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The modern US Army as we know it was largely created in the years between the two world wars. Prior to World War I, officers in leadership positions were increasingly convinced that building a new army could not take place as a series of random developments but was an enterprise that had to be guided by a distinct military policy that enjoyed the support of the nation. In 1920, Congress accepted that idea and embodied it in the National Defense Act. In doing so it also accepted army leadership’s idea of entrusting America’s security to a unique force, the Citizen Army, and tasked the nation’s Regular Army with developing and training that force. Creating the Modern Army details the efforts of the Regular Army to do so in the face of austerity budgets and public apathy while simultaneously responding to the challenges posed by the new and revolutionary mechanization of warfare. In this book Woolley focuses on the development of what he sees as the four major features of the modernized army that emerged due to these efforts. These included the creation of the civilian components of the new army: the Citizen’s Military Training Camps, the Officer Reserve Corps, the National Guard, and the Reserve Officer Training Corps; the development of the four major combat branches as the structural basis for organizing the army as well as creating the means to educate new officers and soldiers about their craft and to socialize them into an army culture; the creation of a rationalized and progressive system of professional military education; and the initial mechanization of the combat branches. Woolley also points out how the development of the army in this period was heavily influenced by policies and actions of the president and Congress. The US Army that fought World War II was clearly a citizen army whose leadership was largely trained within the framework of the institutions of the army created by the National Defense Act. The way that army fought the war may have been less decisive and more costly in terms of lives and money than it should have been. But that army won the war and therefore validated the citizen army as the US way of war.
Nestled in Vietnam’s Thua Thien Province, west of the city of Hue, and bordering Laos, the narrow 40-kilometer long A Shau Valley, situated between densely forested mountain ranges, witnessed prolonged campaigning throughout the Vietnam War and served as a hub of the Communist supply network as well as a key point of access to South Vietnam. Drawing upon an impressive array of archival materials, this deeply researched book offers the first comprehensive account of operations and battles that transpired there during the war, coupled with a trenchant analysis of the American failure to wrest control of the Valley despite years of commitment of troops and resources, and how that failure contributed to the final outcome of the war. In so doing, it not only sheds light on where military tactics and strategy devised by American leaders went awry, but also traces the extraordinary acts of heroism on the part of American soldiers, many of whom lost their lives fighting the North Vietnamese in this hostile, forbidding terrain. This book, which fills a gap in the historiography of the Vietnam War, will appeal to scholars seeking to enhance their understanding of major events and turning points in the war, as well as to students of military history and strategy.
This paper focuses on the formulation of doctrine since World War II. In no comparable period in history have the dimensions of the battlefield been so altered by rapid technological changes. The need for the tactical doctrines of the Army to remain correspondingly abreast of these changes is thus more pressing than ever before. Future conflicts are not likely to develop in the leisurely fashions of the past where tactical doctrines could be refined on the battlefield itself. It is, therefore, imperative that we apprehend future problems with as much accuracy as possible. One means of doing so is to pay particular attention to the business of how the Army's doctrine has developed historically, with a view to improving methods of future development.