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This book discusses the main shortcomings of the classical solution concept from noncooperative game theory (that of Nash equilibria) and provides a comprehensive study of the more refined concepts (such as sequential, perfect, proper and stable equilibria) that have been introduced to overcome these drawbacks. The plausibility of the assumptions underlying each such concept are discussed, desirable properties as well as deficiencies are illustrated, characterizations are derived and the relationships between the various concepts are studied. The first six chapters provide an informal discussion with many examples as well as a comprehensive overview for normal form games. The remaining chapters are devoted to specific applications, illustrating the strength (resp. weakness) of the various concepts.
The book aims at describing the recent developments in the existence and stability of Nash equilibrium. The two topics are central to game theory and economics and have been extensively researched. Recent results on existence and stability of Nash equilibrium are scattered and the relationship between them has not been explained clearly. The book will make these results easily accessible and understandable to researchers in the field.
In this monograph, noncooperative games are studied. Since in a noncooperative game binding agreements are not possible, the solution of such a game has to be self enforcing, i. e. a Nash equilibrium (NASH [1950,1951J). In general, however, a game may possess many equilibria and so the problem arises which one of these should be chosen as the solution. It was first pointed out explicitly in SELTEN [1965J that I not all Nash equilibria of an extensive form game are qualified to be selected as the solution, since an equilibrium may prescribe irrational behavior at unreached parts of the game tree. Moreover, also for normal form games not all Nash equilibria are eligible, since an equilibrium need not be robust with respect to slight perturba tions in the data of the game. These observations lead to the conclusion that the Nash equilibrium concept has to be refined in order to obtain sensible solutions for every game. In the monograph, various refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept are studied. Some of these have been proposed in the literature, but others are presented here for the first time. The objective is to study the relations between these refine ments;to derive characterizations and to discuss the underlying assumptions. The greater part of the monograph (the chapters 2-5) is devoted to the study of normal form games. Extensive form games are considered in chapter 6.
Location analysis has matured from an area of theoretical inquiry that was designed to explain observed phenomena to a vibrant field which can be and has been used to locate items as diverse as landfills, fast food outlets, gas stations, as well as politicians and products in issue and feature spaces. Modern location science is dealt with by a diverse group of researchers and practitioners in geography, economics, operations research, industrial engineering, and computer science. Given the tremendous advances location science has seen from its humble beginnings, it is time to look back. The contributions in this volume were written by eminent experts in the field, each surveying the original contributions that created the field, and then providing an up-to-date review of the latest contributions. Specific areas that are covered in this volume include: • The three main fields of inquiry: minisum and minimax problems and covering models • Nonstandard location models, including those with competitive components, models that locate undesirable facilities, models with probabilistic features, and problems that allow interactions between facilities • Descriptions and detailed examinations of exact techniques including the famed Weiszfeld method, and heuristic methods ranging from Lagrangean techniques to Greedy algorithms • A look at the spheres of influence that the facilities generate and that attract customers to them, a topic crucial in planning retail facilities • The theory of central places, which, other than in mathematical games, where location science was born
An overview of the analysis of dynamic/differential zero-sum and nonzero-sum games and the role of different information patterns.