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First published in 1917, this book offers a vivid and compelling account of life in the trenches during World War I. Written by a French company commander, the book provides a unique perspective on the challenges and horrors of trench warfare. Despite its grim subject matter, the book is also full of moments of humor and humanity, making it a powerful and moving read. This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the "public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
In 'The Attack in Trench Warfare: Impressions and Reflections of a Company Commander', André Laffargue offers a first-hand account of the realities of trench warfare during World War I. Using a combination of vivid descriptions and introspective reflections, Laffargue provides a harrowing portrayal of the horrors faced by soldiers on the front lines. The book's straightforward yet poignant narrative style captures the brutality and futility of war, making it a poignant piece of war literature that continues to resonate with readers today. Laffargue's insights into the psychological impact of combat and the day-to-day struggles of soldiers in the trenches set this book apart as a valuable historical document and a thought-provoking literary work. André Laffargue, a former company commander in the French army, brings a wealth of firsthand experience to his writing. His intimate knowledge of the challenges faced by soldiers in the trenches lends authenticity and depth to his narrative, providing readers with a unique perspective on the realities of war. Laffargue's personal connection to the subject matter adds a layer of emotional resonance that enhances the book's impact and makes it a compelling read for anyone interested in military history or the human experience in wartime. I highly recommend 'The Attack in Trench Warfare' to readers who are looking for a gripping and insightful account of World War I from the perspective of a company commander. Laffargue's powerful storytelling and candid reflections make this book a must-read for anyone seeking a deeper understanding of the human cost of war and the resilience of the human spirit.
Includes The Americans in the First World War Illustration Pack - 57 photos/illustrations and 10 maps The analysis of the impact of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) in the Great War has fallen into two competing camps. The first believes that the AEF was the war winning factor in coalition warfare. The opposite view holds that the AEF itself had no true impact, but rather it was the industrial might and the manpower potential of the United States (US) that was the key element to victory. The caveat to both views was that the AEF did not have enough time in combat to truly show its martial ability. This thesis attempts to analyze the combat effectiveness of the AEF by comparing its experience with that of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) in 1916. The rate of change in the ability of the AEF to adapt to modern warfare will be shown to be slightly higher than that of the BEF of 1916. By November 1918, the AEF was not completely tactically combat effective, but it had dramatically improved from where it started and clearly demonstrated the potential to continue to improve at the same pace.
Historians have portrayed British participation in World War I as a series of tragic debacles, with lines of men mown down by machine guns, with untried new military technology, and incompetent generals who threw their troops into improvised and unsuccessful attacks. In this book a renowned military historian studies the evolution of British infantry tactics during the war and challenges this interpretation, showing that while the British army's plans and technologies failed persistently during the improvised first half of the war, the army gradually improved its technique, technology, and, eventually, its' self-assurance. By the time of its successful sustained offensive in the fall of 1918, says Paddy Griffith, the British army was demonstrating a battlefield skill and mobility that would rarely be surpassed even during World War II. Evaluating the great gap that exists between theory and practice, between textbook and bullet-swept mudfield, Griffith argues that many battles were carefully planned to exploit advanced tactics and to avoid casualties, but that breakthrough was simply impossible under the conditions of the time. According to Griffith, the British were already masters of "storm troop tactics" by the end of 1916, and in several important respects were further ahead than the Germans would be even in 1918. In fields such as the timing and orchestration of all-arms assaults, predicted artillery fire, "Commando-style" trench raiding, the use of light machine guns, or the barrage fire of heavy machine guns, the British led the world. Although British generals were not military geniuses, says Griffith, they should at least be credited for effectively inventing much of the twentieth-century's art of war.
In Dying to Learn, Michael Hunzeker develops a novel theory to explain how wartime militaries learn. He focuses on the Western Front, which witnessed three great-power armies struggle to cope with deadlock throughout the First World War, as the British, French, and German armies all pursued the same solutions-assault tactics, combined arms, and elastic defense in depth. By the end of the war, only the German army managed to develop and implement a set of revolutionary offensive, defensive, and combined arms doctrines that in hindsight represented the best way to fight. Hunzeker identifies three organizational variables that determine how fighting militaries generate new ideas, distinguish good ones from bad ones, and implement the best of them across the entire organization. These factors are: the degree to which leadership delegates authority on the battlefield; how effectively the organization retains control over soldier and officer training; and whether or not the military possesses an independent doctrinal assessment mechanism. Through careful study of the British, French, and German experiences in the First World War, Dying to Learn provides a model that shows how a resolute focus on analysis, command, and training can help prepare modern militaries for adapting amidst high-intensity warfare in an age of revolutionary technological change.