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The Cognitive Basis of Institutions: A Synthesis of Behavioral and Institutional Economics synthesizes modern research in behavioral economics with traditional institutional economics. This work emphasizes that institution and agent are inextricably linked, and that both cognitive and institutional processes coalesce to influence human decision-making. It integrates cognition and institution through the behavioral economics theoretical lens of bounded rationality. Methodologically, it develops game-theoretical, complexity and neuroeconomic solutions to unite study of the two areas. The work concludes by proposing general implications for the economic study of decisions using the cognitive-institutional approach, also providing specific recommendations for public policy. Reveals how institutional structures and individual actions interact and coevolve cognitively Connects individual decision-making, decision-making processes and institutional formation Unites our understanding of cooperative ‘prosocial’ behavior with the institutional dynamics that may create it Discusses the implications of the behavioral-institutional paradigm for paternalism and libertarianism in public policy
This book establishes the study of ToM in adults as a new field of enquiry and identifies and addresses the key questions that need to be asked by cognitive psychologists to develop a new cognitive model of ToM.
Having pioneered the concept in economics that institutions structure incentives, Douglass North's later work posed the question, in turn: what structures institutions? His approach explored the role of culture, norms, and ideas and eventually drew its focus on shared mental models as the basis of institutions. An ongoing literature takes up North's fundamental question. In this paper, we contribute to this literature by bringing together North's mental-models approach and the work of philosopher John Searle. Searle pioneered the concept in philosophy that institutions are constitutive rules, established through collective assignment of particular status to objects in the world. Drawing upon cognitive science research on knowledge, learning, and habituation, as well as computer science research on artificial intelligence, we develop Searle's framework to pose a simple yet general account of the cognitive origins of institutions and the implications of this link for social theory. Our framework reconciles the social science approach to institutions as regulative rules with the philosophy approach to institutions as constitutive rules. It also provides a basis for considering impediments to social interaction that arise when individuals possess conflicting normative ideas and affiliate into groups whose shared understandings appear to conflict.
It is often argued that democratic institutions should be designed to produce good outcomes, assuming that we know what good outcomes are and which institutions will track them. This book denies both assumptions. The idea of the general interest is ill-defined and our understanding of social causality is fragile. Instead, one should reduce as much as possible the impact of self-interest, passion, prejudice, and bias on the decision makers, and then let the chips fall where they may. In addition to making novel theoretical proposals, this book discusses a welter of case studies and historical episodes.
Applying the hot new area of psychological and behavioural economics to notions of economic growth and development, Bertin Martens' new book is a unique and impressive volume.
Generic institutionalism offers a new perspective on institutional economic change within an evolutionary framework. The institutional landscape shapes the social fabric and economic organization in manifold ways. The book elaborates on the ubiquity of such institutional forms with regards to their emergence, durability and exit in social agency-structure relations. Thereby institutions are considered as social learning environments changing the knowledge base of the economy along generic rule-sets in non-nomological ways from within. Specific attention is given to a theoretical structuring of the topic in ontology, heuristics and methodology. Part I introduces a generic naturalistic ontology by comparing prevalent ontological claims in evolutionary economics and preparing them for a broader pluralist and interdisciplinary discourse. Part II reconsiders these ontological claims and confronts it with prevalent heuristics, conceptualizations and projections of institutional change. In this respect the book revisits the institutional economic thought of Thorstein Veblen, Friedrich August von Hayek, Joseph Alois Schumpeter and Pierre Bourdieu. A synthesis is suggested in an application of the generic rule-based approach. Part III discusses the implementation of rule-based bottom-up models of institutional change and provides a basic prototype agent-based computational simulation. The evolution of power relations plays an important role in the programming of real-life communication networks. This notion characterizes the discussed policy realms (Part IV) of ecological and financial sustainability as tremendously complex areas of institutional change in political economy, leading to the concluding topic of democracy in practice. The novelty of this approach is given by its modular theoretical structure. It turns out that institutional change is carried substantially by affective social orders in contrast to rational orders as communicated in orthodox economic realms. The characteristics of affective orders are derived theoretically from intersections between ontology and heuristics, where interdependencies between instinct, cognition, rationality, reason, social practice, habit, routine or disposition are essential for the embodiment of knowledge. This kind of research indicates new generic directions to study social learning in particular and institutional evolution in general.
This book seeks to fill a void in contemporary aesthetics scholarship by considering the cognitive features that make the aesthetic and artistic worthy of philosophical study. Aesthetic cognition has been largely abandoned by analytical philosophy, which instead tends to focus its attention on the ‘non-exhibited’ properties of artwork or issues concerning semantic and syntactic structure. The Cognitive Basis of Aesthetics innovatively seeks to correct the marginalization of aesthetics in analytical philosophy by reinterpreting aesthetic cognition through an integration of Ernst Cassirer’s philosophy of symbolic forms with Paul Crowther’s theory of imagination and philosophy of art. This integration has three important outcomes: 1) it explains why the aesthetic and artistic constitute a unique form of knowledge; 2) it shows the role this plays in the formation of aesthetics as a discipline; and 3) it describes why aesthetic cognition is so deeply engaging. This book’s unique theoretical approach engages with important works of visual, conceptual, and digital art, as well as literature, music, and theatre.