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THIS CASEBOOK contains a selection of U. S. Court of Appeals decisions that discuss, analyze and interpret the arbitrary and capricious standard under the Administrative Procedure Act. The selection of decisions spans from 2014 to the date of publication.Under the APA, an agency action, finding, or conclusion can be set aside where it is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law" or is "unsupported by substantial evidence." 5 U.S.C. � 706(2)(A), (E). This standard is "exceedingly deferential." Defs. of Wildlife v. U.S. Dep't of Navy, 733 F.3d 1106, 1115 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Rice, 85 F.3d 535, 541(11th Cir. 1996)). Mendoza v. Secretary, Department of Homeland Security, (11th Cir. 2017)To determine whether the agency's action was arbitrary and capricious, we examine whether the agency came to a rational conclusion and do not substitute our own judgment for that of the agency. Id. We set aside an agency action as arbitrary and capricious only where (1) the agency "relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider," (2) the agency "failed to consider an important aspect of the problem," (3) the agency explained its decision in a way "that runs counter to the evidence," or (4) the action "is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise." Id. (quoting Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. United States, 566 F.3d 1257, 1264 (11th Cir. 2009)).
THIS CASEBOOK contains a selection of U. S. Court of Appeals decisions that analyze, interpret and apply the arbitrary and capricious standard under the Administrative Procedure Act. * * * Under Administrative Procedure Act § 706(2)(A), a reviewing court may set aside an agency action if it is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).An agency interpretation would surely be "arbitrary" or "capricious" if it were picked out of a hat, or arrived at with no explanation, even if it might otherwise be deemed reasonable on some unstated ground. Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout v. EPA, 846 F. 3d 492, (2nd Cir. 2017). * * * So long as any change is reasonably explained, it is not arbitrary and capricious for an agency to change its mind in light of experience, or in the face of new or additional evidence, or further analysis or other factors indicating that the agency's earlier decision should be altered or abandoned. Cf. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 514-16 (2009). New England Power Generators Association, Inc. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, (DC Cir. 2018). * * *It is well-settled that the NLRB -- like any other agency -- cannot "turn[] its back on its own precedent and policy without reasoned explanation." Dupuy v. NLRB, 806 F.3d 556, 563 (D.C. Cir. 2015); see also E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. NLRB, 682 F.3d 65, 70 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (explaining that the NLRB must "give a reasoned justification for departing from its precedent"). Generally speaking, "the requirement that an agency provide reasoned explanation for its action ... demand[s] that it display awareness that it is changing position. An agency may not, for example, depart from a prior policy sub silentio or simply disregard rules that are still on the books." FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515, 129 S.Ct. 1800, 173 L.Ed.2d 738 (2009). And if "a party makes a significant showing that analogous cases have been decided differently, the agency must do more than simply ignore that argument." LeMoyne-Owen Coll. v. NLRB, 357 F.3d 55, 61 (D.C. Cir. 2004). Thus, when the Board fails to explain -- or even acknowledge -- its deviation from established precedent, "its decision will be vacated as arbitrary and capricious." Manhattan Ctr. Studios, Inc., v. NLRB, 452 F.3d 813, 816 (D.C. Cir. 2006). ABM Onsite Services v. NLRB, 849 F. 3d 1137 (DC Cir. 2017).
A concise but thorough resource, the guide provides a time-saving reference for the latest case law, and the most recent legislation affecting rulemaking.
From two legal luminaries, a highly original framework for restoring confidence in a government bureaucracy increasingly derided as “the deep state.” Is the modern administrative state illegitimate? Unconstitutional? Unaccountable? Dangerous? Intolerable? American public law has long been riven by a persistent, serious conflict, a kind of low-grade cold war, over these questions. Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule argue that the administrative state can be redeemed, as long as public officials are constrained by what they call the morality of administrative law. Law and Leviathan elaborates a number of principles that underlie this moral regime. Officials who respect that morality never fail to make rules in the first place. They ensure transparency, so that people are made aware of the rules with which they must comply. They never abuse retroactivity, so that people can rely on current rules, which are not under constant threat of change. They make rules that are understandable and avoid issuing rules that contradict each other. These principles may seem simple, but they have a great deal of power. Already, without explicit enunciation, they limit the activities of administrative agencies every day. But we can aspire for better. In more robust form, these principles could address many of the concerns that have critics of the administrative state mourning what they see as the demise of the rule of law. The bureaucratic Leviathan may be an inescapable reality of complex modern democracies, but Sunstein and Vermeule show how we can at last make peace between those who accept its necessity and those who yearn for its downfall.
This book examines statutes governing actions against the federal government, such as the Tucker Act and the Federal Tort Claims Act. The expansion of attorneys' fees recovery against the U.S. made possible by the 1980 Equal Access to Justice Act is treated in detail, as are the changes in contract dispute resolution contained in the Contract Disputes Act of 1978.
Modern administrative law has been the subject of intense and protracted intellectual debate, from legal theorists to such high-profile judicial confirmations as those conducted for Supreme Court justices Neil Gorsuch and Brett Kavanaugh. On one side, defenders of limited government argue that the growth of the administrative state threatens traditional ideas of private property, freedom of contract, and limited government. On the other, modern progressives champion a large administrative state that delegates to key agencies in the executive branch, rather than to Congress, broad discretion to implement major social and institutional reforms. In this book, Richard A. Epstein, one of America’s most prominent legal scholars, provides a withering critique of how theadministrative state has gone astray since the New Deal. First examining how federal administrative powers worked well in an earlier age of limited government, dealing with such issues as land grants, patents, tariffs and government employment contracts, Epstein then explains how modern broad mandates for delegated authority are inconsistent with the rule of law and lead to systematic abuse in a wide range of subject matter areas: environmental law; labor law; food and drug law; communications laws, securities law and more. He offers detailed critiques of major administrative laws that are now under reconsideration in the Supreme Court and provides recommendations as to how the Supreme Court can roll back the administrative state in a coherent way.
An in-depth look at the history, leadership, and structure of the Federal Reserve Bank The independence of the Federal Reserve is considered a cornerstone of its identity, crucial for keeping monetary policy decisions free of electoral politics. But do we really understand what is meant by "Federal Reserve independence"? Using scores of examples from the Fed's rich history, The Power and Independence of the Federal Reserve shows that much common wisdom about the nation's central bank is inaccurate. Legal scholar and financial historian Peter Conti-Brown provides an in-depth look at the Fed's place in government, its internal governance structure, and its relationships to such individuals and groups as the president, Congress, economists, and bankers. Exploring how the Fed regulates the global economy and handles its own internal politics, and how the law does—and does not—define the Fed's power, Conti-Brown captures and clarifies the central bank's defining complexities. He examines the foundations of the Federal Reserve Act of 1913, which established a system of central banks, and the ways that subsequent generations have redefined the organization. Challenging the notion that the Fed Chair controls the organization as an all-powerful technocrat, he explains how institutions and individuals—within and outside of government—shape Fed policy. Conti-Brown demonstrates that the evolving mission of the Fed—including systemic risk regulation, wider bank supervision, and as a guardian against inflation and deflation—requires a reevaluation of the very way the nation's central bank is structured. Investigating how the Fed influences and is influenced by ideologies, personalities, law, and history, The Power and Independence of the Federal Reserve offers a uniquely clear and timely picture of one of the most important institutions in the United States and the world.
William Eskridge and John Ferejohn propose an original theory of constitutional law whereby, while the Constitution provides a vision, our democracy advances by means of statutes that supplement or even supplant the written Constitution.
Anyone interested in 'good government' should read Jerry Mashaw's new book on how the social Security Administration implements congressionally mandated policy for controlled consistent distribution of disability benefits. . . . He offers an important perspective on bureaucracy that must be considered when devising procedures for not only disability determinations but also other forms of administrative adjudication.--Linda A. O'Hare, American Bar Association Journal A major contribution to the ongoing debate about administrative law and mass justice.--Lance Liebman and Richard B. Stewart, Harvard Law Review Profound implications for the future of democratic government. . . . Practical, analytical policymaking for a complex decision system of great significance to many Americans.--Paul R. Verkuil, Yale Law Journal An exceptionally valuable book for anyone who is concerned about the role of law in the administrative state. Mashaw manages to range broadly without becoming superficial, and to present a coherent and challenging theory in lively, readable prose. Bureaucratic Justice seems certain to become a standard reference work for administrative lawyers, and for anyone else who seeks the elusive goal of developing more humane and more effective public bureaucracies.--Barry Boyer, Michigan Law Review Strongly recommended for use in graduate seminars in public policy or law. . . . If we are to develop a positive model of bureaucratic competence, we must answer the insightful questions rased in this cogent book.--David L. Martin, American Political Science Review Mashaw provides an excellent analysis of middle range processes of decision making.--Gerald Turkel, Qualitative Sociology Stimulating and provocative and . . . makes a contribution to the ongoing dialogue about due process in public administration.... It is tightly organized, cogently argued, and full of pithy historical illustrations. . . . One of the best such works in many years. --Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science A thoughtful, challenging, and very useful book.--Choice Inspires a new direction in administrative law scholarship.--A.I. Ogus, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies