Download Free Soviet Strategy At The Crossroads Book in PDF and EPUB Free Download. You can read online Soviet Strategy At The Crossroads and write the review.

The collection of essays presented in this volume grew out of a series of lec tures given at the University of North Carolina during the academic year 1976-1977. The series was sponsored by the Soviet and East European Stud ies Program, which I chaired at the time, and the Curriculum of Peace, War and Defense, headed by James Leutze. In the ensuing years almost all the manuscripts have been redrafted at frequent intervals to reflect the changing state of knowledge in each respective discipline. The final version of the text that appears here is therefore the outcome of a long developmen tal process. It is up to date and embodies our individual views on world communism at the present juncture. Although the recent Soviet invasion of Afghanistan occurred shortly after this volume was completed, that event has not impaired the book's timeliness. The findings of Rosefielde, Lee, Valenta, and Leutze all point toward a resurgence of Soviet expansionism, and Parker explicitly predicted the Afghan invasion in the first draft of his essay, June 1978 (see p. 32).
Less than five years after President Boris Yeltsin's ban on communist activity in Russia, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) rose from the debris of the former Communist Party of the Soviet Union to win over one-third of the seats in the lower house of parliament in December 1995 and to challenge Yeltsin for the presidency itself in mid-1996. This groundbreaking study analyzes the CPRF's evolution as it sought to reshape its program and practice to fit the realities of post-Soviet Russia while also battling the more orthodox Marxist-Leninist groups on its left. The authors examine the CPRF's origins, internal factions, and electoral strategy during the parliamentary and presidential contests of 1995 and 1996. They address in particular the nationalist thinking of CPRF chairman Gennadii A. Ziuganov as well as the political profile of leadership and official program that were endorsed at the Third CPRF Congress in January 1995. The CPRF's alternative strategic choices and prospects in the aftermath of the critical 1995–1996 electoral season are also assessed.
This book examines Allied diplomacy from 1941 to 1946, challenging Americocentric views and highlighting the significance of Europe's diplomatic role. Harbutt argues that the Yalta conference of February 1945 was a pivotal moment that signaled a shift from a pre-existing "Europe/America" framework to the "East/West" conception that led to the Cold War.
[Includes 12 maps and 4 tables] In recent years, the U.S. Army has paid increasing attention to the conduct of unconventional warfare. However, the base of historical experience available for study has been largely American and overwhelmingly Western. In Russian-Soviet Unconventional Wars in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Afghanistan, Dr. Robert F. Baumann makes a significant contribution to the expansion of that base with a well-researched analysis of four important episodes from the Russian-Soviet experience with unconventional wars. Primarily employing Russian sources, including important archival documents only recently declassified and made available to Western scholars, Dr. Baumann provides an insightful look at the Russian conquest of the Caucasian mountaineers (1801-59), the subjugation of Central Asia (1839-81), the reconquest of Central Asia by the Red Army (1918-33), and the Soviet war in Afghanistan (1979-89). The history of these wars—especially as it relates to the battle tactics, force structure, and strategy employed in them—offers important new perspectives on elements of continuity and change in combat over two centuries. This is the first study to provide an in-depth examination of the evolution of the Russian and Soviet unconventional experience on the predominantly Muslim southern periphery of the former empire. There, the Russians encountered fierce resistance by peoples whose cultures and views of war differed sharply from their own. Consequently, this Leavenworth Paper addresses not only issues germane to combat but to a wide spectrum of civic and propaganda operations as well.
This book, first published in 1981, is an analysis of the Soviet Union’s military strategy, taking in both sides of the ‘hawks’ and ‘doves’ views of the USSR’s intentions. It examines the Soviet approach to nuclear war, defence and deterrence in the nuclear age and the calculation of risk in the use of the military instrument. One of the main themes running through the chapters is that although the Soviet Union clearly does not view military issues in the same way as does the West, their approach is not necessarily aggressive and dangerous in all respects.