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The suspension and cancellation of a number of key armoured vehicle projects since the 1998 defence review has resulted in the Armed Forces facing a significant shortage in the principal armoured vehicles they require, until at least 2024-2025. Despite the commitment of considerable resources, since 1998, the Ministry of Defence (MOD) has received only a fraction of the armoured vehicles it has set out to buy through its standard acquisition process. The MOD's reluctance to compromise in setting technologically demanding requirements under its standard acquisition process has put the timely and cost-effective delivery of the equipment at risk. Unwieldy procurement processes have not coped well with rapid changes to equipment requirements in the light of operational experience, resulting in a number of armoured vehicle projects being delayed or abandoned. Projects have also suffered from unstable budgets and continual changes to financial plans, with a cycle of unrealistic planning followed by cost overruns. Spending to date includes £321 million on cancelled or suspended projects and a further £397 million funding on-going, but delayed, projects. To address shortfalls in equipment for current operations, such as in Afghanistan, the MOD has placed greater reliance on the Urgent Operational Requirements (UORs) since 2003, at an additional cost of £2.8 billion. This has been more successful and has significantly improved protection levels for UK forces against today's threats but it is not a sustainable substitute for the standard acquisition process.
Armoured vehicles such as tanks, reconnaissance and personnel-carrying vehicles are essential for a wide range of military tasks. Since the 1998 Strategic Defence Review, the Ministry of Defence has attempted to acquire the vehicles it needs through a number of procurement projects. However, none of the principal armoured vehicles it requires have yet been delivered, despite the MoD spending £1.1 billion since 1998, including £321 million wasted on cancelled or suspended projects. As a result there will be gaps in capability until at least 2025, making it more difficult to undertake essential tasks such as battlefield reconnaissance. Partly as a result of this £1.1 billion failure to yet deliver any armoured vehicles, and to meet the specific military demands of operating in Iraq and Afghanistan, the MoD was provided with a further £2.8 billion from the Treasury Reserve to buy Urgent Operational Requirements (UOR) vehicles. Over the past six years, the Department has removed £10.8 billion from armoured vehicle budgets up to 2021. This has left £5.5 billion available for the next ten years, which is insufficient to deliver all of the armoured vehicle programmes which are planned. The MoD needs to be clearer about its priorities, and stop raiding the armoured vehicles chest every time it needs to make savings across the defence budget. It will also need to set more realistic requirements in future if it is to deliver projects on time and to budget. The Committee expressed concern that the Department was unable to identify anyone who has been held to account for the clear delivery failures. Further, the MoD has yet to balance its defence budget fully and devise a plan to close capability gaps, despite having conducted the SDSR and two subsequent planning exercises. It needs to determine its armoured vehicle equipment priorities and deliver these as rapidly and cost-effectively as possible, including making an assessment of which of its existing vehicles should be retained after combat operations in Afghanistan cease.
Examines the British, French, and German armies’ approaches to accommodating significant budget cuts while attempting to sustain their commitment to full spectrum operations. Specifically, it looks at the choices these armies are making with respect to how they spend dwindling resources: What force structure do they identify as optimal? How much readiness do they regard as necessary? Which capabilities are they abandoning?
BBC's efficiency Programme : Seventy-third report of session 2010-12, report, together with formal minutes, oral and written Evidence
Dwight D. Eisenhower once quipped, “You will not find it difficult to prove that battles, campaigns, and even wars have been won or lost primarily because of logistics.” Military acquisition and procurement—that is, how a nation manages investments, technologies, programs, and support—is critical to wartime success or failure. When unexpected battlefield problems arise, how do the government, the military, and industry work together to ensure effective solutions? During the American counterinsurgent campaign in Iraq, the improvised explosive device emerged as a disruptive and devastating threat. As Humvees, and their occupants, were ripped apart by IEDs, it was clear that new solutions had to be found. These solutions already existed but had not been procured, highlighting the need for more effective marketing to the military by industry. The ultimate successful response—the mine-resistant, ambush-protected vehicle, or MRAP—required years of entrepreneurial marketing by the defense industry. In Securing the MRAP: Lessons Learned in Marketing and Military Procurement, James Hasik explores how these vehicles, which the American military mostly rejected despite the great need for them, eventually came to be adopted as the Pentagon’s top procurement priority. Hasik traces the story of the MRAP from the early 1970s to the future of mine-resistant vehicles on the battlefields of tomorrow. An important contribution to the seemingly disparate fields of marketing and defense policy, Securing the MRAP is an eye-opening revelation to defense industrialists, military officers, and government officials who want to understand how to avoid another IED-Humvee debacle.
This report assesses the Ministry of Defence's performance in managing the supply chain to front line troops. The MoD rightly puts a strong emphasis on ensuring troops get the supplies they need. Equally, providing an efficient supply chain would release resources for the front line. The Committee believes there should be greater emphasis on securing value for money and that there is room for it to find efficiencies in the supply chain without jeopardising operational effectiveness. Previous reports have identified persistent problems with late deliveries, unnecessary costs and missed targets. At present, the MoD does not have the information to identify where savings could be made. It does not know the full costs of its current activities or the cost of alternative supply options. The failure to collect basic data about where supplies are stored has directly contributed to the MoD accounts being qualified for three consecutive years. The MoD is now seeking to resolve these information problems through a major initiative known as the Future Logistics Information Services project, expected to be implemented by 2014. Until then, the Department will continue to store data in systems that are at critical risk of failure. It is vital that the MOD sustains its programme in order to secure value for money. Measures which could improve the efficiency of supply operations include putting more pressure on suppliers to deliver on time, keeping stocks at lower levels to reduce the risk of them deteriorating, and benchmarking performance against relevant comparators such as other armed forces.
The National Audit Office report on this topic published as HC 1788, session 2010-12 (ISBN 9780102975376)
This book is about risk conceptions, experiences and reflections. It applies the concept of the risk triangle, with its societal, organisational and personal angles, to two areas of inquiry: financial markets and the military, seeking to demonstrate the challenges, dilemmas and, in many ways, also the impossibilities of risk analysis and risk management. Drawing on empirical and micro- and macro-level analysis, this innovative work will appeal to students of political science, economics and business as well as to risk professionals and risk-takers.
As part of the 2010 Spending Review the government announced a significant reduction in the budget of the Department for Transport, with spending due to be 15% lower by 2014-15, in real terms, than the Department's £12.8 billion budget in 2010-11. The Department prepared early, identifying areas for budget reductions based on good analysis. But for road users, railway passengers and taxpayers, there are many questions which remain unanswered. The Department doesn't fully understand the impact of its cuts to road maintenance. There is concern that short-term budget cutting could prove counter-productive, costing more in the long-term as a result of increased vehicle damage and the higher cost of repairing the more severe road damage. Another area of concern is rail spending. The Department spends two-thirds of its budget through third party organisations such as Network Rail and Transport for London. While information and assurance have improved over some third party spending, there is still a lack of proper accountability and transparency for Network Rail. Rail budgets aren't being reduced as much as other areas, yet passengers still face high fares. The Department hands Network Rail over £3 billion each year, underwrites debt of over £25 billion and continues to treat it as a private sector company. The National Audit Office must be allowed full audit access as quickly as possible.. Better contingency plans for dealing with threats to its planned budget reductions also need to be developed - for example if some of its planned efficiency savings do not deliver or if inflation is higher than forecast
Around half of all children in the UK from separated families are being brought up in poverty. In 2010-11 the Child Maintenance and Enforcement Commission collected and transferred £1.1 billion to parents caring for more than 880,000 children. Nevertheless significant, all too familiar and recurring challenges remain: parents are frustrated with the standard of support received from the Commission. Maintenance payments totalling some £3.7 billion are outstanding, but the Commission estimates that only £1 billion of this is collectable; and costs remain high. The Commission also faces further significant challenges in introducing its new child maintenance scheme. In particular, it will need to respond to substantial cost reductions and successfully implement a new system of charging fees to parents who choose to use the Commission's services. The Commission needs to deliver acceptable standards of service at a reasonable cost. The new child maintenance scheme should improve efficiency, but further changes are needed to streamline existing processes. The Commission has to deliver cost reductions of £117 million by 2014-15 and its plans are currently £16 million short of this target. Its cost reduction plans depend in part on a new IT system which is already late. To meet the current timetable critical testing will have to be undertaken in parallel with development work, mirroring poor practices that have contributed to the failure of a number of government IT projects. Each month of delay will increase the Commission's costs by at least £3 million and may delay planned income from fees.