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A new and urgently needed guide to making the American economy more competitive at a time when tech giants have amassed vast market power. The U.S. economy is growing less competitive. Large businesses increasingly profit by taking advantage of their customers and suppliers. These firms can also use sophisticated pricing algorithms and customer data to secure substantial and persistent advantages over smaller players. In our new Gilded Age, the likes of Google and Amazon fill the roles of Standard Oil and U.S. Steel. Jonathan Baker shows how business practices harming competition manage to go unchecked. The law has fallen behind technology, but that is not the only problem. Inspired by Robert Bork, Richard Posner, and the “Chicago school,” the Supreme Court has, since the Reagan years, steadily eroded the protections of antitrust. The Antitrust Paradigm demonstrates that Chicago-style reforms intended to unleash competitive enterprise have instead inflated market power, harming the welfare of workers and consumers, squelching innovation, and reducing overall economic growth. Baker identifies the errors in economic arguments for staying the course and advocates for a middle path between laissez-faire and forced deconcentration: the revival of pro-competitive economic regulation, of which antitrust has long been the backbone. Drawing on the latest in empirical and theoretical economics to defend the benefits of antitrust, Baker shows how enforcement and jurisprudence can be updated for the high-tech economy. His prescription is straightforward. The sooner courts and the antitrust enforcement agencies stop listening to the Chicago school and start paying attention to modern economics, the sooner Americans will reap the benefits of competition.
Hunt convincingly demonstrates that competition is not about dividing up limited resources but about creating more resources and thus competition is pro-society. This truly interdisciplinary book successfully develops a general theory of competition which is rich in explanatory breadth and depth. Consequently, executives and entrepreneuers, management consultants, public makers, and scholars and students in economics, law, political science, and business should read and study this book. —Robert F. Lusch, University of Oklahoma This book develops a new theory of competition. This theory – labeled "resource-advantage theory" – stems from no single research tradition, but draws on several different traditions in economics, management, marketing, and sociology. In this ground-breaking volume, Shelby Hunt articulates R-A theory, uses the theory to explain and predict economic phenomena, and shows how (and why) it explains and predicts such phenomena.
This insightful book explores the question of competition and effects it has on individuals, organizations, and society as a whole. Visit our website for sample chapters!
This is the first book to provide a systematic treatment of the economics of antitrust (or competition policy) in a global context. It draws on the literature of industrial organisation and on original analyses to deal with such important issues as cartels, joint-ventures, mergers, vertical contracts, predatory pricing, exclusionary practices, and price discrimination, and to formulate policy implications on these issues. The interaction between theory and practice is one of the main features of the book, which contains frequent references to competition policy cases and a few fully developed case studies. The treatment is written to appeal to practitioners and students, to lawyers and economists. It is not only a textbook in economics for first year graduate or advanced undergraduate courses, but also a book for all those who wish to understand competition issues in a clear and rigorous way. Exercises and some solved problems are provided.
John Roemer presents a unified and rigorous theory of political competition between parties and he models the theory under many specifications, including whether parties are policy oriented or oriented toward winning, whether they are certain or uncertain about voter preferences, and whether the policy space is uni- or multidimensional.
This volume considers how media firms, as well as entire industries, exist and persist over time despite what often seems to be intense competition for such resources as audiences and advertisers. Addressing competition within and among media organizations and industries, including broadcasting, cable, and the Internet, author John W. Dimmick studies the media industries through the niche theory lens, developed by bioecologists to explain competition and coexistence. He examines the targets of the different media--audience, advertisers, money--and how they compete, using examples from a variety of studies. Each chapter incorporates relevant economic constructs into the analytic framework. This approach includes the use of economics of scale to explain selection and firm mortality in newspapers and movie theaters; the application of the transaction costs concept to explicate the rise of advertising agencies; the employment of the strategic group concept in analyzing the niche breadth strategy; and the measurement of gratifications-utilities. A comprehensive overview of the determinants of media competition and coexistence, Media Competition and Coexistence: The Theory of the Niche offers unique insights for scholars, students, researchers, and practitioners in media economics, management, and business.
This book integrates spatial and behavioral perspectives - in a word, those of the Rochester and Michigan schools - into a unified theory of voter choice and party strategy. The theory encompasses both policy and non-policy factors, effects of turnout, voter discounting of party promises, expectations of coalition governments, and party motivations based on policy as well as office. Optimal (Nash equilibrium) strategies are determined for alternative models for presidential elections in the US and France, and for parliamentary elections in Britain and Norway. These polities cover a wide range of electoral rules, number of major parties, and governmental structures. The analyses suggest that the more competitive parties generally take policy positions that come close to maximizing their electoral support, and that these vote-maximizing positions correlate strongly with the mean policy positions of their supporters.
These lectures review the research and experience on the subject of health care economy. The author also sets down a moderately rigorous statement of the economic concepts underlying the kind of competition that he regards as the most promising way to achieve a reasonable degree of equity and efficiency in health care. The first lecture is on the public policy goals of health care financing and delivery and discusses efficiency in health care. The second presents an economic analysis of the systems for organizing and financing medical care systems in the United States. The third lecture is about ``managed competition'', and the fourth reviews American experience with efforts to convert from the traditional system to a competitive system.The book is addressed primarily to economists, health policy makers and health services researchers. It explains how market forces may be managed in pursuit of equity and efficiency in health care. It addresses systematically many of the causes of market failure and proposes a strategy (``managed competition'') for overcoming them. It should be of interest to policy makers in any country interested in incentives for more efficient health care delivery. It should also be very useful supplemental reading for courses in health care economics.