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This book applies game theory to the phenomenon of terrorism and investigates how the competition for support can influence the attack behavior of terror organizations. In addition, it examines the economics of terrorism. The so-called outbidding theory, which has become increasingly popular within the field of terrorism research, argues that terror groups vying for resources will engage in more and more violence to demonstrate their capabilities and commitment to their cause. This book challenges the outbidding concept by providing a game-theoretical analysis, which shows that a contest between two terror groups can be interpreted as a race for support. This interpretation may help explain why major attacks occur at all: not as a result of outbidding, but as a result of losing the race. In addition, the author shows that rivalry between terror groups does not necessarily lead to more attacks, but can result in less terrorism due to an increased probability of attack failure induced by the race. Lastly, the model is applied to the rivalry between al-Qaeda and Daesh, elaborated on with empirical evidence. Given its scope, the book is a must read for researches and scholars working in the fields of economics, politics, the social sciences, and military history, as well as military and political decision-makers and authorities working in the field of risk management.
"The theoretical jihadist terrorist communication plan described in this paper shows that the jihadist terrorist knows how to apply strategic communication management techniques. The mass media and especially the Internet have become the key enablers and the main strategic communication assets for terrorists and have ensured them a favorable communication asymmetry. With these assets, terrorists are able to compensate for a significant part of their asymmetry in military might. Jihadist terrorists place a great deal of emphasis on developing comprehensive communication strategies in order to reach their desired short-, mid- and long-term goals and desired end states. Their ability to develop and implement such sophisticated strategies shows their fanatic conviction and their professionalism. Their communication goals are aimed at legitimizing, propagating and intimidating. They craft their strategies based on careful audience analysis and adapt their messages and delivery methods accordingly, adhering to the fundamental rules underlying any communication or public relations campaign. Their skillful use of the mass media and the Internet to compensate for asymmetrical disadvantages has enabled them to keep generating new generations of jihadist terrorists."--Page 5.
Within only a few days after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. Army War College initiated a series of short studies addressing strategic issues in the war on terrorism. This collection of essays analyzes a broad array of subjects of great strategic importance. This volume provides historical documentation of some of the advice given the military leadership in the early days of the war, but it also continues to be a source of solid strategic analysis as the war lengthens and perhaps broadens.
"The theoretical jihadist terrorist communication plan described in this paper shows that the jihadist terrorist knows how to apply strategic communication management techniques. The mass media and especially the Internet have become the key enablers and the main strategic communication assets for terrorists and have ensured them a favorable communication asymmetry. With these assets, terrorists are able to compensate for a significant part of their asymmetry in military might. Jihadist terrorists place a great deal of emphasis on developing comprehensive communication strategies in order to reach their desired short-, mid- and long-term goals and desired end states. Their ability to develop and implement such sophisticated strategies shows their fanatic conviction and their professionalism. Their communication goals are aimed at legitimizing, propagating and intimidating. They craft their strategies based on careful audience analysis and adapt their messages and delivery methods accordingly, adhering to the fundamental rules underlying any communication or public relations campaign. Their skillful use of the mass media and the Internet to compensate for asymmetrical disadvantages has enabled them to keep generating new generations of jihadist terrorists."--P. 5.
This book addresses the difficult problem of defeating Islamic terrorism from a surprising and very effective vantage point. There are 59 million Muslims in Central Asia. They have experienced the threat of Wahhabi terrorism and have been able to contain it at the same time. The author calls on the U.S. Government to ally itself with this part of the world. The people there, being Muslim, understand Islam from the inside and would be happy to help us in this global effort if their traditions and independence were respected. The author calls on the U.S. Government and its allies to both diplomatically and compassionately focus on this part of the world.
A comprehensive look at how terrorist groups organize themselves How do terrorist groups control their members? Do the tools groups use to monitor their operatives and enforce discipline create security vulnerabilities that governments can exploit? The Terrorist's Dilemma is the first book to systematically examine the great variation in how terrorist groups are structured. Employing a broad range of agency theory, historical case studies, and terrorists' own internal documents, Jacob Shapiro provocatively discusses the core managerial challenges that terrorists face and illustrates how their political goals interact with the operational environment to push them to organize in particular ways. Shapiro provides a historically informed explanation for why some groups have little hierarchy, while others resemble miniature firms, complete with line charts and written disciplinary codes. Looking at groups in Africa, Asia, Europe, and North America, he highlights how consistent and widespread the terrorist's dilemma--balancing the desire to maintain control with the need for secrecy--has been since the 1880s. Through an analysis of more than a hundred terrorist autobiographies he shows how prevalent bureaucracy has been, and he utilizes a cache of internal documents from al-Qa'ida in Iraq to outline why this deadly group used so much paperwork to handle its people. Tracing the strategic interaction between terrorist leaders and their operatives, Shapiro closes with a series of comparative case studies, indicating that the differences in how groups in the same conflict approach their dilemmas are consistent with an agency theory perspective. The Terrorist's Dilemma demonstrates the management constraints inherent to terrorist groups and sheds light on specific organizational details that can be exploited to more efficiently combat terrorist activity.
This thesis examines the relationship between the organizational strategies from which terrorist groups have to choose and their respective influence on the effectiveness of a terror group. In the study of terrorism, the dominant measures of effectiveness can only capture different results from the violent strategies of terrorist organizations, such as launching attacks. However, I argue violent strategies only account for one strategic perspective utilized by terror groups. Terrorist organizations can choose to employ violent strategies, non-violent strategies, mixed strategies (a combination of violent and non-violent strategies), or no strategies at all. Secondly, by only capturing violent strategies, current measures of effectiveness neglect to capture the interactions between terrorist organizations and their constituents – or the group of people they claim to represent. By shifting the focus of measuring effectiveness to constituent-based interactions, this research is able to account for all four choices of organizational strategies and their respective influence on an organization’s size. Using data from the Reputation of Terror Groups dataset, I demonstrate that organizations that employ mixed strategies are able to lure more members to their ranks compared to organizations that employ exclusively violent strategies, non-violent strategies, or no strategies at all. Lastly, I present two case studies of terrorist organizations – al-Shabaab of Somalia and the Islamic State – which I use to illustrate my empirical results.
This volume proposes some theories on the conditions that favor the formation of coalitions between terrorist organizations, and how they function within the changing international system. These theories are tested against empirical data on actual cooperation between European and Palestinian terrorist organizations from 1968 to 1990, and cooperation between European left-wing terrorist organizations (the phenomenon known as Euro-terrorism) from 1984 to 1988.
How do terrorists really think? What motivates a terrorist organization? Why is violence the weapon of choice?This groundbreaking, empirical theory plunges deep into terrorist rationale by exploring terrorism and counter warfare strategies (counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, antiterrorism, and concession). Specifically, I explore the reason why some organizations, like ISIL and Hezbollah, not only conduct attacks but also establish shadow governments by controlling the water supply and even taxing the population.Constructing a game theoretical "strategic interaction model", I analyze how a terrorist organization competes with a government for social control over the population. The conclusion of my modeling is that terrorism is inversely proportional to power, measured by social control. When a terrorist organization is less powerful than the government, it attacks. When it is more powerful, it governs. To illustrate the model, I explore shifts in social control; the primary case studies are Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Taliban in Afghanistan, and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS, ISIL, Daesh).My hope is that this theory helps nations precisely suppress terrorist organizations with the appropriate combination of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism._______In Chapter 1, I introduce the puzzle of how violent terrorist organizations often act as shadow governments, supporting the population.In Chapter 2, I outline contemporary literature on terrorism. Specifically, I define the terms terrorism and terrorist organization to ensure that the theory is appropriately applied. Next, I outline the theoretical components of terrorism, explaining concepts like fear as a force multiplier. Then, I illustrate the fundamental components of counter warfare, including counterinsurgency and counterterrorism strategies. Finally, I illustrate why contemporary literature is unable to adequately explain long run shifts in terrorist strategy. I therefore suggest a new model for studying terrorism -- a strategic interaction model.In Chapter 3, I develop a strategic interaction model of terrorism. Firstly, I define the rules of interaction between a terrorist organization, a government, and a population. Then, I establish a connection between political power and social control. Next, I construct the terrorist organization and government's social control functions in order to analyze each of their respective interactions with the population. Finally, I analyze how the two functions interdependently determine primary warfare strategies. In Chapter 4, I apply this theory to two case studies using time and shift in social control as the independent variables and strategy as the dependent variable. I choose Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Taliban in Afghanistan as case studies because of their definitive shifts in social control. Hezbollah gained significant control after ousting Israel from Lebanon in 2000. The Taliban, on the other hand, lost significant control after the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and the establishment of a democratic regime in 2004. In order to quantify shifts in terrorism strategy, I aggregate the number of yearly and monthly attacks. Finally, using narratives, regressions, t-tests, and graphs, I analyze the relationship between social control and strategy shifts.In Chapter 5, I prescribe counter warfare strategies. I briefly outline general steps that the government takes when contemplating primary strategies to combat a terrorist organization. I then apply these counter warfare strategies to ISIL. In this chapter, I hope to give politicians, military commanders, analysts and scholars a more practical lens through which to evaluate counter warfare options. Terrorism cripples populations with fear and chaos. By shedding light on how it works, I hope to develop a new approach to how the international community can counter future terrorism.
Terrorism has existed for centuries and governments have struggled to counter the violent extremist threat within their midst. In the immediate days following the unprovoked attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001, President Bush and our collective national leaders stressed the urgent need to go on the immediate offensive against the terrorists, deploy military forces, and promote democracy abroad. Now, going on seven years in the Global War on Terror (GWOT), one can argue we have made credible tactical gains, but have fallen far short in defeating violent extremism as a threat to our way of life. Cooperation amongst the international community has resulted in genuine security improvements - particularly in disruption of terrorist organizations and finances, securing of borders with tighter security at points of entry, and the killing or capture of individuals of high value. We have seen greater cooperation amongst many countries and internally within the United States, among the interagency to include some specific reforms. But, despite these successes, significant challenges remain and terror organizations like Al-Qa'ida have adapted, are conducting transnational irregular warfare and have grown stronger and more widespread then before the attacks of 9/11. The most recent National Intelligence Estimate judges that the U.S. homeland will continue to face a persistent and evolving terrorist threat, mainly from Islamic terrorist groups and cells and that Al-Qa'ida will remain the most serious threat. More important, the current administration's approach to the war on terror has created more terrorists than it has eliminated and that anti-American sentiment across the world and throughout the Middle East has skyrocketed serving to fuel and inspire Muslims to join or openly support terror groups. I believe we have failed to understand the true enemy who opposes us, the allure and appeal that they hold for the people of Islam worldwide, and our misguided efforts at engaging in a "war of ideas" have been clearly one-sided and not in our favor. Without a clear concept of what victory in a war on terror should look like, we will exhaust our resources to include our service men and women in futility. Our near enemy, Al-Qa'ida has been engaging in war for nearly four decades in order to achieve their overall strategic objective of a world-wide Islamic caliphate where the only law is shar'ia (Islamic law). Al-Qa'ida continues to evolve, has increased its global reach and appeal, and has inspired numerous other extremist groups while continuing to expand its worldwide network. Al-Qa'ida has been elevated to the status we would hold for an institution, not just the world's most feared terrorist group. But they are neither invincible nor invulnerable, and they have stumbled momentously more than once. Today, our heroic military forces have fought tremendously and garnered numerous significant results and tactical victories on the operational fronts in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Philippines and Northeast (HORN) of Africa, some of which are clearly irreversible gains. We have also gained greater insight into this elusive organization and now understand some of the cracks or fissures within their foundation. This newly found understanding and comprehension by experts in the field of study of terrorism, as well as our national leaders, has enlightened us to the simple fact that we must prepare to wage a long war against the Al-Qa'ida Associated Movement (AQAM) and Islamist terrorism. A war that will incorporate all elements of national power in a cogent and executable strategy as well as build and leverage multinational partnerships. A war where the United States is well resourced but, at present, ill-prepared to lead and to conduct.