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Politics may be the art of compromise, but accepting a compromise can be hazardous to a politician's health. Politicians worry about betraying faithful supporters, about losing the upper hand on an issue before the next election, that accepting half a loaf today can make it harder to get the whole loaf tomorrow. In his original interpretation of competition between parties and between Congress and the president, Gilmour explains the strategies available to politicians who prefer to disagree and uncovers the lost opportunities to pass important legislation that result from this disagreement.Strategic Disagreement, theoretically solid and rich in evidence, will enlighten Washington observers frustrated by the politics of gridlock and will engage students interested in organizational theory, political parties, and divided government.
“An excellent workbook-like guide” to the nuts and bolts of professional conflict and the strategies you need to make conflict work for you (Booklist, starred review). Every workplace is a minefield of conflict, and all office tension is shaped by power. Making Conflict Work teaches you to identify the nature of a conflict, determine your power position relative to anyone opposing you, and use the best strategy for achieving your goals. These strategies are equally effective for executives, managers and their direct reports, consultants, and attorneys—anyone who has ever had a disagreement with someone in their organization. Packed with helpful self-assessment exercises and action plans, this book gives you the tools you need to achieve greater satisfaction and success. “A genuine winner.” —Robert B. Cialdini, author of Influence “This book is a necessity . . . Read it.” —Leymah Gbowee, 2011 Nobel Peace Prize laureate and Liberian peace activist “Innovative and practical.” —Lawrence Susskind, Program on Negotiation cofounder “Navigating conflict effectively is an essential component of leadership. Making Conflict Work illustrates when to compromise and when to continue driving forward.” —Hon. David N. Dinkins, 106th mayor of the City of New York “An excellent workbook-like guide.” —Booklist, starred review
Making strategy requires undertaking major—often irreversible—decisions aimed at long-term success in an uncertain future. All leaders must formulate a clear course of action, yet many lack confidence in their ability to think systematically about their strategy. They struggle to apply the abstract lessons offered by conventional approaches to strategic analysis to their unique contexts. Making Great Strategy resolves these challenges with a straightforward, readily applicable framework. Jesper B. Sørensen and Glenn R. Carroll show that one factor underlies all sustainably successful strategies: a logically coherent argument that connects resources, capabilities, and environmental conditions to desired outcomes. They introduce a system for formulating and managing strategy through a set of three core activities: visualization, formalization and logic, and constructive argumentation. These activities can be implemented in any organization and are illustrated through examples and case studies from well-known companies such as Apple, Walmart, and The Economist. This book shows that while great strategic thinking is hard, it is not a mystery. Widely applicable and relevant for managers and leaders at all levels, especially executive teams charged with setting the course of their organizations, it is essential reading for anyone faced with practical problems of strategic management.
The Strategic Triangle is based on a conference held in Potsdam, Germany, and a workshop at the Woodrow Wilson Center.
Bill Clinton's first presidential term was a period of extraordinary change in policy toward low-income families. In 1993 Congress enacted a major expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit for low-income working families. In 1996 Congress passed and the president signed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act. This legislation abolished the sixty-year-old Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program and replaced it with a block grant program, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families. It contained stiff new work requirements and limits on the length of time people could receive welfare benefits.Dramatic change in AFDC was also occurring piecemeal in the states during these years. States used waivers granted by the federal Department of Health and Human Services to experiment with a variety of welfare strategies, including denial of additional benefits for children born or conceived while a mother received AFDC, work requirements, and time limits on receipt of cash benefits. The pace of change at the state level accelerated after the 1996 federal welfare reform legislation gave states increased leeway to design their programs. Ending Welfare as We Know It analyzes how these changes in the AFDC program came about. In fourteen chapters, R. Kent Weaver addresses three sets of questions about the politics of welfare reform: the dismal history of comprehensive AFDC reform initiatives; the dramatic changes in the welfare reform agenda over the past thirty years; and the reasons why comprehensive welfare reform at the national level succeeded in 1996 after failing in 1995, in 1993–94, and on many previous occasions. Welfare reform raises issues of race, class, and sex that are as difficult and divisive as any in American politics. While broad social and political trends helped to create a historic opening for welfare reform in the late 1990s, dramatic legislation was not inevitable. The interaction of contextual factors with short
Contains eighteen essays in which political scientists and scholars of public policy examine the performance of the U.S. Congress as a democratic institution, covering ideals and development, elections and representation, structures and processes, policy and performance, and assessments and prospects.
This military biography examines the man who sought to rebuild the Germany Army after WWI—and the rival who stoked the rise of Nazism. After Germany’s devastating defeat in the First World War, General Hans von Seekt became Chief of the Army Command at the Reichewehr Ministry of the Weimar Republic. His job was to rebuild the shattered German army and repair the nation’s standing on the world stage. The punitive terms of the post-war settlement made these ambitious goals nearly impossible, but the most significant challenges von Seekt faced came from within Germany. Von Seekt aimed to build a modern and efficient military with a main strategy of peaceful defense purposes. This original and far-sighted policy was opposed by his rival, General Erich Ludendorff, who led a nationalistic movement seeking revenge for Germany’s defeat. Ludendorff proposed to rebuild the once-mighty German imperial army as a major international force. The failure of von Seekt's experiment was tragically mirrored by the fall of the Weimar Republic, and the rise of rise of Hitler and Nazi Germany.
"A project of the International Peace Academy and CISAC, The Center for International Security and Cooperation"--P. ii.
This book examines how democracy influences state-building and market-building in 25 post-communist countries from 1990 to 2004.
This book investigates the relationship between democracy promotion and US national security strategy through an examination of the Reagan administration’s attempt to launch a global campaign for democracy in the early 1980s, which culminated in the foundation of the National Endowment for Democracy in 1983, and through an analysis of the early political interventions of the Endowment until 1986. A case study of the formation and early operations of the National Endowment for Democracy under the Reagan administration, based on primary documents from both the national security bureaucracy and the private sector, shows that while democracy promotion provided a new tactical approach to the conduct of US political warfare operations, these operations remained tied to the achievement of traditional national security goals such as destabilising enemy regimes and building stable and legitimate friendly governments, rather than being guided by a strategy based on the universal promotion of democracy. This book will be of interest to students and scholars of US Foreign Policy, Democracy Promotion and for those seeking to gain a better understanding of the Reagan Administration.