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Contrary to what is often reported in history books, the Morgenthau Plan was a major element in postwar planning led by Washington, before the war was even over. This book traces the roles played by Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Secretary of the Treasury to President Roosevelt, and his assistant Harry Dexter White, in the planning for the postwar world. Close attention is given to the discussions leading up to the Second Quebec Conference in 1944 where Winston Churchill's acceptance of the plan was obtained. It is clear that the effects of the policy were understood in advance. The book follows the devastating consequences of the policies based on the plan and their contribution to the postwar collapse of the European economy. Damning evidence shows that the Allies intentionally brought starvation and disease to large civilian populations, while condemning millions of Germans to slave labor in neighboring countries and knowingly sending surrendered Russians to be sent back home for certain execution. The motives of revisionist historians are suspect, as they should be. It is obvious that the conclusions that can be drawn from this account could be abused. They could be used to condemn all Americans for the policies of some of their leaders. They could also be used by people trying to justify the behavior of the National Socialists or by anti-Semites. However, it should be pointed out that the American people paid an extremely high price for their Secretary of Treasurys interference in foreign affairs. It should also be pointed out that one of the severest critics of Western postwar policy was the Jewish publicist Victor Gollancz. This account is based primarily on unclassified information that has been available to the public for decades. Although many accounts of the Morgenthau Plan accept the euphemisms, understatements and outright fabrications offered by the individuals concerned, this account will demonstrate that it was not impossible for a conscientious researcher to uncover a more accurate picture of the truth. However, most scholars have decided to accept at face value statements that on close inspection are obviously false. Some of these misstatements concerning the Morgenthau Plan are understandable. It is less understandable when a respected biographer like Robert E. Sherwood intentionally distorts the historical record. The contradictions between what really happened and what Americans believe and have been told are manifold. It is ironic that Nazis who committed the most terrible crimes frequently received more humane treatment at the hands of the Allies than Germans who had opposed Nationalist Socialism. It is also striking to note the evidence that key individuals had Communist leanings, and it was the Soviet Union that benefited most from the Morgenthau Plan. Many of the subjects dealt with in this manuscript are fertile ground for a researcher wanting to make a name for himself. They are nearly virgin territory. Why have so many of these subjects been treated as taboo? When will our historians feel free to explore the implications that America's progressive establishment was frequently in alignment with Communist goals?
"The best biography of a crucial figure at pivotal moment in American history since Robert E. Sherwood's Pulitzer Prize-winning 1948 classic, Roosevelt and Hopkins." --Steven Casey, author of Cautious Crusade: Franklin D. Roosevelt, American Public Opinion and the War against Nazi Germany, 1941-1945
The Middle Power Project describes a defining period of Canadian and international history. During the Second World War, Canada transformed itself from British dominion to self-proclaimed middle power. It became an active, enthusiastic, and idealistic participant in the creation of one of the longest lasting global institutions of recent times – the United Nations. This was, in many historians’ opinions, the beginning of a golden age in Canadian diplomacy. Chapnick suggests that the golden age may not have been so lustrous. During the UN negotiations, Canadian policymakers were more cautious than idealistic. The civil service was inexperienced and often internally divided. Canada’s significant contributions were generally limited to the much neglected economic and social fields. Nevertheless, creating the UN changed what it meant to be Canadian. Rightly or wrongly, from the establishment of the UN onwards, Canadians would see themselves as leading internationalists. Based on materials not previously available to Canadian scholars, The Middle Power Project presents a critical reassessment of the traditional and widely accepted account of Canada’s role and interests in the formation of the United Nations. It will be be read carefully by historians and political scientists, and will be appreciated by general readers with an interest in Canadian and international history.
Since the original publication of this classic book in 1979, Roosevelt's foreign policy has come under attack on three main points: Was Roosevelt responsible for the confrontation with Japan that led to the attack at Pearl Harbor? Did Roosevelt "give away" Eastern Europe to Stalin and the U.S.S.R. at Yalta? And, most significantly, did Roosevelt abandon Europe's Jews to the Holocaust, making no direct effort to aid them? In a new Afterword to his definitive history, Dallek vigorously and brilliantly defends Roosevelt's policy. He emphasizes how Roosevelt operated as a master politician in maintaining a national consensus for his foreign policy throughout his presidency and how he brilliantly achieved his policy and military goals.
James McAllister outlines a new account of early Cold War history, one that focuses on the emergence of a bipolar structure of power, the continuing importance of the German question, and American efforts to create a united Western Europe. Challenging the conventional wisdom among both international relations theorists and Cold War historians, McAllister argues that America's central objective from the Second World War to the mid-1950s was to create a European order that could be peaceful and stable without requiring the permanent presence of American ground forces on the continent.The permanent presence of American forces in Europe is often seen as a lesson that policymakers drew from the disastrous experiences of two world wars, but McAllister's archival research reveals that both FDR and Eisenhower, as well as influential strategists such as George Kennan, did not draw this lesson. In the short term, American power was necessary to balance the Soviet Union and reassure Western Europe about the revival of German power, but America's long-term objective was to create the conditions under which Western Europe could take care of both of these problems on their own.In the author's view, the key element of this strategy was the creation of the European Defense Community. If Western Germany could be successfully integrated and rearmed within the context of the EDC, Western Europe would have taken the most important step to becoming a superpower on par with the United States and the Soviet Union. Understanding why this strategy was pursued and why it failed, McAllister asserts, has important implications for both international relations theory and contemporary questions of American foreign policy.
Ronald E. Powaski offers the first complete, accessible history of the events, forces, and factors that have brought the world to the brink of a nuclear holocaust. He traces the evolution of the nuclear arms race from FDR's decision to develop an atomic bomb to Reagan's decision to continue its expansion in the 1980's. Focusing on the forces that have propelled the arms race and the reasons behind the repeated failures to check the proliferation of nuclear weapons, Powaski discusses such topics as the Manhattan Project, the decision to drop the bomb on Hiroshima, the debate over whether to share atomic information, the effect of nuclear weapons on U.S. military and foreign policy, and the role of these weapons in arms control negotiations in the last five presidential administrations.
America's struggle against Nazism is one of the few aspects of World War II that has escaped controversy. Historians agree that it was a widely popular war, different from the subsequent conflicts in Korea and Vietnam because of the absence of partisan sniping, ebbing morale, or calls for a negotiated peace. In this provocative book, Steven Casey challenges conventional wisdom about America's participation in World War II. Drawing on the numerous opinion polls and surveys conducted by the U.S. government, he traces the development of elite and mass attitudes toward Germany, from the early days of the war up to its conclusion. Casey persuasively argues that the president and the public rarely saw eye to eye on the nature of the enemy, the threat it posed, or the best methods for countering it. He describes the extensive propaganda campaign that Roosevelt designed to build support for the war effort, and shows that Roosevelt had to take public opinion into account when formulating a host of policies, from the Allied bombing campaign to the Morgenthau plan to pastoralize the Third Reich. By examining the previously unrecognized relationship between public opinion and policy making during World War II, Casey's groundbreaking book sheds new light on a crucial era in American history.
The description for this book, Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation, will be forthcoming.