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Explores the Origin of the Recent Banking Crisis and how to Preclude Future CrisesShedding new light on the recent worldwide banking debacle, The Banking Crisis Handbook presents possible remedies as to what should have been done prior, during, and after the crisis. With contributions from well-known academics and professionals, the book contains e
Addresses the inequity of developed and developing nations from the bottom up through an exploration of current literature, specific case-studies, and data-based recommendations for new crisis indicators. It explores such topics as the Greek debt crisis, electronic banking, and financial crises in developing economies.
This open access book provides a readable narrative of the bubbles and the banking crisis Japan experienced during the two decades between the late 1980s and the early 2000s. Japan, which was a leading competitor in the world’s manufacturing sector, tried to transform itself into an economy with domestic demand-led mature growth, but the ensuing bubbles and crisis instead made the country suffer from chronicle deflation and stagnation. The book analyses why the Japanese authorities could not avoid making choices that led to this outcome. The chapters are based on the lectures to regulators from emerging economies delivered at the Global Financial Partnership Center of the Financial Services Agency of Japan.
The Great Financial Crisis that began in 2007-2008 reminds us with devastating force that financial instability and crises are endemic to capitalist economies. This Handbook describes the theoretical, institutional, and historical factors that can help us understand the forces that create financial crises.
Crisis and Response: An FDIC History, 2008¿2013 reviews the experience of the FDIC during a period in which the agency was confronted with two interconnected and overlapping crises¿first, the financial crisis in 2008 and 2009, and second, a banking crisis that began in 2008 and continued until 2013. The history examines the FDIC¿s response, contributes to an understanding of what occurred, and shares lessons from the agency¿s experience.
This book presents a detailed account of Iceland’s recovery from the tumultuous banking collapse that overturned its financial industry in 2008. Early chapters recount how Iceland’s central bank was unable to follow the quantitative easing policies of the time to print money and save the banks, while serving the world ́s smallest currency area. The book goes on to explore how the government exercised force majeure rights to implement emergency legislation aimed at preventing the “socialization of losses”. Later chapters investigate how, eight years later, these policies have yielded renewed growth and reinvigorated liquidity streams for the financial system. The authors argue that Iceland, long-called the ‘canary in the coal mine’ of the developed world, offers important lessons for the future. This book will be useful to all readers interested in better understanding the unique history of Iceland’s banking crisis and the phenomena of its recovery.
The deflation of the subprime mortgage bubble in 2006-7 is widely agreed to have been the immediate cause of the collapse of the financial sector in 2008. Consequently, one might think that uncovering the origins of subprime lending would make the root causes of the crisis obvious. That is essentially where public debate about the causes of the crisis began—and ended—in the month following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and the 502-point fall in the Dow Jones Industrial Average in mid-September 2008. However, the subprime housing bubble is just one piece of the puzzle. Asset bubbles inflate and burst frequently, but severe worldwide recessions are rare. What was different this time? In What Caused the Financial Crisis leading economists and scholars delve into the major causes of the worst financial collapse since the Great Depression and, together, present a comprehensive picture of the factors that led to it. One essay examines the role of government regulation in expanding home ownership through mortgage subsidies for impoverished borrowers, encouraging the subprime housing bubble. Another explores how banks were able to securitize mortgages by manipulating criteria used for bond ratings. How this led to inaccurate risk assessments that could not be covered by sufficient capital reserves mandated under the Basel accords is made clear in a third essay. Other essays identify monetary policy in the United States and Europe, corporate pay structures, credit-default swaps, banks' leverage, and financial deregulation as possible causes of the crisis. With contributions from Richard A. Posner, Vernon L. Smith, Joseph E. Stiglitz, and John B. Taylor, among others, What Caused the Financial Crisis provides a cogent, comprehensive, and credible explanation of why the crisis happened. It will be an essential resource for scholars and students of finance, economics, history, law, political science, and sociology, as well as others interested in the financial crisis and the nature of modern capitalism and regulation.
Collects the transcripts of a series of lectures given by Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke about the 2008 financial crisis as part of a course at George Washington University on the role of the Federal Reserve in the economy.
Hailed as "the best business book of 2010" (Huffington Post), this New York Times bestseller about the 2008 financial crisis brings the devastation of the Great Recession to life. As soon as the financial crisis erupted, the finger-pointing began. Should the blame fall on Wall Street, Main Street, or Pennsylvania Avenue? On greedy traders, misguided regulators, sleazy subprime companies, cowardly legislators, or clueless home buyers? According to Bethany McLean and Joe Nocera, two of America's most acclaimed business journalists, many devils helped bring hell to the economy. All the Devils Are Here goes back several decades to weave the hidden history of the financial crisis in a way no previous book has done. It explores the motivations of everyone from famous CEOs, cabinet secretaries, and politicians to anonymous lenders, borrowers, analysts, and Wall Street traders. It delves into the powerful American mythology of homeownership. And it proves that the crisis ultimately wasn't about finance at all; it was about human nature. Just as McLean's The Smartest Guys in the Room was hailed as the best Enron book on a crowded shelf, so will All the Devils Are Here be remembered for finally making sense of the financial meltdown and its consequences.
A full account of the rise and fall of British banking stability which sheds new light on why banking systems crash.