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Autonomy is one of the most foundational conditions of liberalism, a political philosophy that prizes individual freedom. Today, we still grapple with autonomy's value and its implications. How important is autonomy for a good life? Should people try to achieve autonomy for themselves? And does autonomy support healthy citizenship in free societies? In Ethical Autonomy, Lucas Swaine offers new and compelling answers to these key philosophical and political questions. Swaine charts the evolution of autonomy from ancient Greece to modern democratic life. Illuminating the history of the concept and its development within political theory, he focuses on autonomy at its most basic level: personal autonomy. Swaine methodically exposes the dark side of personal autonomy, pinpointing its deficiencies at both theoretical and practical levels. In so doing, he provides a powerful critique of the very idea of personal autonomy, arguing that it is so underspecified and indeterminate that it falls apart. Moreover, Swaine suggests, personally autonomous individuals devolve and degrade their moral agency, often at others' expense, and in many cases with shocking real-world consequences. Swaine's solution to problems of personal autonomy is to develop a new model of individual-level autonomy, which he calls "ethical autonomy." A form of self-rule integrating moral character and grounded in principles of liberty of conscience, ethical autonomy incorporates restraints on an autonomous individual's imagination, deliberation, and will. It supports the central commitments of liberalism and enhances active and astute forms of democratic citizenship. This novel understanding of autonomy stresses the values of freedom, toleration, respect, individual rights, limited government, and the rightful rule of law.
The notion that consent based on the concept of autonomy, underpins a good or beneficent medical intervention is deeply rooted in the jurisprudence of most countries throughout the world. Autonomy, Consent and the Law examines these notions in the UK, Australia and the US, and critiques the way in which autonomy and consent are treated in bioethics and law.
Autonomy has recently become one of the central concepts in contemporary moral philosophy and has generated much debate over its nature and value. This 2005 volume brings together essays that address the theoretical foundations of the concept of autonomy, as well as essays that investigate the relationship between autonomy and moral responsibility, freedom, political philosophy, and medical ethics. Written by some of the most prominent philosophers working in these areas, this book represents research on the nature and value of autonomy that will be essential reading for a broad swathe of philosophers as well as many psychologists.
This collection of original essays explores the social and relational dimensions of individual autonomy. Rejecting the feminist charge that autonomy is inherently masculinist, the contributors draw on feminist critiques of autonomy to challenge and enrich contemporary philosophical debates about agency, identity, and moral responsibility. The essays analyze the complex ways in which oppression can impair an agent's capacity for autonomy, and investigate connections, neglected by standard accounts, between autonomy and other aspects of the agent, including self-conception, self-worth, memory, and the imagination.
People are socially situated amid complex relations with other people and are bound by interpersonal frameworks having significant influence upon their lives. These facts have implications for their autonomy. Challenging many of the currently accepted conceptions of autonomy and of how autonomy is valued, Oshana develops a 'social-relational' account of autonomy, or self-governance, as a condition of persons that is largely constituted by a person’s relations with other people and by the absence of certain social relations. She denies that command over one's motives and the freedom to realize one's will are sufficient to secure the kind of command over one's life that autonomy requires, and argues against psychological, procedural, and content neutral accounts of autonomy. Oshana embraces the idea that her account is 'perfectionist' in a sense, and argues that ultimately our commitment to autonomy is defeasible, but she maintains that a social-relational account best captures what we value about autonomy and best serves the various ends for which the concept of autonomy is employed.
This volume addresses the complex interplay between the conditions of an agent’s personal autonomy and the constitution of her self in light of two influential background assumptions: a libertarian thesis according to which it is essential for personal autonomy to be able to choose freely how one’s self is shaped, on the one hand, and a line of thought following especially the seminal work of Harry Frankfurt according to which personal autonomy necessarily rests on an already sufficiently shaped self, on the other hand. Given this conceptual framework, a number of influential aspects within current debate can be addressed in a new and illuminating light: accordingly, the volume’s contributions range from 1) discussing fundamental conceptual interconnections between personal autonomy and freedom of the will, 2) addressing the exact role and understanding of different personal traits, e.g. Frankfurt’s notion of volitional necessities, commitments to norms and ideals, emotions, the phenomenon of weakness of will, and psychocorporeal aspects, 3) and finally taking into account social influences, which are discussed in terms of their ability to buttress, to weaken, or even to serve as necessary preconditions of personal autonomy and the forming of one’s self. The volume thus provides readers with an extensive and most up-to-date discussion of various influential strands of current philosophical debate on the topic. It is of equal interest to all those already engaged in the debate as well as to readers trying to get an up-to-date overview or looking for a textbook to use in courses.
Nietzsche is a central figure in our modern understanding of the individual as freely determining his or her own values. These essays by leading Nietzsche scholars investigate what this freedom really means: How free are we really? What does it take to be free? It might be a 'right', but it also needs to be earned.
This book explores, in rich and rigorous ways, the possibilities and limitations of “thick” (concepts of) autonomy in light of contemporary debates in philosophy, ethics, and bioethics. Many standard ethical theories and practices, particularly in domains such as biomedical ethics, incorporate minimal, formal, procedural concepts of personal autonomy and autonomous decisions and actions. Over the last three decades, concerns about the problems and limitations of these “thin” concepts have led to the formulation of “thick” concepts that highlight the mental, corporeal, biographical and social conditions of what it means to be a human person and that enrich concepts of autonomy, with direct implications for the ethical requirement to respect autonomy. The chapters in this book offer a wide range of perspectives on both the elements of and the relations (both positive and negative) between “thin” and “thick” concepts of autonomy as well as their relative roles and importance in ethics and bioethics. This book offers valuable and illuminating examinations of autonomy and respect for autonomy, relevant for audiences in philosophy, ethics, and bioethics.
This volume presents the reader with a stimulating tapestry of essays exploring the nature of personal autonomy, self-determination, and agency, and their role in human optimal functioning at multiple levels of analysis from personal to societal and cross-cultural. The starting point for these explorations is self-determination theory, an integrated theory of human motivation and healthy development which has been under development for more than three decades (Deci & Ryan, 2000). As the contributions will make clear, psychological autonomy is a concept that forms the bridge between the dependence of human behavior on biological and socio-cultural determinants on the one side, and people’s ability to be free, reflective, and transforming agents who can challenge these dependencies, on the other. The authors within this volume share a vision that human autonomy is a fundamental pre-condition for both individuals and groups to thrive, and that without understanding the nature and mechanisms of autonomous agency vital social and human problems cannot be satisfactory addressed. This multidisciplinary team of researchers will collectively explore the nature of personal autonomy, considering its developmental origins, its expression within relationships, its importance within groups and organizational functioning, and its role in promoting to the democratic and economic development of societies. The book is aimed toward developmental, social, personality, and cross-cultural psychologists, towards researchers and practitioners’ in the areas of education, health and medicine, social work and, economics, and also towards all interested in creating a more sustainable and just world society through promoting individual freedom and agency. This volume will provide a theoretical and conceptual account of the nature and psychological mechanisms of personal motivational autonomy and human agency; rich multidisciplinary empirical evidence supporting the claims and propositions about the nature of human autonomy and capacities for self-regulation; explanations of how and why different psychological and socio-cultural conditions may play a role in promoting or undermining people’s autonomous motivation and well-being, discussions of how the promotion of human autonomy can positively influence environmental protection, democracy promotion and economic prosperity.
The concept of individual autonomy is one of the most frequently utilized—and perhaps least understood—terms of current moral, political, and legal debate. The first anthology devoted entirely to this philosophical concept, "The Inner Citadel" includes both extensive discussions of autonomy itself and theoretical applications of autonomy to various areas of philosophical inquiry. John Christman has assembled essays by eminent philosophers including Gerald Dworkin, Joel Feinberg, Harry Frankfurt, and David A. J. Richards. Together, these essays provide the necessary foundation for the myriad debates and controversies in areas such as bioethics, feminism, and paternalism whose resolution turns on the nature and value of individual autonomy. As the idea of autonomy is central to a wide range of philosophical issues and impinges on other disciplines, "The Inner Citadel" will be essential reading for students of moral, political, social, and legal philosophy, as well as a valuable resource for those interested in law, political science, and psychology. John Christman is Professor of Philosophy, Political Science, and Women's Studies at Penn State University. He is the author of several books and essays on moral and political philosophy, focusing on issues of agency, freedom, equality, and identity.His books include "The Myth of Property"; "Social and Political Philosophy: A Contemporary Introduction"; and "The Politics of Persons." He has received awards from the National Endowment for the Humanities and The Penn State Institute for Arts and Humanities, and he was named "Distinguished Alumni" of the University of New Orleans, College of Liberal Arts in 1991. His work on the concept of autonomy and issues relating to that idea have spanned over two decades, and he has contributed significantly to scholarship on fundamental issues in social and political philosophy.