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Mandatory pensions are a worldwide phenomenon. However, with fixed contribution rates, monthly benefits, and retirement ages, pension systems are not consistent with three long-run trends: declining mortality, declining fertility, and earlier retirement. Many systems need reform. This book gives an extensive nontechnical explanation of the economics of pension design. The theoretical arguments have three elements: * Pension systems have multiple objectives--consumption smoothing, insurance, poverty relief, and redistribution. Good policy needs to bear them all in mind. * Good analysis should be framed in a second-best context-- simple economic models are a bad guide to policy design in a world with imperfect information and decision-making, incomplete markets and taxation. * Any choice of pension system has risk-sharing and distributional consequences, which the book recognizes explicitly. Barr and Diamond's analysis includes labor markets, capital markets, risk sharing, and gender and family, with comparison of PAYG and funded systems, recognizing that the suitable level of funding differs by country. Alongside the economic principles of good design, policy must also take account of a country's capacity to implement the system. Thus the theoretical analysis is complemented by discussion of implementation, and of experiences, both good and bad, in many countries, with particular attention to Chile and China.
Public pension systems are underfunded, straining state budgets. Historically, many states have presumed that they can modify pension benefits only as to newly-hired employees, and that they must leave benefit accruals untouched for current workers. More recently, though, states have begun enacting more fundamental pension reform that modifies future accruals or even reduces cost-of-living allowances for retirees. Nearly all such new reforms have been the subject of one or more lawsuits alleging that the federal and/or state constitution bars the legislature from reducing benefits or accrual patterns. This dissertation examines the legal underpinnings for arguments made against pension reform, and suggests that constitutional doctrine ought to allow pension systems to be reformed in ways that protect past benefit accruals while reorganizing future benefit accruals in a way that is fairer to younger and more mobile workers. That theory is consistent with contract law and constitutional principles. The dissertation then moves to the real challenge, which is how to apply that theory in particular cases, such as contribution increases, cost of living reductions, retirement age increases, or the establishment of a different pension system entirely. In such cases, it is not always immediately obvious what it means to protect past accruals but allow modifications to future accruals. Given that neither state nor federal judges are pension specialists, courts may benefit from a closer examination of a wide variety of pension reforms.
During reform's three phases (commitment-building, coalition building, and implementation) there are tradeoffs among inclusiveness (of process), radicalism (of reform), and participation in, and compliance with the new system. Including more and more various veto and proposal actors, early in the deliberative process, may increase buy-in and compliance when pension reform is implemented but at the expense of faster and greater change.
Demographic realities will soon force developed countries to find ways to pay for longer retirements for more people. In Pension Strategies in Europe and the United States, leading economists analyze topical issues in pension policy, with a focus on raising the retirement age, increasing retirement savings, and the political sustainability of reforms that will accomplish these goals. After a substantive and wide-ranging introduction by the editors that weaves together the demographic and economic strands of the story, the chapters present cutting-edge research, offering both theoretical and empirical analyses. Contributors examine such topics as the reform of key structural features of existing pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension systems, analyzing how benefits should vary with the age of retirement, labor supply elasticity after France's 1993 pension reform, and fiscal response to a demographic shock; the feasibility of PAYG reforms in the United States and the competition among state pension systems that results from labor mobility in Europe; and private, funded systems (increasingly perceived as necessary adjuncts to PAYG systems) in the UK, the US, and the Netherlands, and in terms of individual portfolio management. The editors conclude the volume with a study of recent German and UK reforms and their effects on personal savings.ContributorsTheodore C. Bergstrom, A. Lans Bovenberg, Antoine Bozio, Woojen Chung, Juan C. Conesa, Gabrielle Demange, Richard Disney, Carl Emmerson, Robert Fenge, Luisa Fuster, Carlos Garriga, Christian Gollier, John L. Hartman, Ayse Imrohoroglu, Selahattin Imrohoroglu, Thijs Knaap, Georges de Ménil, Pierre Pestieau, Eytan Sheshinski, Matthew WakefieldRobert Fenge is Senior Research Fellow at the Ifo Institute for Economic Research and Assistant Professor of Economics at the University of Munich. Georges de Ménil is Professor of Economics at École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS), Paris. Pierre Pestieau is Professor of Economics at the University of Liège. Fenge and Pestieau are coauthors of Social Security and Early Retirement (MIT Press, 2005).
In this document the Government is looking at options for delivering a simpler and fairer state pension which rewards those who save for their retirement and is sustainable for future generations. The consultation is on two broad options for reform of the state pension, and the most appropriate mechanism for determining future changes to state pension age. The four guiding principles for pension reform are: personal responsibility; fairness; simplicity; affordability and sustainability. The options for reform of the state pension are: (1) faster flat rate or (2) a single tier pension. Currently the basic state pension is a flat-rate payment of £97.65 a week and the state second pension is partly flat rate and partly linked to earnings, such that higher earners receive a higher state pension. Option 1 would accelerate reforms so that the state second pension becomes fully flat rate by 2020 instead of the early 2030s. At the end of the transition those with a full contribution record - about 30 years - would receive the full pension, in two tiers, currently estimated at about £140 a week. Option 2 is a more radical approach, combining the two existing pensions into one single-tier pension. Future pensioners with at least 30 qualifying years would receive the same flat-rate pension currently estimated at £140 a week. This payment would be set above the basic level of support provided by Pension Credit. There are also two options for changing state pension age: through a formula linked to life expectancy; through a regular review.