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This book draws together the seminal contributions to the literature on the nature of macroeconomics in open economies and illuminates the material. This is an essential guide to the subject for students.
A theoretical and empirical examination of why political institutions and organizations matter in economic growth.
Given today’s heightened competition between national economies in the global marketplace, many have come to believe that government intervention is needed in order for a country to maximize its economic well-being. But to what extent can even the most capable government act to attract investment and enhance economic growth without creating or exacerbating conflicts in society—especially when unpopular measures, such as those aimed at controlling inflation and population growth, must be implemented? This timely book by an international team of economists and political scientists tackles that question head on. The contributors draw on theory and empirical data to provide a framework for measuring governments’ ability to gather material resources and mobilize populations. They analyze a variety of policy choices made in the United States and in other nations arond the world during the past fifty years, showing how states can increase their political capacity and thereby reduce economic transaction costs and domestic resistance to government goals.
Originally, economics was called political economy, and those studying it readily accepted that economic decisions are made in a political world. But economics eventually separated itself from politics to pursue rigorous methods of analyzing individual behavior and markets. Recently, an increasing number of economists have turned their attention to the old question of how politics shape economic outcomes. To date, however, this growing literature has lacked a cogent organization and a unified approach. Here, in the first full-length examination of how political forces affect economic policy decisions, Allan Drazen provides a systematic treatment, organizing the increasingly influential "new political economy" as a more established field at the highly productive intersection of economics and political science. Although he provides an extraordinarily helpful guide to the recent explosion of papers on political economy in macroeconomics, Drazen moves far beyond survey, giving definition and structure to the field. He proposes that conflict or heterogeneity of interests should be the field's essential organizing principle, because political questions arise only when people disagree over which economic policies should be enacted or how economic costs and benefits should be distributed. Further, he illustrates how heterogeneity of interests is crucial in every part of political economy. Drazen's approach allows innovative treatment--using rigorous economic models--of public goods and finance, economic growth, the open economy, economic transition, political business cycles, and all of the traditional topics of macroeconomics. This major text will have an enormous impact on students and professionals in political science as well as economics, redefining how decision makers on several continents think about the full range of macroeconomic issues and informing the approaches of the next generation of economists.
Robert Mundell's pioneering theory of optimum currency areas is revisited, with experts from the IMF, the BIS, the European Investment Bank, academia, European think tanks, and the Bank of Israel looking at its current practical applications, especially in the context of the forthcoming European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Robert Mundell himself offers an update to help in assessing the implications and consequences of EMU.
The traditional assumption holds that the territory of money coincides precisely with the political frontiers of each nation state: France has the franc, the United Kingdom has the pound, the United States has the dollar. But the disparity between that simple mental landscape and the actual organization of currency spaces has grown in recent years, as territorial boundaries of individual states limit currency circulation less and less. Many currencies are used outside their "home" country for transactions either between nations or within foreign states. In this book, Benjamin J. Cohen asks what this new geography of money reveals about financial and political power. Cohen shows how recent changes in the geography of money challenge state sovereignty. He examines the role of money and the scope of cross-border currency competition in today's world. Drawing on new work in geography and network theory to explain the new spatial organization of monetary relations, Cohen suggests that international relations, political as well as economic, are being dramatically reshaped by the increasing interpenetration of national monetary spaces. This process, he explains, generates tensions and insecurities as well as opportunities for cooperation.
Presented in this volume are analytical papers by leading academics on the consequences of regulatory reform in the 1992-process on financial markets and institutions, as well as on macro-economic adjustment and the scope of monetary and fiscal policy after 1992. Also included are policy-oriented papers by economists in academic and policy-making authorities which discuss potential policy conflicts within the EC and between the EC, EFTA, the US, Japan and Eastern Europe as a result of financial liberalization and monetary integration following 1992.The volume focuses on developments in financial markets as crucial for financial and industrial restructuring, as well as for prospects for a monetary union. Analytical papers form the basis for broader policy oriented discussion of potential policy conflicts among industrialized countries, as well as of prospects for currency reform in the Eastern block.
One of the most striking macroeconomic developments during the last three decades is the rise and persistence of large fiscal deficits in a number of countries. Despite recent major fiscal reforms around the world, many countries suffer from recurrent large fiscal imbalances that often reflect lack of fiscal discipline. Why do some countries have recurrent fiscal deficit or volatility problems, while others do not? What factors are most important in explaining cross-country variation in fiscal outcomes? How are they related to growth or inflation? This book presents new, rigorous, theoretical and empirical studies on these fiscal issues, and highlights social polarization as an essential organizing principle in a political economy approach. Also, it discusses how institutional constraints may favourably affect fiscal dynamics in the presence of social polarization.
In this book, Federico Sturzenegger and Mariano Tommasi propose formal models to answer some of the questions raised by the recent reform experience of many Latin American and eastern European countries.