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Includes over 14 photos and maps More than fifty years after World War II, America’s major air power contribution to the war in Europe-in efforts such as Big Week, Regensburg, and Patton’s dash across Europe-live on in the memories of airmen and students of air power. Never before had air forces performed so many roles in so many different types of operations. Air power proved to be extremely flexible: wartime missions included maintaining air superiority, controlling the air space over the battlefield; strategic bombardment, destroying the enemy’s industrial and logistical network; air-ground support, attacking targets on the battlefield; and military airlift, delivering war materiel to distant bases. Perhaps one of the least known but significant roles of the Army Air Forces (AAF) was in antisubmarine warfare, particularly in the European-African-Middle Eastern theater. From the coasts of Greenland, Europe, and Africa to the mid-Atlantic, AAF aircraft hunted German U-boats that sank thousands of British and American transport ships early in the war. These missions supplemented the efforts of the Royal Navy, the Royal Air Force Coastal Command, and the U.S. Navy, and helped those sea forces to wrest control of the sea lanes from German submarines.
The year 2001 marks the centenary of the Royal Navy's submarine service. In the aftermath of the 2016 celebrations of the Battle of Jutland centenary, it is worth considering how the First World War at sea changed. This volume opens with an examination of the background to the Board of Admiralty's decision in 1900 to buy submarines, bringing to light documents that go a long way toward dispelling the myth that Britain's pre-1914 naval leaders were opposed to the development of the submarine as a major weapon. Indeed, the documents show that senior naval officers and influential civilians in Whitehall believed that the advent of the submarine would revolutionize naval warfare in a way that would bolster the Royal Navy's position as the world's predominant naval power. This edited selection of documents illustrates not only the Admiralty's thinking on the employment of the submarine between 1900 and 1918, it also charts the technical development of British submarines, and explains issues such as why the pioneer submariners came to regard themselves as an élite group within the Royal Navy - and were allowed to become the 'silent service'.
This book takes a fresh look at the undersea war as a whole and all the complex factors bearing on the campaign, only one of which was convoy. Its analysis is original, and its conclusions thought-provoking – an important contribution to the naval history of the Great War.
Contains the 4th session of the 28th Parliament through the 1st session of the 48th Parliament.
The classic problem of when to depend on lessons learned from previous conflicts and when to employ new tactics and technology always confronts military leaders. At the beginning of World War II, for example, Allied naval strategists were prepared to do battle using traditional tactics against surface vessels, but - this study contends - not against submarines; because the strategists failed to appreciate either the damage done by submarines in World War I or the tactics that had worked successfully against them. Consequently, from the beginning of World War II to mid-1943, German U-boats were able to mount a devastating campaign against Allied shipping. In Slide Rules and Submarines, Montgomery Meigs describes how the allies learned to counter the U-boat threat. Using new technology - and new tactics derived from scientific methods - they devised countermeasures to defeat the German submarine menace. Then, continuing to apply those successful measures, they went on to negate the Japanese submarine threat in the Pacific. The author cites the crucial role of civilian scientists - the "outsiders" - who worked with military staffs and operational commanders of the campaign at sea. Their open minds and objective methods were essential for the application of such tactical advances as sonar and radar, acoustic torpedoes, depth finders, and code breaking to the battle. As this study illustrates, the importance of such timely and innovative cooperation among scientists, the research and development community, and military commanders in bringing technological knowledge to bear for operational and strategic advantage cannot be overstated. Meigs study of how such cooperation succeeded in the crucible of wartime crisis is itself an example of how the lessons of the past can serve us well today. J. A. Baldwin Vice Admiral, United States Navy President, National Defense University