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Why and how has China succeeded as a developmental state despite a seemingly rents-ridden bureaucracy? Following conventional wisdom, "Weberian" bureaucracies are an institutional precondition for development, especially in interventionist states like China. However, my research finds that China's fast-growing economy has not been governed by a purely salaried civil service. Instead, Chinese bureaucracies still remain partially prebendal; at every level of government, each office systematically appropriates authority to generate income for itself. My study unravels the paradox of "developmentalism without Weberianness" by illuminating China's unique path of bureaucratic adaptation in the reform era -- labeled as bureau-contracting -- where contracting takes place within the state bureaucracy. In a bureau-contracting structure, the state at each level contracts the tasks of governance to its own bureaucracies, assigning them revenue-making privileges and property rights over income earned in exchange for services rendered. Contrasting previous emphases on the prevalence of illicit corruption in China, my study shows how and why bureaucracies in this context are actually authorized by the state to profit from public office. Specifically, I identify two factors that constrain arbitrary and excessively predatory behavior among Chinese bureaucracies: first, mechanisms of rents management, and second, the mediation of narrow departmental interests by local developmental incentives. In short, I argue that it is the combination of an incentive-compatible fiscal design and increasingly sophisticated instruments of oversight that have sustained an otherwise unorthodox structure of governance in China. In a phrase, bureau-contracting presents a high-powered but opportunistic alternative to the Weberian ideal-type. The Chinese experience suggests that "market-compatible" bureaucratic institutions need not necessarily conform to -- and may even diverge significantly -- from standard Western models, at least at early stages of development. My research draws on interviews with 165 cadres across different regions and governmental sectors, as well as statistical analysis of previously unavailable budget data.
This book is about the enterprise reform in China in general, and the Contract Management Responsibility System (the CMRS) in particular. The latter is an institutional arrangement to deal with the relation between the government and the state-owned enterprise which has always been at the centre of the enterprise reform. This research is based on four in-depth case studies of Chinese state-owned companies.
This book challenges the common perception or assumption that greater state intervention and re-centralization will result in convergence towards a more equitable and inclusive growth model in China. Instead of asking whether local agency matters, this project examines the conditions and latitude of local agency under initial decentralization followed by increasing top-down re-centralization. The central argument is that in response to common policy directives and pressures from above, disparities in local growth strategies have interacted with political institutions in generating “embedded” sub-national welfare mix models, with varying articulations of state, market, community, and family in Chinese welfare production. The bottom-up feedback effects from these embedded models have somewhat offset growing top-down pressure for re-centralization, contributing to persistent sub-national variations. This author contributes to a growing literature of comparative political economy that seeks to examine the political and economic logics of social policy in non-western and authoritarian political systems.
In the past decade, China was able to carry out economic reform without political reform, while the Soviet Union attempted the opposite strategy. How did China succeed at economic market reform without changing communist rule? Susan Shirk shows that Chinese communist political institutions are more flexible and less centralized than their Soviet counterparts were. Shirk pioneers a rational choice institutional approach to analyze policy-making in a non-democratic authoritarian country and to explain the history of Chinese market reforms from 1979 to the present. Drawing on extensive interviews with high-level Chinese officials, she pieces together detailed histories of economic reform policy decisions and shows how the political logic of Chinese communist institutions shaped those decisions. Combining theoretical ambition with the flavor of on-the-ground policy-making in Beijing, this book is a major contribution to the study of reform in China and other communist countries. This title is part of UC Press's Voices Revived program, which commemorates University of California Press's mission to seek out and cultivate the brightest minds and give them voice, reach, and impact. Drawing on a backlist dating to 1893, Voices Revived makes high-quality, peer-reviewed scholarship accessible once again using print-on-demand technology. This title was originally published in 1994. In the past decade, China was able to carry out economic reform without political reform, while the Soviet Union attempted the opposite strategy. How did China succeed at economic market reform without changing communist rule? Susan Shirk shows that Chine
Charlotte P. Lee examines the Chinese Communist Party's renewed emphasis on party-managed training academies.
The authors of this work argue strongly that the decentralization that has taken place in China over the past two decades threatens to undermine the future of reform and perhaps even the state itself. They contend that reform has undermined state capacity in China, and that the state's fiscal revenues, as a percentage of GNP, have declined and will continue to decline into the foreseeable future, thereby weakening China's ability to mobilize resources for modernization.
This book addresses the long-standing puzzle of how China's private sector manages to grow without secure property rights, and proposes a new theory of selective property rights to explain this phenomenon. Drawing on rich empirical evidence including in-depth interviews, a unique national survey of private entrepreneurs, two original national audit experiments and secondary sources, Professor Yue Hou shows that private entrepreneurs in China actively seek opportunities within formal institutions to advance their business interests. By securing seats in the local legislatures, entrepreneurs use their political capital to deter local officials from demanding bribes, ad hoc taxes, and other types of informal payments. In doing so they create a system of selective, individualized, and predictable property rights. This system of selective property rights is key to understanding the private sector growth in the absence of the rule of law.