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Statutory interpretation affects every area of law and is of growing scholarly interest given long-running debate about the coherence of statutory interpretation and the fact that the law of interpretation comprises 'frail guidelines'. This contributed work critically analyses the law in light of this debate. It examines areas where the law is coherent leading to confidence in the judiciary and the administration of the law. It also examines areas where the law is not coherent and is need of improvement.
Combining pragmatics, dialectics, analytics, and legal theory, this work translates interpretative canons into patterns of natural argument.
In an ideal world, the laws of Congress--known as federal statutes--would always be clearly worded and easily understood by the judges tasked with interpreting them. But many laws feature ambiguous or even contradictory wording. How, then, should judges divine their meaning? Should they stick only to the text? To what degree, if any, should they consult aids beyond the statutes themselves? Are the purposes of lawmakers in writing law relevant? Some judges, such as Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, believe courts should look to the language of the statute and virtually nothing else. Chief Judge Robert A. Katzmann of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit respectfully disagrees. In Judging Statutes, Katzmann, who is a trained political scientist as well as a judge, argues that our constitutional system charges Congress with enacting laws; therefore, how Congress makes its purposes known through both the laws themselves and reliable accompanying materials should be respected. He looks at how the American government works, including how laws come to be and how various agencies construe legislation. He then explains the judicial process of interpreting and applying these laws through the demonstration of two interpretative approaches, purposivism (focusing on the purpose of a law) and textualism (focusing solely on the text of the written law). Katzmann draws from his experience to show how this process plays out in the real world, and concludes with some suggestions to promote understanding between the courts and Congress. When courts interpret the laws of Congress, they should be mindful of how Congress actually functions, how lawmakers signal the meaning of statutes, and what those legislators expect of courts construing their laws. The legislative record behind a law is in truth part of its foundation, and therefore merits consideration.
We are capable of writing crisp yet flexible laws, but Solan explains that difficult cases result when the ways in which our cognitive and linguistic faculties are structured fail to produce a single, clear interpretation. Though we are predisposed to absorb new situations into categories we have previously formed, our conceptualization is not always as crisp as the legislative and judicial realms demand. In such cases, Solan contends that other values, most importantly legislative intent, must come into play. The Language of Statutes provides an excellent introduction to statutory interpretation, rejecting the extreme arguments that judges have either too much or too little leeway, and explaining how and why a certain number of interpretive problems are simply inevitable. --Book Jacket.
Most new law is statutory law; that is, law enacted by legislators. An important question, therefore, is how should this law be interpreted by courts and agencies, especially when the text of a statute is not entirely clear. This book focuses on what judges should do once the legal materials fail to resolve the interpretive question.
Including a discussion of legislative powers, constitutional regulations relative to the forms of legislation and to legislative procedure.
Kent Greenwalt's second volume on aspects of legal interpretation analyzes statutory and common law interpretation, suggesting that multiple factors are important for each, and that the relation between them influences both. The book argues against any simple "textualism," claiming that even reader understanding of statutes depends partly on perceived intent. In respect to common law interpretation, use of reasoning by analogy is defended and any simple dichotomy of "holding" and "dictum" is resisted.
This volume is for students and scholars of intellectual property law, practitioners seeking creative arguments from across the field, and policymakers searching for solutions to changing social and technological issues. The book explores the tensions between two fundamentally competing demands made of IP law.