Download Free Terrorism Afghanistan And Americas New Way Of War Book in PDF and EPUB Free Download. You can read online Terrorism Afghanistan And Americas New Way Of War and write the review.

"Although many books have examined 11 September and its aftermath, this work is the first to study an evolving U.S. tactical style that follows the new network-centric pattern and the first to use Afghanistan as a test of that pattern. The book also fully explores the contributions made by the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps while fighting in the landlocked country as well as the importance of the future use of maritime power. Friedman does not neglect to acknowledge the role played by politics, including the ethnic politics of Pakistan. Indeed, the author's careful examination of these new warfare concepts as applied to the Afghan War provides valuable lessons to those concerned about future conflicts."--BOOK JACKET.
The Attack On The World Trade Center And The Pentagon On September 11, 2001, And The U.S. Government Response, Especially After The Bombing Of Afghanistan, Transformed U.S. And Global Politics. The New Crusade Examines The Myths That Have Arisen Around The War On Terrorism And The Ways They Are Used To Benefit A Small Elite. Mahajan Demonstrates How Accepted Accounts Of The Causes Of The U.S. Military Intervention In Afghanistan, The Conduct Of The War, And Its Consequences Have Been Systematically Distorted.
A high-ranking general's gripping insider account of the U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and how it all went wrong. Over a thirty-five-year career, Daniel Bolger rose through the army infantry to become a three-star general, commanding in both theaters of the U.S. campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. He participated in meetings with top-level military and civilian players, where strategy was made and managed. At the same time, he regularly carried a rifle alongside rank-and-file soldiers in combat actions, unusual for a general. Now, as a witness to all levels of military command, Bolger offers a unique assessment of these wars, from 9/11 to the final withdrawal from the region. Writing with hard-won experience and unflinching honesty, Bolger makes the firm case that in Iraq and in Afghanistan, we lost -- but we didn't have to. Intelligence was garbled. Key decision makers were blinded by spreadsheets or theories. And, at the root of our failure, we never really understood our enemy. Why We Lost is a timely, forceful, and compulsively readable account of these wars from a fresh and authoritative perspective.
"Although many books have examined 11 September and its aftermath, this work is the first to study an evolving U.S. tactical style that follows the new network-centric pattern and the first to use Afghanistan as a test of that pattern. The book also fully explores the contributions made by the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps while fighting in the landlocked country as well as the importance of the future use of maritime power. Friedman does not neglect to acknowledge the role played by politics, including the ethnic politics of Pakistan. Indeed, the author's careful examination of these new warfare concepts as applied to the Afghan War provides valuable lessons to those concerned about future conflicts."--BOOK JACKET.
Perspectives on the American Way of War examines salient cases of American experience in irregular warfare, focusing upon the post-World War II era. This book asks why recent misfires have emerged in irregular warfare from an institutional, professional, and academic context which regularly produces evidence that there is in fact no lack of understanding of both irregular challenges and correct responses. Expert contributors explore the reasoning behind the inability to achieve victory, however defined, and argue that what security professionals have failed to fully recognize, even today, is that what is at issue is not warfare suffused with politics but rather the very opposite, politics suffused with warfare. Perspectives on the American Way of War will be of great interest to scholars of war and conflict studies, strategic and military studies, insurgency and counterinsurgency, and terrorism and counterterrorism. The book was originally published as a special issue of Small Wars & Insurgencies.
The defense debate tends to treat Afghanistan as either a revolution or a fluke: either the "Afghan Model" of special operations forces (SOF) plus precision munitions plus an indigenous ally is a widely applicable template for American defense planning, or it is a nonreplicable product of local idiosyncrasies. In fact, it is neither. The Afghan campaign of last fall and winter was actually much closer to a typical 20th century mid-intensity conflict, albeit one with unusually heavy fire support for one side. And this view has very different implications than either proponents or skeptics of the Afghan Model now claim. Afghan Model skeptics often point to Afghanistan's unusual culture of defection or the Taliban's poor skill or motivation as grounds for doubting the war's relevance to the future. Afghanistan's culture is certainly unusual, and there were many defections. The great bulk, however, occurred after the military tide had turned not before-hand. They were effects, not causes. The Afghan Taliban were surely unskilled and ill-motivated. The non-Afghan al Qaeda, however, have proven resolute and capable fighters. Their host's collapse was not attributable to any al Qaeda shortage of commitment or training. Afghan Model proponents, by contrast, credit precision weapons with annihilating enemies at a distance before they could close with our commandos or indigenous allies. Hence the model's broad utility: with SOF-directed bombs doing the real killing, even ragtag local militias will suffice as allies. All they need do is screen U.S. commandos from the occasional hostile survivor and occupy the abandoned ground thereafter. Yet the actual fighting in Afghanistan involved substantial close combat. Al Qaeda counterattackers closed, unseen, to pointblank range of friendly forces in battles at Highway 4 and Sayed Slim Kalay.
Based on hundreds of oral interviews and unclassified documents, this study offers a comprehensive chronological narrative of the first four years of Operation Enduring Freedom.
Tom Engelhardt' creator of the vital website TomDispatch.com' takes a scalpel to the American urge to dominate the globe. Tracing developments from 9/11 to late last night' this is an unforgettable anatomy of a disaster that is yet to end. Since 2001' Tom Engelhardt has written regular reports for his popular site Tom Dispatch that have provided badly - needed insight into U.S. militarism and its effects' both at home and abroad. When others were celebrating the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq' he warned of the enormous dangers of both occupations.
At almost nine years, the U.S. war in Afghanistan is the longest in our history, surpassing even the Vietnam War, and it will shortly surpass the Soviet Union's own extended military campaign there. With the surge, it will cost the U.S. taxpayers nearly $100 billion per year, a sum roughly seven times larger than Afghanistan's annual gross national product (GNP) of $14 billion and greater than the total annual cost of the new U.S. health insurance program. Thousands of American and allied personnel have been killed or gravely wounded. The U.S. interests at stake in Afghanistan do not warrant this level of sacrifice. President Obama justified expanding our commitment by saying the goal was eradicating Al Qaeda. Yet Al Qaeda is no longer a significant presence in Afghanistan, and there are only some 400 hard-core Al Qaeda members remaining in the entire Af/Pak theater, most of them hiding in Pakistan's northwest provinces. America's armed forces have fought bravely and well, and their dedication is unquestioned. But we should not ask them to make sacrifices unnecessary to our core national interests, particularly when doing so threatens long-term needs and priorities both at home and abroad. Instead of toppling terrorists, America's Afghan war has become an ambitious and fruitless effort at "nation-building." We are mired in a civil war in Afghanistan and are struggling to establish an effective central government in a country that has long been fragmented and decentralized. No matter how desirable this objective might be in the abstract, it is not essential to U.S. security and it is not a goal for which the U.S. military is well suited. There is no clear definition of what would comprise 'success' in this endeavor. Creating a unified Afghan state would require committing many more American lives and hundreds of billions of additional U.S. dollars for many years to come. The bottom line is clear: Our vital interests in Afghanistan are limited and military victory is not the key to achieving them.