of American leaders to limit the nation-building involvement of the troops they deploy, the capability mismatch between military and civilian organizations, combined with the require-ments of peace operations and character of American soldiers, makes such a result unavoidable. He argues that the Army iii especially needs to accept some degree of nation-building as its mission, and adapt its force structure, training, and planning accordingly. He also presents some other recommendations to enhance further the Army's ability to meet the full spectrum of future challenges it will face. There is much in this study to support the current program for Army Transformation, as well as to present a case for a larger active force structure, especially for combat support and combat service support. Dr. Crane's analysis and recommendations also merit examination as part of the Quadrennial Defense Review process. Statistical analysis of the period since America became the world's lone superpower suggests that its armed forces will face an increasing number of SSCs. The services will have to find a way to accomplish these most-likely missions while still retaining full ability to win those major wars that remain the most dangerous threat to national security.
Since the previous National Military Strategy (2011_, global disorder has significantly increased while some of our comparative military advantage has begun to erode. We now face multiple, simultaneous security challenges from traditional state actors and transregional networks of sub-state groups -- all taking advantage of rapid technological change. This 2015 National Military Strategy describes how the U.S. will employ our military forces to protect and advance our national interests. We must be able to rapidly adapt to new threats while maintaining comparative advantage over traditional ones. Future conflicts will come more rapidly, last longer, and take place on a much more technically challenging battlefield. Success will increasingly depend on how well our military instrument can support the other instruments of power and enable our network of allies and partners. Figures. This is a print on demand report.