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Examines the role of Office of the Secretary of Defense and Secretary Charles E. Wilson in the transformation of national security policy during the first Eisenhower administration. Includes bibliography and index.
A narrative history and assessment of the early years of Robert McNamara's tenure as Secretary of Defense, including McNamara's relationship with Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, the transformation of the Department of Defense as a part of Kennedy's New Frontier, and the Pentagon's handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Bay of Pigs episode, and onset of the Vietnam War along with other major national security events and developments during a turbulent and momentous period of the Cold War. (Fuller description is on the dust jacket flaps.)
The New Look sought to formulate a more selective and flexible response to Communist challenges. The New Look was not simply a `bigger bang for a buck' nor merely a device for achieving a balanced budget, nor did it amount solely to a strategy of massive retaliation, as is commonly assumed. Dr Dockrill's incisive revisionist analysis of the subject throws new light on US ambitious global strategy during the Eisenhower years.
A Companion to Dwight D. Eisenhower brings new depth to the historiography of this significant and complex figure, providing a comprehensive and up-to-date depiction of both the man and era. Thoughtfully incorporates new and significant literature on Dwight D. Eisenhower Thoroughly examines both the Eisenhower era and the man himself, broadening the historical scope by which Eisenhower is understood and interpreted Presents a complete picture of Eisenhower’s many roles in historical context: the individual, general, president, politician, and citizen This Companion is the ideal starting point for anyone researching America during the Eisenhower years and an invaluable guide for graduate students and advanced undergraduates in history, political science, and policy studies Meticulously edited by a leading authority on the Eisenhower presidency with chapters by international experts on political, international, social, and cultural history
Contents: Intro.: The Post WWII Army; Overview; Chap. 1: The Pentomic Era: The U.S. Army and the Conceptual Challenge of the Nuclear Age; The Army and the ¿New Look¿; The Dual-Capability Conundrum; Kennedy Admin.; Chap. 2: Reorienting the Army ¿ After Vietnam: Nixon Admin. and Defense; The STEADFAST Reorg.; Doctrinal Ferment; Meeting the Army¿s Educational Needs; Towards Army 86; Operational Art and AirLand Battle; Chap. 3: A Strange New World -¿ Army after the Cold War: Impact of the Goldwater-Nichols Act; Army of the 1990s; Doctrinal Revision; The New Louisiana Maneuvers; The Debate Intensifies; Force XXI Campaign; Doctrine as an Engine of Change?; From Quadrennial Review to Quadrennial Review.
the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 quickly ushered in a popular and political movement toward nuclear disarmament. Across the globe, heads of state, high-ranking ministers, and bureaucrats led intense efforts to achieve effective disarmament agreements. Ultimately these efforts failed. In The American Nuclear Disarmament Dilemma, David Tal offers a detailed analysis of U.S. policy from 1945 to the summer of 1963, exploring the reasons for failure and revealing the complex motivations that eventually led to the Limited Test Ban Treaty. While previous books have focused on the policies of specific administrations, Tal’s is the first to consider negotiations as an evolving phenomenon that preoccupied three presidents, from Truman to Kennedy. Drawing on extensive archival research, the author examines the profound dilemma faced by leaders on all sides—forced by political pressure to engage in negotiations whose success they saw as injurious to national interests. Far from believing that the nuclear arms race would inevitably lead to war, the United States regarded nuclear weapons as the greatest guarantee that war would not happen.
Examines the role of Office of the Secretary of Defense and Secretary Charles E. Wilson in the transformation of national security policy during the first Eisenhower administration. Includes bibliography and index.
Book Description: The first publication in a multivolume series on the history of the acquisition of major weapon systems by the Department of Defense, author Elliott Converse presents a meticulously researched overview of changes in acquisition policies, organizations, and processes within the United States military establishment during the decade and a half following World War II. Many of the changes that shaped the nature and course of weapons research and development, production, and contracting through the end of the century were instituted between 1945 and 1960; many of the problems that have repeatedly challenged defense policymakers and acquisition professionals also first surfaced during these years. This study is the first to combine the histories of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the military services into one account. The volume is organized chronologically, with individual chapters addressing the roles of OSD, the Army, Navy and Air Force in two distinct periods.