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Arguing that voluntary associations and the press created a reading public capable of reasoning on matters of state, McNairn traces the emergence of 'public opinion' as a new form of authority in mid-19th century Upper Canada.
Kant claims to have established his table of categories or "pure concepts of the understanding" according to the "guiding thread" provided by logical forms of judgment. By drawing extensively on Kant's logical writings, Béatrice Longuenesse analyzes this controversial claim, and then follows the thread through its continuation in the transcendental deduction of the categories, the transcendental schemata, and the principles of pure understanding. The result is a systematic, persuasive new interpretation of the Critique of Pure Reason. Longuenesse shows that although Kant adopts his inventory of the forms of judgment from logic textbooks of his time, he is nevertheless original in selecting just those forms he holds to be indispensable to our ability to relate representations to objects. Kant gives formal representation to this relation between conceptual thought and its objects by introducing the term "x" into his analysis of logical forms to stand for the object that is "thought under" the concepts that are combined in judgment. This "x" plays no role in Kant's forms of logical inference, but instead plays a role in clarifying the relation between logical forms (forms of concept subordination) and combinations ("syntheses") of perceptual data, necessary for empirical cognition. Considering Kant's logical forms of judgment thus helps illuminate crucial aspects of the Transcendental Analytic as a whole, while revealing the systematic unity between Kant's theory of judgment in the first Critique and his analysis of "merely reflective" (aesthetic and teleological) judgments in the third Critique.
By the mid-nineteenth-century, 'public opinion' emerged as a new form of authority in Upper Canada. Contemporaries came to believe that the best answer to common questions arose from deliberation among private individuals. Older conceptions of government, sociability and the relationship between knowledge and power were jettisoned for a new image of Upper Canada as a deliberative democracy. The Capacity to Judge asks what made widespread public debate about common issues possible; why it came to be seen as desirable, even essential; and how it was integrated into Upper Canada's constitutional and social self-image. Drawing on an international body of literature indebted to Jürgen Habermas and based on extensive research in period newspapers, Jeffrey L. McNairn argues that voluntary associations and the press created a reading public capable of reasoning on matters of state, and that the dynamics of political conflict invested that public with final authority. He traces how contemporaries grappled with the consequences as they scrutinized parliamentary, republican and radical options for institutionalizing public opinion. The Capacity to Judge concludes with a case study of deliberative democracy in action that serves as a sustained defense of the type of intellectual history the book as a whole exemplifies.
The power of national and transnational constitutional courts to issue binding rulings in interpreting the constitution or an international treaty has been endlessly discussed. What does it mean for democratic governance that non-elected judges influence politics and policies? The authors of Judicial Power - legal scholars, political scientists, and judges - take a fresh look at this problem. To date, research has concentrated on the legitimacy, or the effectiveness, or specific decision-making methods of constitutional courts. By contrast, the authors here explore the relationship among these three factors. This book presents the hypothesis that judicial review allows for a method of reflecting on social integration that differs from political methods, and, precisely because of the difference between judicial and political decision-making, strengthens democratic governance. This hypothesis is tested in case studies on the role of constitutional courts in political transformations, on the methods of these courts, and on transnational judicial interactions.
God invites us to judge and to help correct wrongs from a place of understanding. Sometimes we pre-judge a person based on our own biases and superficial experiences. We stifle dialog before the conversation even begins. If all we know is our own faith, and we never put it side-by-side with what others believe, our spiritual growth and commitments can be easily stunted. By truly listening and learning from those with different beliefs, we can broaden and deepen our kingdom commitments. It is possible to stand up for Jesus, to articulate our faith clearly as witnesses, and to defend our faith effectively, while at the same time not being perceived as judgmental. Christians need to be faithful witnesses to God who are willing to listen to people with drastically different stories. In those exchanges, when we suspend judgment and truly listen, we will find truth and beauty and goodness in some of the most unexpected places. We will also find that, if we truly listen, we may be given a chance to speak. Features include: Help for interfaith and intercultural dialog Thought-provoking questions for spiritual conversation or reflection
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct provides an up-to-date resource for information on legal ethics. Federal, state and local courts in all jurisdictions look to the Rules for guidance in solving lawyer malpractice cases, disciplinary actions, disqualification issues, sanctions questions and much more. In this volume, black-letter Rules of Professional Conduct are followed by numbered Comments that explain each Rule's purpose and provide suggestions for its practical application. The Rules will help you identify proper conduct in a variety of given situations, review those instances where discretionary action is possible, and define the nature of the relationship between you and your clients, colleagues and the courts.
Hegel's Science of Logic has received less attention than his Phenomenology of Spirit, but Hegel himself took it to be his highest philosophical achievement and the backbone of his system. The present book focuses on this most difficult of Hegel's published works. Béatrice Longuenesse offers a close analysis of core issues, including discussions of what Hegel means by 'dialectical logic', the role and meaning of 'contradiction' in Hegel's philosophy, and Hegel's justification for the provocative statement that 'what is real is rational, what is rational is real'. She examines both Hegel's debt and his polemical reaction to Kant, and shows in great detail how his project of a 'dialectical' logic can be understood only in light of its relation to Kant's 'transcendental' logic. This book will appeal to anyone interested in Hegel's philosophy and its influence on contemporary philosophical discussion.
Sir Mark Hadley's aim in this book is to be frank rather than scholarly about judging. The trial judge is in a very different position to the appellate judge. The trial is where the facts are determined, and it is essentially a trial judge who exercises the powers of discretion which modern society increasingly vests in its judiciary. As society becomes more complex, so does the law. However, law cannot provide for every circumstance and so its application often involves the exercise of discretion. Criminal sentencing, child welfare, the protection of those who lack mental capacity, and disputes about medical treatment are obvious examples. How do judges go about that? How far are judges influenced or affected by their backgrounds, beliefs, and own life experiences? And, if consistency is an aspect of public justice, can that be achieved? And what about the conflict between public justice and personal privacy? These are pressing questions in a society where judges have greater effective power than ever before. [Subject: Family Law, Judicial History]