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During the Cold War, Westerners were obsessed with the military policies of the Soviet Union. Until the demise of the Soviet Union, however, few details of Moscow's thinking on military matters were available. In this book, Andrei Kokoshin reveals how Soviet military theorists developed and debated the concepts that provided the basis for the Kremlin's defense policies. Drawing on Soviet-era archives and unpublished materials, he sheds light on this important chapter in the history of Russia and the world.The book covers three main themes: the relationship between politics and military strategy in the Soviet Union; how the Soviet political and military leadership assessed threats to Soviet security, the nature of future wars, and methods of warfare; and the relationship between offense and defense in Soviet military strategy. Kokoshin places the strategic concepts behind Moscow's military policies in the context of internal and international struggles for power, and assesses the future role of military power in Russia's national security strategy.
In modern history, China has been primarily a land power, dominating smaller states along its massive continental flanks. But China’s turn toward the sea is now very much a reality, as evident in its stunning rise in global shipbuilding markets, its vast and expanding merchant marine, the wide offshore reach of its energy and minerals exploration companies, its growing fishing fleet, and indeed its increasingly modern navy. Yet, for all these achievements, there is still profound skepticism regarding China’s potential as a genuine maritime power. Beijing must still import the most vital subcomponents for its shipyards, maritime governance remains severely bureaucratically challenged, and the navy evinces, at least as of yet, little enthusiasm for significant blue water power projection capabilities. This volume provides a truly comprehensive assessment of prospects for China’s maritime development by situating these important geostrategic phenomena within a larger world historical context. China is hardly the only land power in history to attempt transformation by fostering sea power. Many continental powers have elected or been impelled to transform themselves into significant maritime powers in order to safeguard their strategic position or advance their interests. We examine cases of attempted transformation from the Persian Empire to the Soviet Union, and determine the reasons for their success or failure. Too many works on China view the nation in isolation. Of course, China’s history and culture are to some extent exceptional, but building intellectual fences actually hinders the effort to understand China’s current development trajectory. Without underestimating the enduring pull of China’s past as it relates to threats to the country’s internal stability and its landward borders, this comparative study provides reason to believe that China has turned the corner on a genuine maritime transformation. If that proves indeed to be the case, it would be a remarkable if not singular event in the history of the last two millennia.
For the first two decades after the Cold War, Russian naval power hardly featured in the Euro-Atlantic community’s strategic thinking. This began to change in the mid-2010s, as the idea that the Russian navy poses a threat to NATO began to gain ground. That threat took shockingly real form in February 2022, when Moscow launched its invasion of Ukraine. The sea in Russian strategy is the first sustained examination of Russian maritime power in the period since the fall of the Soviet Union. It brings together leading specialists from public policy and academia to reflect on historical and contemporary aspects of Russia's naval strategy and capacities. At a time of mounting tensions, which some observers have named the ‘Fourth Battle of the Atlantic’, the book offers an informed and nuanced discussion, taking into account the view from Moscow and how this differs from western perspectives. It sketches a trajectory of Russia’s power at sea and reflects on current capabilities and problems, as well as Moscow’s strategic planning for the future.
Former British Ambassador to the Soviet Union and author of the definitive account of the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan, Sir Rodric Braithwaite offers here a tour d'horizon of nuclear policy from the end of World War II and start of the Cold War to the present day. Armageddon and Paranoia unfolds the full history of nuclear weapons that began with the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union and now extends worldwide. For decades, an apocalypse seemed imminent, staved off only by the certainty that if one side launched these missiles the other would launch an equally catastrophic counterstrike. This method of avoiding all-out nuclear warfare was called "Deterrence," a policy of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). Still, though neither side actively wanted to plunge the world into nuclear wasteland, the possibility of war by misjudgment or mistake meant fears could never be entirely assuaged. Both an exploration of Deterrence and the long history of superpower nuclear policy, Armageddon and Paranoia comes at a time when tensions surrounding nuclear armament have begun mounting once more. No book until this one has offered so comprehensive a history of the topic that has guided--at times dominated--the world in which we live.
Russia grapples with the radical post-Cold War world order
This book examines the viability of non-provocative defence - the controversial idea that defensive military policies and practices reduce the risk of wars and provide a viable basis for defending a society should war break out. Drawing on case studies from Europe, the 1991 Persian Gulf War, and Asia-Pacific, the author concludes that non-provocative defence concepts remain relevant and that they can help in deterring, conducting, and settling wars.
This book focuses on the theory and practice of maritime strategy and operations by the weaker powers at sea. Illustrated by examples from naval and military history, the book explains and analyzes the strategies of the weaker side at sea in both peacetime and wartime; in defense versus offense; the main prerequisites for disputing control of the sea; and the conceptual framework of disputing control of the sea. It also explains and analyzes in some detail the main methods of disputing sea control – avoiding/seeking decisive encounters, weakening enemy naval forces over time, counter-containment of enemy naval forces, destroying the enemy’s military-economic potential at sea, attacks on the enemy coast, defense of the coast, defense/capturing important positions/basing areas, and defense/capturing of a choke point. A majority of the world’s navies are currently of small or medium-size. In the case of a war with a much stronger opponent, they would be strategically on the defensive, and their main objective then would be to dispute control of the sea by a stronger side at sea. This book provides a practical guide to such a strategy. This book would be of much interest to students of naval power, maritime security, strategic studies and military/naval history.