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Among the various conceptions of truth is one according to which 'is true' is a transparent, entirely see-through device introduced for only practical (expressive) reasons. This device, when introduced into the language, brings about truth-theoretic paradoxes (particularly, the notorious Liar and Curry paradoxes). The options for dealing with the paradoxes while preserving the full transparency of 'true' are limited. In Spandrels of Truth, Beall concisely presents and defends a modest, so-called dialetheic theory of transparent truth.
Truth: The Basics is a concise and engaging introduction to philosophical theories about the nature of truth. The two authors – leading philosophers in this field – build the book around a single question: what, if anything, is common to all truths, which makes them true? The book explores five important answers (‘theories’) to the given question: correspondence, semantic, verifiability, transparency, and plurality. For each given theory, the following questions are addressed: What is the theory’s answer to the central question? What is the basic motivation behind that answer? What is a precise argument for that answer? What are the biggest objections to that answer? What are a few good resources for understanding more about the theory? An additional chapter provides an extensive introduction to the notorious liar paradox. Truth: The Basics is an ideal starting point for anyone seeking a lively and accessible introduction to the rich and complex philosophical study of truth. Key Features: Written in a clear and concise fashion Clearly explains five major theories of truth for an uninitiated readership of undergraduate students and general readers Prepares the reader to tackle more advanced work in truth studies Makes connections between truth and other areas of philosophy, including the philosophy of language, semantics, metaphysics, logic and epistemology Includes technical appendices for more advanced readers
Truth and Its Deformities is the 32nd volume in the Midwest Studies in Philosophy series. It contains major new contributions on a range of topics related to the general theme of the volume by some of the most important philosophers writing on truth in recent years.
Truth is one of the oldest and most central topics in philosophy. Formal theories explore the connections between truth and logic, and they address truth-theoretic paradoxes such as the Liar. Three leading philosopher-logicians now present a concise overview of the main issues and ideas in formal theories of truth. Beall, Glanzberg, and Ripley explain key logical techniques on which such formal theories rely, providing the formal and logical background needed to develop formal theories of truth. They examine the most important truth-theoretic paradoxes, including the Liar paradoxes. They explore approaches that keep principles of truth simple while relying on nonclassical logic; approaches that preserve classical logic but do so by complicating the principles of truth; and approaches based on substructural logics that change the shape of the target consequence relation itself. Finally, inconsistency and revision theories are reviewed, and contrasted with the approaches previously discussed. For any reader who has a basic grounding in logic, this book offers an ideal guide to formal theories of truth.
The aim of this volume is to open up new perspectives and to raise new research questions about a unified approach to truth, modalities, and propositional attitudes. The volume’s essays are grouped thematically around different research questions. The first theme concerns the tension between the theoretical role of the truth predicate in semantics and its expressive function in language. The second theme of the volume concerns the interaction of truth with modal and doxastic notions. The third theme covers higher-order solutions to the semantic and modal paradoxes, providing an alternative to first-order solutions embraced in the first two themes. This book will be of interest to researchers working in epistemology, logic, philosophy of logic, philosophy of language, philosophy of mathematics, and semantics. The Open Access version of this book, available at www.taylorfrancis.com, has been made available under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives 4.0 license.
In the context of debates about truth, nihilism is the view that nothing is true. This is a very striking and (at first) implausible thesis, which is perhaps why it is seldom discussed. Truth without Truths applies nihilism to the philosophical debates on truth and paradox, and explores how a nihilist approach to truth is a serious contender. David Liggins demonstrates that a strong case for nihilism about truth is available. The main grounds for taking nihilism on truth seriously are the solutions it provides to a wide range of paradoxes involving truth, and its epistemological superiority to theories that posit truths. The discussion considers a wider range of paradoxes than usual-including the truth-teller paradox and other paradoxes of underdetermination. Liggins shows how the debate over truth and paradox can be advanced by drawing on metaphysical debates about realism and anti-realism. Truth without Truths is also a challenge to deflationism. Deflationists provide an austere, metaphysically lightweight account of truth. But there is one posit that all contemporary deflationists make: they posit truths. By showing that we can well do without truths, Liggins argues that deflationism is actually too lavish a position. Liggins's preferred form of alethic nihilism includes a Ramseyan analysis of the concept of truth, which uses quantification into sentence position, conceived of as non-objectual and non-substitutional. This book is part of a wider movement exploring the implications of admitting forms of non-objectual, non-substitutional quantification-sometimes called 'higher-order metaphysics'.
The definitive and essential collection of classic and new essays on analytic theories of truth, revised and updated, with seventeen new chapters. The question "What is truth?" is so philosophical that it can seem rhetorical. Yet truth matters, especially in a "post-truth" society in which lies are tolerated and facts are ignored. If we want to understand why truth matters, we first need to understand what it is. The Nature of Truth offers the definitive collection of classic and contemporary essays on analytic theories of truth. This second edition has been extensively revised and updated, incorporating both historically central readings on truth's nature as well as up-to-the-moment contemporary essays. Seventeen new chapters reflect the current trajectory of research on truth.
Questions about truth and questions about reality are intimately connected. One can ask whether numbers exist by asking "Are there numbers?" But one can also ask what arguably amounts to the same question by asking "Is the sentence 'There are numbers' true?" Such semantic ascent implies that reality can be investigated by investigating our true sentences. This line of thought was dominant in twentieth century philosophy, but is now beginning to be called into question. In From Truth to Reality, Heather Dyke brings together some of the foremost metaphysicians to examine approaches to truth, reality, and the connections between the two. This collection features new and previously unpublished material by JC Beall, Mark Colyvan, Michael Devitt, John Heil, Frank Jackson, Fred Kroon, D. H. Mellor, Luca Moretti, Alan Musgrave, Robert Nola, J. J. C. Smart, Paul Snowdon, and Daniel Stoljar.
The relative merits and demerits of historically prominent views about truth, such as the correspondence theory, coherentism, pragmatism, verificationism, and instrumentalism have been subject to much attention, and have fueled the long-lived debate over which of these views is the most plausible. While diverging in their specific philosophical commitments, adherents of these views are in agreement in at least one fundamental respect: they are all alethic monists. They endorse the thesis that there is only one property in virtue of which propositions can be true, and so, in this sense, take truth to be one. The truth pluralist, on the other hand, rejects this idea: there are several properties in virtue of which propositions can be true. The literature on truth pluralism has been growing steadily for the past twenty years. This volume, however, is the first to focus specifically on pluralism about truth. Part I is dedicated to the development, investigation, and critical discussion of different forms of pluralism. One additional reason to examine truth pluralism is the significant connections it bears to other debates in the truth literature--particularly debates concerning traditional theories of truth and the deflationism/inflationism divide. Parts II and III of the volume connect truth pluralism to these two debates.