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The release of previously unavailable Soviet archives has allowed a re-examination of Anglo-Soviet relations during Churchill's peacetime administration, with special emphasis on the Kremlin's motivation for resisting the Prime Minister's attempts to end the Cold War. Throughout 1951-55, the time was not yet ripe for détente: the USSR and Western powers were less than willing to accommodate each other. Instead they engaged in the consolidation of their own blocs and the build-up of their defensive potential. With Winston Churchill becoming the most outspoken advocate of détente, the Kremlin greeted the return to power of the Conservative Party under his leadership with a general mistrust. After Josef Stalin's death in March 1953, détente remained a distant reality. The collective leadership was keen to reduce international tensions without modifying its predecessor's foreign policy, or abandoning Soviet strongholds of central and eastern Europe. As part of its peace offensive, the Kremlin was prepared to improve the atmosphere in relations with Britain and increase the volume of Anglo-Soviet trade. However, the British remained mistrustful of the intentions of Stalin's successors, and refrained from initiatives leading to a relaxation of export controls independent from American embargo policy. The author demonstrates that Stalin's heirs suspected that Churchill's pursuit of détente was designed to secure far-reaching concessions. Moscow also felt that as a junior partner acting in full dependence on and in co-operation with US policy, Churchill was in no position to conciliate between the USSR and the USA. Engaged in a domestic struggle for power, members of the collective leadership were reluctant to allow their opponent, Georgi Malenkov, to negotiate single-handedly with western statesmen. It was only after Nikita Khrushchev's ascendance to power and Churchill's resignation from office that the Kremlin was prepared to participate in summit talks with the western heads of government.
Covering the development of the atomic bomb during the Second World War, the origins and early course of the Cold War, and the advent of the hydrogen bomb in the early 1950s, Churchill and the Bomb in War and Cold War explores a still neglected aspect of Winston Churchill's career – his relationship with and thinking on nuclear weapons. Kevin Ruane shows how Churchill went from regarding the bomb as a weapon of war in the struggle with Nazi Germany to viewing it as a weapon of communist containment (and even punishment) in the early Cold War before, in the 1950s, advocating and arguably pioneering “mutually assured destruction” as the key to preventing the Cold War flaring into a calamitous nuclear war. While other studies of Churchill have touched on his evolving views on nuclear weapons, few historians have given this hugely important issue the kind of dedicated and sustained treatment it deserves. In Churchill and the Bomb in War and Cold War, however, Kevin Ruane has undertaken extensive primary research in Britain, the United States and Europe, and accessed a wide array of secondary literature, in producing an immensely readable yet detailed, insightful and provocative account of Churchill's nuclear hopes and fears.
Exploring the visions of the end of the Cold War that have been put forth since its inception until its actual ending, this volume brings to the fore the reflections, programmes, and strategies that were intended to call into question the bipolar system and replace it with alternative approaches or concepts. These visions were associated not only with prominent individuals, organized groups and civil societies, but were also connected to specific historical processes or events. They ranged from actual, thoroughly conceived programmes, to more blurred, utopian aspirations — or simply the belief that the Cold War had already, in effect, come to an end. Such visions reveal much about the contexts in which they were developed and shed light on crucial moments and phases of the Cold War.
This book addresses the interface of the British Foreign Office, foreign policy and commerce in the twentieth century. Two related questions are considered: what did the Foreign Office do to support British commerce, and how did commerce influence British foreign policy? The editors of this work collect a range of case studies that explore the attitude of the Foreign Office towards commerce and trade promotion, against the backdrop of a century of relative economic decline, while also considering the role of British diplomats in creating markets and supporting UK firms. This highly researched and detailed examination is designed for readers aiming to comprehend the role that commerce played in Britain’s foreign relations, in a century when trade and commerce have become an inseparable element in foreign and security policies.
Winston Churchill is a renowned historical figure, whose remarkable political and military career continues to enthral. This book consists of short, highly readable chapters on key aspects of Churchill's career. Written by leading experts, the chapters draw on documents from Churchill's extensive personal papers as well as cutting–edge scholarship. Ranging from Churchill's youthful statesmanship to the period of the Cold War, the volume considers his military strategy during both World Wars as well as dealing with the social, political and economic issues that helped define the Churchillian era. Suitable for those coming to Churchill for the first time, as well as providing new insights for those already familiar with his life, this is a sparkling collection of essays that provides an enlightening history of Churchill and his era.
For many people throughout the English-speaking world and beyond, Winston Churchill was the greatest statesman of the twentieth century: the saviour of his country and a staunch defender of democracy in the face of totalitarianism. By writing history, as well as by making it, Churchill influenced our whole view of the twentieth century and his role in it. But how does he look now, in a new century, with a different agenda and when few can remember him? This book confronts and addresses this question; partly by including the reminiscences and recollections of four people who still vividly remember Churchill (Tony Benn, Lord Carrington, Lord Deedes and Lady Soames); but primarily by bringing together a group of historians (David Cannadine, Roland Quinault, Paul Addison, Chris Wrigley, Stuart Ball, David Reynolds, John Charmley, David Carlton, John W. Young and Peter Hennessy), who explore the complexities and ambiguities of this extraordinary man.
This is the first book to examine in detail the relationship between the Cold War and International Law.
Nearly 40 years after the concept of finite deterrence was popularized by the Johnson administration, nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) thinking appears to be in decline. The United States has rejected the notion that threatening population centers with nuclear attacks is a legitimate way to assure deterrence. Most recently, it withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, an agreement based on MAD. American opposition to MAD also is reflected in the Bush administration's desire to develop smaller, more accurate nuclear weapons that would reduce the number of innocent civilians killed in a nuclear strike. Still, MAD is influential in a number of ways. First, other countries, like China, have not abandoned the idea that holding their adversaries' cities at risk is necessary to assure their own strategic security. Nor have U.S. and allied security officials and experts fully abandoned the idea. At a minimum, acquiring nuclear weapons is still viewed as being sensible to face off a hostile neighbor that might strike one's own cities. Thus, our diplomats have been warning China that Japan would be under tremendous pressure to go nuclear if North Korea persisted in acquiring a few crude weapons of its own. Similarly, Israeli officials have long argued, without criticism, that they would not be second in acquiring nuclear weapons in the Middle East. Indeed, given that Israelis surrounded by enemies that would not hesitate to destroy its population if they could, Washington finds Israel's retention of a significant nuclear capability totally "understandable."