Download Free The Army Air Forces In World War Ii Europe Argument To V E Day January 1944 To May 1945 Book in PDF and EPUB Free Download. You can read online The Army Air Forces In World War Ii Europe Argument To V E Day January 1944 To May 1945 and write the review.

On August 17, 1942, twelve Boeing B-17 Flying Fortresses of the United States Eighth Air Force carried out the first American raid over occupied Europe, striking the rail yards at Rouen, France. Soon after, hundreds of American B-17s and Consolidated B-24 Liberators filled the skies above Europe. Despite frequent attacks against Germany and its allies by four different air forces, American commanders failed to stage a successful air offensive against Germany in the summer and fall of 1943. When victory in the air war against the Axis powers appeared bleak at the threshold of 1944, a change in command accompanied by top-down organizational restructuring allowed the American leaders to snatch victory from the jaws of defeat for the first time. Uniting against the Reich: The American Air War in Europe addresses how the United States swiftly reversed its air war against the Axis powers by reevaluating both individual agency and the structural elements that impeded the US from taking the lead in the European Theater. Luke W. Truxal argues that the appointment of General Dwight D. Eisenhower as the Supreme Allied Commander incorporated various air commands under a single authority, which allowed them to unify their efforts against a specific strategic objective. In this narrative, victory in Europe hinged on restructuring the air force under one command system in order to wage a series of sustained and targeted bombings against German infrastructure and industry. Truxal's provocative reinterpretation of personality, material, and command organization helps to explain the success of the American war effort in Europe leading up to and after February 1944, when Germany lost 355 fighters during an operation that lasted only five days. This comprehensive and well-written account offers a compelling new assessment of the development of the American war in Europe and emphasizes the importance of developing an "air-mindedness" when evaluating and strategizing large-scale operations.
There has been a great deal of speculation recently concerning the likely impact of the 'Information Age' on warfare. In this vein, much of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) literature subscribes to the idea that the Information Age will witness a transformation in the very nature of war. In this book, David Lonsdale puts that notion to the test. Using a range of contexts, the book sets out to look at whether the classical Clausewitzian theory of the nature of war will retain its validity in this new age. The analysis covers the character of the future battlespace, the function of command, and the much-hyped concept of Strategic Information Warfare. Finally, the book broadens its perspective to examine the nature of 'Information Power' and its implications for geopolitics. Through an assessment of both historical and contemporary case studies (including the events following September 11 and the recent war in Iraq), the author concludes that although the future will see many changes to the conduct of warfare, the nature of war, as given theoretical form by Clausewitz, will remain essentially unchanged.
This book offers a strategic analysis of one of the most outstanding military careers in history, identifying the most pertinent strategic lessons from the campaigns of Alexander the Great. David Lonsdale argues that since the core principles of strategy are eternal, the study and analysis of historical examples have value to the modern theorist and practitioner. Furthermore, as strategy is so complex and challenging, the remarkable career of Alexander provides the ideal opportunity to understand best practice in strategy, as he achieved outstanding and continuous success across the spectrum of warfare, in a variety of circumstances and environments. This book presents the thirteen most pertinent lessons that can be learned from his campaigns, dividing them into three categories: grand strategy, military operations, and use of force. Each of these categories provides lessons pertinent to the modern strategic environment. Ultimately, however, the book argues that the dominant factor in his success was Alexander himself, and that it was his own characteristics as a strategist that allowed him to overcome the complexities of strategy and achieve his expansive goals.
In 1944 and 1945, Tom Faulkner was a B-24 pilot flying out of San Giovanni airfield in Italy as a member of the 15th Air Force of the U.S. Army Air Forces. Only 19 years old when he completed his 28th and last mission, Tom was one of the youngest bomber pilots to serve in the U.S. Army Air Forces during World War II. Between September 1944 and the end of February 1945, he flew against targets in Hungary, Germany, Italy, Austria, and Yugoslavia. On Tom’s last mission against the marshalling yards at Augsburg, Germany, his plane was severely damaged, and he had to fly to Switzerland where he and his crew were interned. The 15th Air Force generally has been overshadowed by works on the 8th Air Force based in England. Faulkner’s memoir helps fill an important void by providing a first-hand account of a pilot and his crew during the waning months of the war, as well as a description of his experiences before his military service. David L. Snead has edited the memoir and provided annotations and corroboration for the various missions.
​*** OVER 210,000 WEST POINT MILITARY HISTORY SERIES SETS IN PRINT ​*** From the prewar development of the German war machine to the ultimate victory of the Allied coalition, here is an in-depth analysis of the battles that raged on the Western and Eastern Fronts. It examines the major strategies, the innovative tactics, and the new generation of weapons—along with the people who used them.
The Allied Operation Mallory Major (northern Italy, July 1944) aimed at the destruction of all bridges across the Po River and its tributaries and at isolating the enemy in the northern Apennine mountains (the Gothic Line). The Allied Air Forces could count on the ground support of the guerrillas from the Great Partisan Pocket (in the Apennines south of Piacenza) and were opposed by the Flak. This army was led by aging German officers and NCOs leading young non-German women and men in Wehrmacht service: the Czech guards (Regierungstruppe), and the Italian, Slovak, Polish and former Soviet gunners (the Wehrmacht had transferred its German young men to front line units). Yet, this improbable Flak force proved to be effective and supported by Luftwaffe aircraft (outnumbered by at least 10 to 1) it faced both a hailstorm of Allied bombs and guerrilla ground attacks. Women played a major role in this campaign. Axis, guerrillas, and Allied intelligence used women to infiltrate the enemy and as auxiliaries, nurses and fighters. Another aspect of this battle was the Hitler-Beneš confrontation, an intelligence-guerrilla war which took place within the ranks of the Regierungstruppe.
An illustrated study of the little-known history of the failed Allied bombing campaign designed to shatter German defenses on D-Day. D-Day is one of the most written-about events in military history. One aspect of the invasion, however, continues to be ignored: the massive pre-assault bombardment by the Allied Expeditionary Air Force (AEAF), reinforced by RAF Bomber Command and the US Eighth Air Force on June 6 which sought to neutralize the German defenses along the Atlantic Wall. Unfortunately, this failed series of attacks resulted in death or injury to hundreds of soldiers, and killed many French civilians. Despite an initial successful attack performed by the Allied forces, the most crucial phase of the operation, which was the assault from the Eighth Air Force against the defenses along the Calvados coast, was disastrous. The bombers missed almost all of their targets, inflicting little damage to the German defenses, which resulted in a high number of casualties among the Allied infantry. The primary cause of this failure was that planners at Eighth Air Force Headquarters had changed aircraft drop times at the last moment, to prevent casualties amongst the landing forces, without notifying either Eisenhower or Doolittle. This book examines this generally overlooked event in detail, answering several fundamental questions: What was the AEAF supposed to accomplish along the Atlantic Wall on D-Day and why did it not achieve its bombardment objectives? Offering a new perspective on a little-known air campaign, it is packed with illustrations, maps and diagrams exploring in detail the features and ramifications of this mission.