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The alternating double auction market institution is presented as a discrete time version of the open outcry market. The game in extensive form is analyzed in an almost perfect information setting, using the concept of subgame perfectness. By applying two new equilibrium selection criteria, a general existence result is obtained for "impatience equilibria" of the game. All such equilibria are shown to have unique properties concerning the traded quantities and prices. The most important results are that the equilibrium prices are independent of the number of traders and are always very close to - if not inside - the range of competitive prices. The latter can be evaluated as game theoretic support for the convergence of prices to the competitive price. The process of price formation is traced by applying the learning direction theory and introducing the "anchor price hypothesis".
This book focuses on markets organized as double auctions in which both buyers and sellers can submit bids and asks for standardized units of well-defined commodities and securities. It examines evidence from the laboratory and computer simulations.
This book provides a new bidding strategy for agents to adopt in continuous double auctions (CDAs) and proposes some generally used tools to enhance the performance of existing bidding strategies in CDAs. It is the first book to focus on CDAs where a limited amount of seller agents and buyer agents trade what they want. The superior performance of the new bidding strategy and the tools proposed by this book are illustrated through extensive experiments.
The increasing importance of intelligent agents and their impact on industry/business worldwide is well documented through academic research papers and industrial reports. There is a strong affinity between the Web a worldwide distributed computing environment and the capability of intelligent agents to act on and through software. The ultimate goal of intelligent agents is to accelerate the evolution of the Web from a passive, static medium to a tuned, highly valued environment. This volume contains selected papers from PRIMA 2001, the fourth Pacific Rim International Workshop on Multi-Agents, held in Taipei, Taiwan, July 28-29, 2001. In this volume, the papers cover specification, modeling, and applications of intelligent agents. PRIMA is a series of workshops on autonomous agents and multi-agent systems, integrating the activities in Asia and the Pacific Rim countries. PRIMA 2001 built on the great success of its predecessors, PRIMA98 i n Singapore, PRIMA99 i n Kyoto, Japan, and PRIMA 2000 in Melbourne, Australia. The aim of PRIMA 2001 was to bring together researchers from Asia and the Pacific Rim and developers from academia and industry to report on the latest technical advances or domain applications and to discuss and explore scientific and practical problems as raised by the participants.
The explosive growth in computational power over the past several decades offers new tools and opportunities for economists. This handbook volume surveys recent research on Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE), the computational study of economic processes modeled as dynamic systems of interacting agents. Empirical referents for "agents" in ACE models can range from individuals or social groups with learning capabilities to physical world features with no cognitive function. Topics covered include: learning; empirical validation; network economics; social dynamics; financial markets; innovation and technological change; organizations; market design; automated markets and trading agents; political economy; social-ecological systems; computational laboratory development; and general methodological issues.*Every volume contains contributions from leading researchers*Each Handbook presents an accurate, self-contained survey of a particular topic *The series provides comprehensive and accessible surveys
An examination of an area of economic research whereby economists have begun to use laboratories to evaluate economic propositions under carefully controlled conditions. The authors argue for the effectiveness of this technique in selected circumstances.
Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE) is a new discipline of economics, largely grounded on concepts like evolution, auto-organisation and emergence: it intensively uses computer simulations as well as artificial intelligence, mostly based on multi-agents systems. The purpose of this book is to give an up-to date view of the scientific production in the fields of Agent-based Computational Economics (mainly in Market Finance and Game Theory). Based on communications given at AE'2005 (Lille, USTL, France), this book offers a wide panorama of recent advances in ACE (both theoretical and methodological) that will interest academics as well as practitioners.
A broad overview of market mechanisms, with an emphasis on the interplay between theory and real-life applications; examples range from eBay auctions to school choice. This book offers an introduction to market design, providing students with a broad overview of issues related to the design and analysis of market mechanisms. It defines a market as a demand and a supply, without specifying a price system or mechanism. This allows the text to analyze a broad set of situations—including such unconventional markets as college admissions and organ donation—and forces readers to pay attention to details that might otherwise be overlooked. Students often complain that microeconomics is too abstract and disconnected from reality; the study of market design shows how theory can help solve existing, real-life problems. The book focuses on the interplay between theory and applications. To keep the text as accessible as possible, special effort has been made to minimize formal description of the models while emphasizing the intuitive, with detailed explanations and resolution of examples. Appendixes offer general reviews of elements of game theory and mechanism design that are related to the themes explored in the book, presenting the basic concepts with as many explanations and illustrations as possible. The book covers topics including the basics of simple auctions; eBay auctions; Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auctions; keyword auctions, with examples from Google and Facebook; spectrum auctions; financial markets, with discussions of treasury auctions and IPOs; trading on the stock market; the basic matching model; medical match; assignment problems; probabilistic assignments; school choice; course allocation, with examples from Harvard and Wharton; and kidney exchange.
This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.