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Over 2,800 total pages ... INTRODUCTION Today’s operational environment presents threats the Army has not faced in nearly 20 years. Against peer competitors, the joint force may face air parity or even localized enemy air overmatch, challenging the assumption of air superiority the joint force has held since the Korean War. This will make maneuver forces vulnerable to air attack by fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, unmanned aircraft systems, and cruise missiles. Maneuver forces lack capacity and capability to address these threats and the Army requires a speedy response. Stinger missiles provide a key capability for maneuver forces to defend themselves from aerial observation and attack. However, without direct involvement from senior brigade combat team leaders and effective leader training, these missiles will become dead weight at best or a fratricide in waiting at worst. Units must plan effectively to utilize this capability and ensure it ties directly to their scheme of maneuver as opposed to simply task-organizing one Stinger team per company. Just a SAMPLE of the CONTENTS CALL HANDBOOK NO. 18-16 Maneuver Leader’s Guide to Stinger - Lessons and Best Practices (2018) INTRODUCTION TO MANPORTABLE (Stinger) AIR DEFENSE WEAPON SYSTEM - SUBCOURSE NO. AD 0575 (no date) FM 3-23.25 SHOULDER-LAUNCHED MUNITIONS (2006) FM 10-550/TO 13C7-22-71 AIRDROP OF SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT: RIGGING STINGER WEAPON SYSTEMS AND MISSILES (2000) FM 44-18-1 STINGER TEAM OPERATIONS (1984) FM 3-01.11 (FM 44-100-2) AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY REFERENCE HANDBOOK (2000) MCRP 3-25.10A Low Altitude Air Defense (LAAD) Gunner’s Handbook (2011) TM 9-1425-429-12 OPERATOR'S AND ORGANIZATIONAL MAINTENANCE MANUAL: STINGER GUIDED MISSILE SYSTEM (1980) TM 9-1425-429-12-HR HAND RECEIPT MANUAL COVERING SYSTEM COMPONENTS OF END ITEM (COEI) BASIC ISSUE ITEMS (BII), AND ADDITIONAL AUTHORIZATION LIST (AAL) FOR STINGER AIR DEFENSE GUIDED MISSILE SYSTEM, STINGER TRAINING SET GUIDED MISSILE SYSTEM M134, COOLANT RECHARGING UNIT TRAINING SYSTEM M80, AND BATTERY CHARGER PP-7309/T (1983) TM 55-1425-429-14 TECHNICAL MANUAL TRANSPORTABILITY GUIDANCE STINGER WEAPON SYSTEM (1981) TM 9-1265-209-10 TECHNICAL MANUAL OPERATOR’S MANUAL FOR MULTIPLE INTEGRATED LASER ENGAGEMENT SYSTEM (MILES) SIMULATOR SYSTEM, FIRING, LASER: M74 NSN 1265-01-159-0485 FOR STINGER WEAPON SYSTEM (1987) TM 9-2330-357-14&P TECHNICAL MANUAL OPERATOR'S, ORGANIZATIONAL, DIRECT SUPPORT, AND GENERAL SUPPORT MAINTENANCE MANUAL (INCLUDING REPAIR PARTS AND SPECIAL TOOLS LISTS) FOR SEMITRAILER, FLATBED: RADAR SET AND LAUNCHING STATION M860A1 (NSN 2330-01-117-3280) (1993)
Noted authority Steven J. Zaloga charts the development, combat use, and influence of man-portable air defense systems, from the late 1960s to the present day. The first attempts at developing a man-portable air defense system (MANPADS) based around a guided missile began in the mid-1950s, as a response to the increased speed and maneuverability of jet aircraft. This book charts the technological evolution of the MANPADS and explores their combat usage and the lessons from these encounters. Besides detailing the missiles, it also surveys the various methods developed as countermeasures to the MANPADS threat. The first generation of MANPADS, such as the US Army's Redeye and the Soviet Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail), saw combat use in the Vietnam War in 1972 and the Yom Kippur War of 1973. The next generation of infrared-guided MANPADS, such as the US Stinger and Soviet Igla, came to prominence following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Since the 1970s, MANPADS have been used in innumerable wars, border conflicts, civil wars and insurrections. Featuring specially commissioned artwork and carefully chosen photographs, this study tells the story of these lethally effective weapons, from their origins to their use today.
This paper seeks to identify the Critical Technology Events (CTEs) in the development of the Stinger and the Javelin missiles. It is the third paper in a series that, driven by the importance of understanding past military technological successes to today's defense science and technology (S&T) investment and management, examines some of the key factors that have led to meaningful technology generation and ultimate incorporation into current U.S. Army weapons systems. The first paper in the series focused on the Abrams tank.1 The second focused on the Apache helicopter.2 With studies of a complex ground system and a complex air system complete, this paper turns to two technologically advanced infantry weapons, the Stinger and the Javelin. These armaments have different roles in the arsenal, but they are both man-portable, fire-and-forget missiles whose development posed some unique challenges. A fourth and final paper in the series will summarize findings of this report, and the reports on the Abrams and the Apache, and offer recommendations for managing the Army's S&T portfolio.
The loss of Stinger missile capability in the USMC will leave a gap in the future concept known as Sea Shield. Without a sound Sea Shield the operational concepts of Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS) and Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare (EMW) will be unsupportable. The future vision of the USMC and Navy are embodied in the transformational concepts of Seabasing, Sea Shield, Sea Strike, Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare (EMW), Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS), and Ship to Objective Maneuver (STOM). In the quest to transform many have advocated the removal of Short Range Air Defense (SHORAD) systems from the Marine Corps. The future Marine Corps operating concepts will be protected by the Navy's future concept of Sea Shield (see Fig 1). Sea Shield will protect the Sea Base and STOM forces ashore through a network of sensors and weapons platforms (see Fig 3). As STOM forces maneuver 110nm inland to seize objectives, Sea Shield will experience blind spots due to radar horizon, terrain shadowing, electronic warfare, and interference (see Fig 2). In these cases Sea Shield will not adequately defend against asymmetric, low, slow flying threats. Calculations in Fig 2 show a 5,500 foot sensor gap from Sea Based assets. Airborne sensors only provide detection and surveillance cueing and not target quality data for guiding missiles to airborne threats. The last radar piece of Sea Shield is organic STOM force sensors. Radar horizon and terrain shadowing will also degrade these sensors because they are not designed to move with the maneuver forces. Consequently, maneuver forces will require an organic air defense capability for local protection from immediate, pop up, low-level air threats. This organic air defense capability is the Stinger missile system. However, it will be removed from service by 2009 due to shelf life and obsolescence. This capability is a current and future requirement.
This anthology discusses the converging operational issues of air base defense and counterinsurgency. It explores the diverse challenges associated with defending air assets and joint personnel in a counterinsurgency environment. The authors are primarily Air Force officers from security forces, intelligence, and the office of special investigations, but works are included from a US Air Force pilot and a Canadian air force officer. The authors examine lessons from Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, and other conflicts as they relate to securing air bases and sustaining air operations in a high-threat counterinsurgency environment. The essays review the capabilities, doctrine, tactics, and training needed in base defense operations and recommend ways in which to build a strong, synchronized ground defense partnership with joint and combined forces. The authors offer recommendations on the development of combat leaders with the depth of knowledge, tactical and operational skill sets, and counterinsurgency mind set necessary to be effective in the modern asymmetric battlefield.
The United States faces major challenges in dealing with Iran, the threat of terrorism, and the tide of political instability in the Arabian Peninsula. The presence of some of the world’s largest reserves of oil and natural gas, vital shipping lanes, and Shia populations throughout the region have made the peninsula the focal point of US and Iranian strategic competition. Moreover, large youth populations, high unemployment rates, and political systems with highly centralized power bases have posed other economic, political, and security challenges that the Gulf states must address and that the United States must take into consideration when forming strategy and policy.
July 2019 Printed in BLACK AND WHITE The Army's Weapon Systems Handbook was updated in July 2019, but is still titled "Weapon Systems Handbook 2018." We are printing this in black and white to keep the price low. It presents many of the acquisition programs currently fielded or in development. The U.S. Army Acquisition Corps, with its 36,000 professionals, bears a unique responsibility for the oversight and systems management of the Army's acquisition lifecycle. With responsibility for hundreds of acquisition programs, civilian and military professionals collectively oversee research, development and acquisition activities totaling more than $20 billion in Fiscal Year 2016 alone. Why buy a book you can download for free? We print this so you don't have to. We at 4th Watch Publishing are former government employees, so we know how government employees actually use the standards. When a new standard is released, somebody has to print it, punch holes and put it in a 3-ring binder. While this is not a big deal for a 5 or 10-page document, many DoD documents are over 400 pages and printing a large document is a time- consuming effort. So, a person that's paid $25 an hour is spending hours simply printing out the tools needed to do the job. That's time that could be better spent doing mission. We publish these documents so you can focus on what you are there for. It's much more cost-effective to just order the latest version from Amazon.com. SDVOSB If there is a standard you would like published, let us know. Our web site is usgovpub.com
The gap between the growing cruise and ballistic missile threat to U.S. Air Force bases in Europe and the U.S. capacity and capability to counter the threat is worrisome. This report assesses alternative Air Force courses of action.
Despite the rising salience of missile threats, current air and missile defense forces are far too susceptible to suppression. Today’s U.S. air and missile defense (AMD) force lacks the depth, capacity, and operational flexibility to simultaneously perform both missions. Discussions about improving AMD usually revolve around improvements to the capability and capacity of interceptors or sensors. Rather than simply doing more of the same, the joint integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) efforts might be well served by new or reinvigorated operational concepts, here discussed collectively as “Distributed Defense.” By leveraging networked integration, Distributed Defense envisions a more flexible and more dispersible air and missile defense force capable of imposing costs and dilemmas on an adversary, complicating the suppression of U.S. air and missile defenses. Although capability and capacity improvements remain essential to the high-end threats, the Distributed Defense concept focuses on creating a new architecture for today’s fielded or soon-to-be fielded IAMD force to boost flexibility and resilience.