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With the assistance of several scholars, including James M. McPherson and Gary Gallagher, and a long-time specialist in Civil War books, Ralph Newman, David Eicher has selected for inclusion in The Civil War in Books the 1,100 most important books on the war. These are organized into categories as wide-ranging as "Battles and Campaigns," "Biographies, Memoirs, and Letters," "Unit Histories," and "General Works." The last of these includes volumes on black Americans and the war, battlefields, fiction, pictorial works, politics, prisons, railroads, and a host of other topics. Annotations are included for all entries in the work, which is presented in an oversized 8 1/2 x 11 inch volume in two-column format. Appendixes list "prolific" Civil War publishers and other Civil War bibliographies, and the works included in Eicher's mammoth undertaking are indexed by author or editor and by title. Gary Gallagher's foreword traces the development of Civil War bibliographies and declares that Eicher's annotation exceeds that of any previous comprehensive volume. The Civil War in Books, Gallagher believes, is "precisely the type of guide" that has been needed. The first full-scale, fully-annotated bibliography on the Civil War to appear in more than thirty years, Eicher's The Civil War in Books is a remarkable compendium of the best reading available about the worst conflict ever to strike the United States. The bibliography, the most valuable reference book on the subject since The Civil War Day by Day, will be essential for college and university libraries, dealers in rare and secondhand books, and Civil War buffs.
How the Civil War changed the face of war The Civil War represented a momentous change in the character of war. It combined the projection of military might across a continent on a scale never before seen with an unprecedented mass mobilization of peoples. Yet despite the revolutionizing aspects of the Civil War, its leaders faced the same uncertainties and vagaries of chance that have vexed combatants since the days of Thucydides and the Peloponnesian War. A Savage War sheds critical new light on this defining chapter in military history. In a masterful narrative that propels readers from the first shots fired at Fort Sumter to the surrender of Robert E. Lee's army at Appomattox, Williamson Murray and Wayne Wei-siang Hsieh bring every aspect of the battlefield vividly to life. They show how this new way of waging war was made possible by the powerful historical forces unleashed by the Industrial Revolution and the French Revolution, yet how the war was far from being simply a story of the triumph of superior machines. Despite the Union’s material superiority, a Union victory remained in doubt for most of the war. Murray and Hsieh paint indelible portraits of Abraham Lincoln, Ulysses S. Grant, William Tecumseh Sherman, and other major figures whose leadership, judgment, and personal character played such decisive roles in the fate of a nation. They also examine how the Army of the Potomac, the Army of Northern Virginia, and the other major armies developed entirely different cultures that influenced the war’s outcome. A military history of breathtaking sweep and scope, A Savage War reveals how the Civil War ushered in the age of modern warfare.
With Blood Image, Paul Anderson shows that the symbol of a man can be just as important as the man himself. Turner Ashby was one of the most famous fighting men of the Civil War. Rising to colonel of the 7th Virginia Cavalry, Ashby fought brilliantly under Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson during the 1862 Shenandoah Valley campaign until he died in battle. Anderson demonstrates that Ashby's image -- a catalytic, mesmerizing, and often contradictory combination of southern antebellum cultural ideals and wartime hopes and fears -- emerged during his own lifetime and was not a later creation of the Lost Cause. The stylistic synergy of Anderson's startling narrative design fuels a poignant irony: men like Ashby -- a chivalrous, charismatic "knight" who had difficulty complying with Stonewall Jackson's authority -- become trapped by the desire to have their real lives reflect their imagined ones.
In a groundbreaking, comprehensive history of the Army of Northern Virginia's retreat from Gettysburg in July 1863, Kent Masterson Brown draws on previously untapped sources to chronicle the massive effort of General Robert E. Lee and his command as they sought to move people, equipment, and scavenged supplies through hostile territory and plan the army's next moves. Brown reveals that even though the battle of Gettysburg was a defeat for the Army of Northern Virginia, Lee's successful retreat maintained the balance of power in the eastern theater and left his army with enough forage, stores, and fresh meat to ensure its continued existence as an effective force.
It has long been a trope of Civil War history that Gettysburg was an accidental battlefield. General Lee, the old story goes, marched blindly into Pennsylvania while his chief cavalryman Jeb Stuart rode and raided incommunicado. Meanwhile, General Meade, in command only a few days, gave uncertain chase to an enemy whose exact positions he did not know. And so these ignorant armies clashed by first light at Gettysburg on July 1, 1863. In the spirit of his iconoclastic Lee’s Real Plan at Gettysburg, Troy D. Harman argues for a new interpretation: once Lee invaded Pennsylvania and the Union army pursued, a battle at Gettysburg was entirely predictable, perhaps inevitable. Most Civil War battles took place along major roads, railroads, and waterways; the armies needed to move men and equipment, and they needed water for men, horses, and artillery. And yet this perspective hasn’t been fully explored when it comes to Gettysburg. Look at an 1863 map, says Harman: look at the area framed in the north by the Susquehanna River and in the south by the Potomac, in the east by the Northern Central Railroad and in the west by the Cumberland Valley Railroad. This is where the armies played a high-stakes game of chess in late June 1863. Their movements were guided by strategies of caution and constrained by roads, railroads, mountains and mountain passes, rivers and creeks, all of which led the armies to Gettysburg. It’s true that Lee was disadvantaged by Stuart’s roaming and Meade by his newness to command, which led both to default to the old strategic and logistical bedrocks they learned at West Point—and these instincts helped reinforce the magnetic pull toward Gettysburg. Moreover, once the battle started, Harman argues, the blue and gray fought tactically for the two creeks—Marsh and Rock, essential for watering men and horses and sponging artillery—that mark the battlefield in the east and the west as well as for the roadways that led to Gettysburg from all points of the compass. This is a perspective often overlooked in many accounts of the battle, which focus on the high ground—the Round Tops, Cemetery Hill—as key tactical objectives. Gettysburg Ranger and historian Troy Harman draws on a lifetime of researching the Civil War and more than thirty years of studying the terrain of Gettysburg and south-central Pennsylvania and northern Maryland to reframe the story of the Battle of Gettysburg. In the process he shows there’s still much to say about one of history’s most written-about battles. This is revisionism of the best kind.
A companion volume to Taken at the Flood, this work identifies areas of research and in-depth source material for studies of the Maryland Campaign of 1862.
Though the efficient movement of men, supplies, and equipment was a fundamental component of the civil war, Earl J. Hess’s Civil War Logistics is the first comprehensive study of the logistical systems that allowed the Union and Confederate armies to wage war. According to Hess, the Federal logistical effort was far more successful than the Confederate attempt to move and supply southern armies. This was due mainly to limited resources in the South but also to the North’s administrative management and a willingness to seize transportation resources when it needed them. Hess concludes that the logistical superiority of the northern forces laid a vital foundation for Union victory in the Civil War.