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Herbert Hochberg is one of the most influential analytical philosophers and one of the most influential critics of analytical philosophy. He disputed with almost all leading analytical philosophers, from Quine, Goodman and Wilfrid Sellars to David Lewis and David Armstrong. His point of view is ontological and he harks back to the origins of analytical philosophy where he finds unknown precursors of current views. And he finds parallels to contemporary non-analytic philosophies. In his own ontology he tries to dispense with simple particulars.
Thought, Fact, and Reference was first published in 1978.Against a background of criticism of alternative accounts, Professor Hochberg presents an analysis of thought, reference, and truth within the tradition of logical atomism. He analyzes G. E. Moore's early attack on idealism and examines the influence of Moore on the development of Bertrand Russell's and Ludwig Wittgenstein's logical atomism. He traces an early divergence between Russell and Wittgenstein, on the one side, and Moore and Gottlob Frege on the other, into variants recently advocated by Wilfrid Sellars, Gustav Bergmann, and others. The work will be of interest to professional philosophers, graduate students in philosophy, and linguists with interests in philosophy.
This work is both an excellent primer in the development of twentieth-century philosophy, and at the same time, a critique of its linguistic excesses and separation from the world as such. Herbert Hochberg takes as his cue the words of Bertrand Russell that "absorption in language sometimes leads to a neglect of the connection of language with non-linguistic facts, although it is this connection that gives meaning to words and significance to sentences." Introducing Analytic Philosophy is a balanced effort to stay within the linguistic turns that have characterized philosophy in the past century. The author does this by a review of those philosophies that treat things and facts seriously. It is Hochberg's contention that the classical focus on ontology, combined with precise and careful formulations that marked the writings of the early founders of the analytic tradition, has degenerated into the spinning of intricate webs of verbal analysis. The latter supposedly yield theories of meaning, but more often signal the rebirth of idealism in the guises of anti-realism and internal realism. The focus on the world, as what words are about, is often lost by analytic philosophers who concentrate on language itself at the cost of the world itself. Such trends toward linguistic exclusivity have come to typify analytic tradition in the United States and the United Kingdom, as well as continental European tendencies. Hochberg is unafraid of a polemical accounting of those trends that display arrogance toward and ignorance of the philosophical tradition that such tendencies illustrate, even in influential works. The book discusses in depth the early works of Frege, Meinong, and Bradley, and follows these with examinations of Russell, Wittgenstein, and other important, if lesser-known works. The author notes the processes by which the early analytic tradition, with its careful and precise formulations, was sometimes transformed into dismissal of real-world concerns as such. The work is clear and incisive. It can be read with great benefit by scientists and students of culture, no less than specialists in the history of philosophy. Herbert Hochberg is professor of philosophy at the University of Texas in Austin. Among his works are critical related essays in Philosophical Studies, Methodos, Nous, and a series of edited volumes.
This edited volume systematically addresses the connection between Wilfrid Sellars and the history of modern philosophy, exploring both the content and method of this relationship. It intends both to analyze Sellars’ position in relation to singular thinkers of the modern tradition, and to inquire into Sellars’ understanding of philosophy as a field in reflective and constructive conversation with its past. The chapters in Part I cover Sellars’ interpretation and use of Descartes, Leibniz, Hume, Kant, and Hegel. Part II features essays on his relationship with Peirce, Frege, Carnap, Wittgenstein, American pragmatism, behaviorism, and American realism, particularly his father, Roy Wood. Sellars and the History of Modern Philosophy features original contributions by many of the most renowned Sellars scholars throughout the world. It offers an exhaustive survey of Sellars’ views on the historical antecedents and meta-philosophical aspects of his thought.
All except three of the papers in this volume were presented at the colloquium on "L'Ontologie formelle aujourd'hui", Geneva, 3-5 June 1988. The three exceptions, the papers by David Armstrong, Uwe Meixner and Wolfgang Lenzen, were presented at the colloquium on "Properties", Zinal, June 1-3, 1990. It was, incidentally, at the second of these two colloquia that the European Society for Analytic Philosophy came into being. The fathers of analytic philosophy - Moore and Russell - were in no doubt that ontology or metaphysics as well as the topics oflanguage, truth and logic constituted the core subject-matter of their "analytic realism", 1 for the task of metaphysics as they conceived things was the description of 2 the world. And logic and ontology are indissolubly linked in the system of the grandfather of analytic philosophy, Frege. After the Golden Age of analytic philosophy - in Cambridge and Austria - opposition to realism as well as the "linguistic turn" contributed for a long time to the eclipse of ontology. 3 Thanks in large measure to the work of some of the senior contributors to the present volume - Roderick Chisholm, Herbert Hochberg, David Armstrong and Karel Lambert - ontology and metaphysics now enjoy once again the central position they occupied some eighty years ago in the heyday of analytic philosophy.
Hochberg's masterful essays present studies in ontology and analysis that focus on the "revolt against idealism" strongly identified with the brilliant trio of Bertrand Russell, G. E. Moore, and Ludwig Wittgenstein in the early part of the twentieth century. The chapters focus upon the development of analytic philosophy and revival of realism. The volume is at once a history of a special period, time, and place in the evolution of the analytic tradition, an examination of influences upon and differences among these three major figures, and a close reading of their primary works. The author takes up the problems posed by reference and predication, truth, facts, causality, dispositions, intentionality, propositions, particulars and universals, the analytic-synthetic distinction, logicism. abstract entities, and materialism. The essays present a systematic analysis of such issues in the context of classical works of these three Cambridge philosophers, who were all critical to the development of modern philosophy. For those who wish to understand the essential contours of the work of these exemplars of the analytic tradition, there can be no more impressive work. Hochberg is more than a commentator; he is a participant in major debates within philosophy. Indeed, his critique of materialism and defense of realism rests on a sophisticated examination of the status of mental states or phenomenal objects in the world, and the inability of all varieties of reductionism to explain the universe. The materialist is in the same situation as the extreme idealists: denial either of mental states or physical states. For Hochberg, the old argument that only physical or mental states are real has littleto do with the phenomena about us. The great strength of Cambridge philosophy is in mov
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The book contains the first systematic study of the ontology and metaphysics of Gustav Bergmann, tracing their development from early (1940s) criticisms of Carnap’s semantical theories in Introduction to Semantics, to their culmination in his 1992 New Foundations of Ontology. This involves a detailed study of the implicit metaphysical doctrines in Carnap’s important, but long neglected, 1942 book and their connection to his influential views on reference, truth and modality, (including, contrary to current opinion, Carnap’s initiating the development of predicate modal logic) that culminated in Meaning and Necessity. In dealing with various fundamental issues in ontology and metaphysics, the book discusses relevant views of major philosophers, such as Russell, Moore, Bradley, Wittgenstein, Meinong, Brentano, Husserl, Broad, McTaggart, and Quine, and of contemporary and recent figures, including D. M. Armstrong, D. Lewis, S. Kripke, J. Searle, W. Sellars, D. Davidson, J. J. C. Smart, and H. Feigl. Building on the critical studies of Bergmann, Carnap and such other philosophers, the author argues for a form of Logical Realism derived from important, but long misunderstood and ignored, aspects of Russell’s theories of descriptions, reference and truth.
The book presents the state of the art of research into the legacy of interwar Polish analytic philosophy and exemplifies different approaches to the history of philosophy. It contains discussions and reconstructions of aspects of Polish philosophy and logic as well as reactions to and developments of this tradition.