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On 22 August 1914, on a battlefield one hundred kilometers wide, stretching from Luxembourg to the River Meuse, two French and two German armies clashed in a series of encounters known collectively as the Battle of the Ardennes. On that day 27,000 young French soldiers died, the bloodiest day in the military history of France, most of them in the Ardennes, and yet it is almost unknown to English-speaking readers. There has never been an operational study of the Battle of the Ardennes, in any language, at best a single chapter in a history of greater scope, at least a monograph of an individual tactical encounter within the overall battle. This book fills a glaring gap in the study of the opening phase of the First World War the Battles of the Frontiers and provides fresh insight into both French and German plans for the prosecution of what was supposed to be a short war. At the center of this book lies a mystery. In a key encounter battle one French army corps led by a future Minister of War, General Pierre Roques, outnumbered its immediate opposition by nearly six-to-one and yet dismally failed to capitalize on that superiority. The question is how, and why. Intriguingly there is a six-hour gap in the war diaries of all General Roques' units, it smacks of a cover-up. By a thorough investigation of German sources, and through the discovery of three vital messages buried in the French archives, it is now possible to piece together what happened during those missing hours and show how Roques threw away an opportunity to break the German line and advance unopposed deep into the hinterland beyond. The chimera of a clean break and exploitation, that was to haunt the Allied High Command for the next four years in the trenches of the Western Front, was a brief and tantalizing opportunity for General Roques. The final part of this book seeks to answer the question "why?" The history of both French and German pre-war preparation reveals the political, economic and cultural differences that shaped the two opposing national armies. Those differences, in turn, predicated the behavior of General Roques and his men as well as that of his German opponent. With a clear understanding of those differences, the reader may now understand how the French lost their best opportunity not only to stymie the Schlieffen Plan, but to change the course of the rest of the war. The author's text is supported by a separate map book containing 60 newly-commissioned color maps.
The purpose of this thesis is threefold: to present the first operational study of the August 1914 Ardennes campaign; to demonstrate that in two particular encounter battles the French had the opportunity to inflict a tactical, possibly operational defeat upon their opponents but in both cases failed to do so; and to explore the reasons for that French failure, by relating events on the battlefield to each side's pre-war preparations.
Like the Battle of Verdun, the Battle of the Frontiers has often been ignored by military historians, who assumed that the French lost the first battles of the World War I because they launched suicidal bayonet charges against German machine guns. Therefore, for nearly a century, these battles have been considered uninteresting. In reality, these were some of the most important, hard-fought and instructive battles of the First World War. The Battle of the Frontiers is the first history of this battle in English and is based on ground-breaking research conducted in French and German army archives. It also makes use of neglected French and German books and articles, as well as German regimental histories, and includes personal accounts by participants such as Manfred von Richthofen (when he was still a cavalry lieutenant) and the young Erwin Rommel. Terence Zuber here presents a dramatic new perspective on combat in 1914.
27,000 French people were killed on 22nd August 1914, the bloodiest day in French history.
Twice in the 20th century, a British Expeditionary Force has taken the field in Northern France to fight beside the French Army. Twice, the Expeditionary Force has survived threat of complete destruction. But the differences between the Retreat to Dunkirk in 1940 and the first encounter with the enemy at Mons in 1914 are significant.
If wars were wagered on like pro sports or horse races, the Germany military in August 1914 would have been a clear front-runner, with a century-long record of impressive victories and a general staff the envy of its rivals. Germany's overall failure in the first year of World War I was surprising and remains a frequent subject of analysis, mostly focused on deficiencies in strategy and policy. But there were institutional weaknesses as well. This book examines the structural failures that frustrated the Germans in the war's crucial initial campaign, the invasion of Belgium. Too much routine in planning, command and execution led to groupthink, inflexibility and to an overconfident belief that nothing could go too terribly wrong. As a result, decisive operation became dicey, with consequences that Germany's military could not overcome in four long years.