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Huelfer examines the casualty issue in American military thought and practice during the years between the World Wars. He argues that Americans exhibited a distinct aversion to combat casualties duirng the Interwar Period, a phenomenon that visibly influenced the military establishment and helped shape strategic planning, force modernization, and rearmament for World War II. In a broad topical approach, Huelfer's main theme—casualty aversion—is woven into discussions about military strategy and policies, doctrinal and technological development, the military education system, and how the American officer corps emerged from World War I and prepared for World War II. As Huelfer makes clear, aversion to combat casualties is not just a post-Vietnam War phenomenon, but rather has long been embedded within the American national heritage. Conventional wisdom link today's exacerbated aversion to combat casualties as fallout from the Vietnam debacle. In fact, this Vietnam Syndrome has remained at the forefront of contemporary strategic thinking. Huelfer shows that American political and military leaders have held lasting concerns about risking soldiers' lives in combat, even pre-dating U.S. involvement in World War II. The grim experiences of World War I had a profound impact upon the U.S. officer corps and how it viewed potential future conflicts. The casualty issue permeated the officers' strategic culture during the Interwar Period and colored their thinking about improving training, doctrinal evolution, force modernization, and technological development. Even though one cannot find the terms casualty issue, casualty aversion, or sensitivity to casualties directly stated in the speeches and writings of the era, this awareness clearly emerged as a subtext for the entire American effort in preparation for World War II. Huelfer highlights how casualty aversion shaped American strategy for World War II by incorporating ideas about the use of overwhelming force, air power, and mechanization—all designed to minimize losses.
Americans are greatly concerned about the number of our troops killed in battle--33,000 in the Korean War; 58,000 in Vietnam; 4,500 in Iraq--and rightly so. But why are we so indifferent, often oblivious, to the far greater number of casualties suffered by those we fight and those we fight for? This is the compelling, largely unasked question John Tirman answers in The Deaths of Others. Between six and seven million people died in Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq alone, the majority of them civilians. And yet Americans devote little attention to these deaths. Other countries, however, do pay attention, and Tirman argues that if we want to understand why there is so much anti-Americanism around the world, the first place to look is how we conduct war. We understandably strive to protect our own troops, but our rules of engagement with the enemy are another matter. From atomic weapons and carpet bombing in World War II to napalm and daisy cutters in Vietnam and beyond, our weapons have killed large numbers of civilians and enemy soldiers. Americans, however, are mostly ignorant of these methods, believing that American wars are essentially just, necessary, and "good." Trenchant and passionate, The Deaths of Others forces readers to consider the tragic consequences of American military action not just for Americans, but especially for those we fight against.
Advances in trauma care have accelerated over the past decade, spurred by the significant burden of injury from the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Between 2005 and 2013, the case fatality rate for United States service members injured in Afghanistan decreased by nearly 50 percent, despite an increase in the severity of injury among U.S. troops during the same period of time. But as the war in Afghanistan ends, knowledge and advances in trauma care developed by the Department of Defense (DoD) over the past decade from experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq may be lost. This would have implications for the quality of trauma care both within the DoD and in the civilian setting, where adoption of military advances in trauma care has become increasingly common and necessary to improve the response to multiple civilian casualty events. Intentional steps to codify and harvest the lessons learned within the military's trauma system are needed to ensure a ready military medical force for future combat and to prevent death from survivable injuries in both military and civilian systems. This will require partnership across military and civilian sectors and a sustained commitment from trauma system leaders at all levels to assure that the necessary knowledge and tools are not lost. A National Trauma Care System defines the components of a learning health system necessary to enable continued improvement in trauma care in both the civilian and the military sectors. This report provides recommendations to ensure that lessons learned over the past decade from the military's experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq are sustained and built upon for future combat operations and translated into the U.S. civilian system.
"Lasers will continue to play an important and sometimes dangerous role on the modern battlefield. At present, there is no adequate comprehensive protection against accidental or intentional exposure to lasers in combat. Thus, it is critical that the field of laser safety research develop preventative protocols and prophylactic technologies to protect the warfighter and to support military operational objectives. This book details the current state-of-the-art in scientific, biomedical, and technical information concerning the effects of military lasers on the human body. An important purpose of this book is to identify current knowledge gaps in the various areas of this interdisciplinary field, and to offer specific recommendations for laser safety research and development into the future"--
The Casualty Gap shows how the most important cost of American military campaigns--the loss of human life--has been paid disproportionately by poorer and less-educated communities since the 1950s. Drawing on a rich array of evidence, including National Archives data on the hometowns of more than 400,000 American soldiers killed in World War II, Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq, this book is the most ambitious inquiry to date into the distribution of American wartime casualties across the nation, the forces causing such inequalities to emerge, and their consequences for politics and democratic governance.
In this companion volume to his 1995 bibliography of the same title, Daniel Blewett continues his foray into the vast literature of military studies. As did its predecessor, it covers land, air, and naval forces, primarily but not exclusively from a U.S. perspective, with the welcome emergence of small wars from publishing obscurity. In addition to identifying relevant organizations and associations, Blewett has gathered together the very best in chronologies, bibliographies, biographical dictionaries, indexes, journals abstracts, glossaries, and encyclopedias, each accompanied by a brief descriptive annotation. This work remains a pertinent addition to the general reference collections of public and academic libraries as well as special libraries, government documents collections, military and intelligence agency libraries, and historical societies and museums.
In America's Victories, Professor Larry Schweikart restores the truth about our amazing military heritage. Just as he did in his acclaimed previous book, A Patriot's History of the United States, Professor Schweikart cuts through the distortions passed along by academia and the media
A new investigation into how the advent of precision-guided munitions affects the likelihood of US policy makers to use force. As such, this is an inquiry into the impact of ethics, strategy and military technology on the decision calculus of national leaders. Following the first Gulf War in 1991, this new study shows how US Presidents increasingly used stand-off precision guided munitions (or "PGMs", especially the Tomahawk cruise missile) either to influence foreign adversaries to make specific policy choices or to signal displeasure with their actions. Such uses of force are attractive because they can lead to desirable policy outcomes where conventional diplomacy has failed but without the large cost of lives, economic resources, or political capital that result from large-scale military operations. In a post-9/11 world, understanding alternative uses of force under significant policy constraints is still of supreme importance.
When the United States entered World War II, it took more than industrial might to transform its tiny army—smaller than even Portugal's—into an overseas fighting force of more than eight and a half million. Peter Schifferle contends that the determination of American army officers to be prepared for the next big war was an essential component in America's ultimate triumph over its adversaries. Crucial to that preparation were the army schools at Fort Leavenworth. Interwar Army officers, haunted by the bloodshed of World War I's Meuse-Argonne Offensive, fully expected to return to Europe to conclude the "unfinished business" of that conflict, and they prepared well. Schifferle examines for the first time precisely how they accomplished this through a close and illuminating look at the students, faculty, curriculum, and essential methods of instruction at Fort Leavenworth. He describes how the interwar officer corps there translated the experiences of World War I into effective doctrine, engaged in intellectual debate on professional issues, conducted experiments to determine the viability of new concepts, and used military professional education courses to substitute for the experience of commanding properly organized and resourced units. Schifferle highlights essential elements of war preparation that only the Fort Leavenworth education could provide, including intensive instruction in general staff procedures, hands-on experience with the principles and techniques of combined arms, and the handling of large division-sized formations in combat. This readied army officers for an emerging new era of global warfare and enabled them to develop the leadership decision making they would need to be successful on the battlefield. But Schifferle offers more than a recitation of curriculum development through the skillful interweaving of personal stories about both school experiences and combat operations, collectively recounting the human and professional development of the officer corps from 1918 to 1945. Well crafted and insightful, Schifferle's meticulously researched study shows how and why the Fort Leavenworth experience was instrumental in producing that impressive contingent of military officers who led the U.S. Army to final victory in World War II. By the end of the book, the attentive reader will also fully comprehend why the military professionals at Fort Leavenworth have come to think of it as the "Intellectual Center of the Army."
With its impressive breadth of coverage – both geographically and chronologically – the International Encyclopedia of Military History is the most up-to-date and inclusive A-Z resource on military history. From uniforms and military insignia worn by combatants to the brilliant military leaders and tacticians who commanded them, the campaigns and wars to the weapons and equipment used in them, this international and multi-cultural two-volume set is an accessible resource combining the latest scholarship in the field with a world perspective on military history.