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The second volume in this series, Hunting the Viet Cong: The Fall of Diem and the Collapse of the Strategic Hamlets, 1961-64 looks at why the strategy ultimately failed. Focussing on events in South Vietnam, the book exposes Viet Cong atrocities, South Vietnamese corruption and American military and political negligence. The book reveals just how violent and aggressive the Viet Cong were towards their own people. Fear was a weapon of choice: beheading civilians, mutilating children and destroying schools and hospitals were all legitimate tactics in the VC toolbox. The book also explains how a strategy designed to protect Vietnamese villagers made them easy targets for violent guerrillas. Finally, it reveals that there were many decent Americans in South Vietnam who understood the nation and its people but who were constantly ignored by those in power. --
Over the period form 1961 to 1963 the Government of Vietnam introduced the Strategic Hamlet Program, which was designed to be the central part of a comprehensive plan to pacify South Vietnam. Pacification was to be achieved by isolating the rural population from the Viet Cong communist guerrillas. The aims of the Strategic Hamlet Program were expressed as security, economic development, social advancement, and political participation. By instituting reforms the Government of Vietnam believed that it could win the allegiance of the people and thus defeat the VietCong. The Strategic Hamlet Program eventually failed because of inadequate planning and coordination, inadequate resources, an unrealistic timetable, problems with siting and construction, and inadequate and falsified evaluation procedures. In addition there was a lack of commitment to the program, especially from President Diem. Another factor contributing to the failure of the program was the impatience and intolerance of the United States towards the government of President Diem. Above all, the peasants, who had been identified as the focus in the war against the insurgents, rejected the program because the promised reforms did not materialize amid the corruption and bureaucratic inefficiency associated with the implementation of the program. Keywords: Counter insurgency; South Vietnam; Low Intensity Conflict; Theses.
Vietnam's Lost Revolution employs newly-released archival material from Vietnam to examine the rise and fall of the Special Commissariat for Civic Action in the First Republic of Vietnam, and in so doing reassesses the origins of the Vietnam War. A cornerstone of Ngô Đình Diệm's presidency, Civic Action was intended to transform Vietnam into a thriving, modern, independent, noncommunist Southeast Asian nation. Geoffrey Stewart juxtaposes Diem's revolutionary plan with the conflicting and competing visions of Vietnam's postcolonial future held by other indigenous groups. He shows how the government failed to gain legitimacy within the peasantry, ceding the advantage to the communist-led opposition and paving the way for the American military intervention in the mid-1960s. This book provides a richer and more nuanced analysis of the origins of the Vietnam War in which internal struggles over national identity, self-determination, and even modernity itself are central.
Over the period from 1961 to 1963 the Government of Vietnam Introduced the Strategic Hamlet Program which was designed to be the central part of a comprehensive plan to pacify South Vietnam. Pacification was to be achieved by isolating the rural population from the Viet Cong communist guerrillas. The aims of the Strategic Hamlet Program were expressed as security, economic development, social advancement, and political participation. By instituting reforms the Government of Vietnam believed that it could win the allegiance of the people and thus defeat the Viet Cong. The Strategic Hamlet Program eventually failed because of inadequate planning and coordination, inadequate resources and unrealistic timetable, problems with siting and construction, and inadequate and falsified evaluation procedures. In addition there was a lack of commitment to the program especially from President Diem. Another factor contributing to the failure of the program was the Impatience and Intolerance of the United States towards the government of President Diem. Above all, the peasants who had been identified as the focus in the war against the Insurgents, rejected the program because the promised reforms did not materialize amid the corruption and bureaucratic inefficiency associated with the implementation of the program.
The Psychological War for Vietnam, 1960–1968, for the first time fully explores the most sustained, intensive use of psychological operations (PSYOP) in American history. In PSYOP, US military personnel use a variety of tactics—mostly audio and visual messages—to influence individuals and groups to behave in ways that favor US objectives. Informed by the author’s firsthand experience of such operations elsewhere, this account of the battle for “hearts and minds” in Vietnam offers rare insight into the art and science of propaganda as a military tool in the twentieth century. The Psychological War for Vietnam, 1960–1968, focuses on the creation, capabilities, and performance of the forces that conducted PSYOP in Vietnam, including the Joint US Public Affairs Office and the 4th PSYOP Group. In his comprehensive account, Mervyn Edwin Roberts III covers psychological operations across the entire theater, by all involved US agencies. His book reveals the complex interplay of these activities within the wider context of Vietnam and the Cold War propaganda battle being fought by the United States at the same time. Because PSYOP never occurs in a vacuum, Roberts considers the shifting influence of alternative sources of information—especially from the governments of North and South Vietnam, but also from Australia, Korea, and the Philippines. The Psychological War for Vietnam, 1960–1968, also addresses the development of PSYOP doctrine and training in the period prior to the introduction of ground combat forces in 1965 and, finally, shows how the course of the war itself forced changes to this doctrine. The scope of the book allows for a unique measurement of the effectiveness of psychological operations over time.