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[Illustrated with 3 figures and 8 maps] In 1944, the 4th Armored Division played a central role in one of the more remarkable campaigns in American military history - Third Army’s pursuit across France, which was capped off by the encirclement and capture of Nancy. In the course of this campaign, the 4th Armored Division practiced a mode of warfare that has since become known to the Army as AirLand Battle. In as much as the encirclement of Nancy is one of the few historical examples that shows American mechanized forces waging war in accordance with the tenets of AirLand Battle, anyone seeking a deeper appreciation of today’s doctrine would do well to study this campaign carefully. The 4th Armored Division in the Encirclement of Nancy originated at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College as an introductory class for a course on modern division level operations. It is a companion piece to The Lorraine Campaign: An Overview, September-December 1944, published in February 1985.
In 1944, the 4th Armored Division played a central role in one of the more remarkable campaigns in American military history-Third Army's pursuit across France, which was capped off by the encirclement and capture of Nancy. In the course of this campaign, the 4th Armored Division practiced a mode of warfare that has since become known to the Army as AirLand Battle. Inasmuch as the encircle ment of Nancy is one of the few historical examples that shows American mechanized forces waging war in accordance with the tenets of AirLand Battle, anyone seeking a deeper appreciation of today's doctrine would do well to study this campaign carefully. The 4th Armored Division in the Encirclement of Nancy originated at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College as an introductory class for a course on modern division-level operations. It is a companion piece to The Lorraine Campaign: An Overview, September-December 1944, published in February 1985.
In September 1944 Hitler ordered an attack on Gen. George Patton's Third Army, which was deep inside France making for the Rhine and threatening the German industrial heartland beyond. The ensuing battle near Arracourt--the U.S. Army's largest tank-versus-tank clash until the Bulge--went badly for the Germans, who committed their armor piecemeal and whose offensive was shattered in a series of intense, close-range tank duels with the Americans. Armor expert Steven Zaloga deftly reconstructs the battle and shows how American Sherman tanks bested superior German Panthers.
Little has been published on US armored infantry units and tactics over the years. However, their contribution to the war effort was hugely important. There were a total of 57 armored infantry battalions and two regiments that served throughout the war and in all theaters. Equipped with halftracks, they fought as part of combined arms teams and combat commands alongside tanks, tank destroyers and artillery battalions. Significantly, they were not simply standard infantry battalions provided with halftracks. Their company and platoon organization was very different from the standard infantry unit and these highly mobile, heavily armed battalions fought in an entirely different manner. Using period training manuals and combat reports this book provides an exclusive look at the unique tactics developed by US armored infantry units including movement formations and battle drills.
In September 2010, James G. Pierce, a retired U.S. Army colonel with the Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, published a study on Army organizational culture. Pierce postulated that "the ability of a professional organization to develop future leaders in a manner that perpetuates readiness to cope with future environmental and internal uncertainty depends on organizational culture." He found that today's U.S. Army leadership "may be inadequately prepared to lead the profession toward future success." The need to prepare for future success dovetails with the use of the concepts of mission command. This book offers up a set of recommendations, based on those mission command concepts, for adopting a superior command culture through education and training. Donald E. Vandergriff believes by implementing these recommendations across the Army, that other necessary and long-awaited reforms will take place.
From the Preface: The following pages provide a narrative analysis of the U.S. Army's development of armored organizations and their related doctrine, materiel, and training activities in the period 1917-1945. This period marked the emergence of clear principles of armored warfare that became the underpinning of the Armor Branch, influencing armored developments long after World War II ended. A unique style of mounted maneuver combat emerged that reflected a mix of tradition an innovation. In the process, American military culture changed, particularly through the adoption of combined-arms principles. Conversely, political actions, budgetary considerations, and senior leadership decisions also shaped the course of armor development. The emergence of an American armored force involved more than simply tank development. It included the creation of an armored division structure steeped in combined-arms principles, organizational flexibility, and revolutionary command and control processes. Parallel developments included the establishment of specialized units to provide antitank, reconnaissance, and infantry support capabilities. Several Army branches played a role in determining the precise path of armored development, and one of them-the Cavalry-became a casualty as a result.
A photo-packed account of how the tanks of 4th Armored Division defeated two panzer brigades over eleven days of battle at Arracourt: “An enjoyable read.” —AMPS September 1944: With the Allies closing in on the Rhine, Adolf Hitler orders a counterattack on General Patton’s Third Army in France. Near the small French town of Arracourt, elements of the US 4th Armored Division meet the grizzled veterans of the 5th Panzer Army in combat. Atop their M4 Shermans, American tank crews square off against the technologically superior Mark V Panther tanks of the Wehrmacht. Yet through a combination of superior tactics, leadership, teamwork, and small-unit initiative, the outnumbered American forces win a decisive victory against the 5th Panzer Army. Indeed, of the 262 tanks and mobile assault guns fielded by German forces at Arracourt, 200 were damaged or destroyed by enemy fire. The Americans, by contrast, lost only 48 tanks. Following the collapse of the German counterattack, Patton’s Third Army found itself within striking distance of the Third Reich’s borderlands. The battle of Arracourt was the US Army’s largest tank battle until the Ardennes Offensive in December 1944. It helped pave the way for the final Allied assault into Germany, and showed how tactical ingenuity and adaptive leadership can overcome an enemy’s superior size or technological strength. This extensively illustrated book recounts the dramatic story. “An interesting study of small-unit leadership that emphasizes the importance of tank-crew training, the value of a reliable logistics system and effects of weather on battlefield activities.” —ARMOR Magazine “This well-written book explains how U.S. forces won this critical battle.” —WWII History Magazine “Enjoyable . . . includes some nicely done full color profiles of some of the tanks involved.” —ModelingMadness.com
This work proposes the reorganization of America's ground forces on the strategic, operational and tactical levels. Central to the proposal is the simple thesis that the U.S. Army must take control of its future by exploiting the emerging revolution in military affairs. The analysis argues that a new Army warfighting organization will not only be more deployable and effective in Joint operations; reorganized information age ground forces will be significantly less expensive to operate, maintain, and modernize than the Army's current Cold War division-based organizations. And while ground forces must be equipped with the newest Institute weapons, new technology will not fulfill its promise of shaping the battlefield to American advantage if new devices are merely grafted on to old organizations that are not specifically designed to exploit them. It is not enough to rely on the infusion of new, expensive technology into the American defense establishment to preserve America's strategic dominance in the next century. The work makes it clear that planes, ships, and missiles cannot do the job of defending America's global security issues alone. The United States must opt for reform and reorganization of the nation's ground forces and avoid repeating Britain's historic mistake of always fielding an effective army just in time to avoid defeat, but too late to deter an aggressor.