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Social and Economic Networks in Cooperative Game Theory presents a coherent overview of theoretical literature that studies the influence and formation of networks in social and economic situations in which the relations between participants who are not included in a particular participant's network are not of consequence to this participant. The material is organized in two parts. In Part I the authors concentrate on the question how network structures affect economic outcomes. Part II of the book presents the formation of networks by agents who engage in a network-formation process to be able to realize the possible gains from cooperation.
Networks of relationships help determine the careers that people choose, the jobs they obtain, the products they buy, and how they vote. The many aspects of our lives that are governed by social networks make it critical to understand how they impact behavior, which network structures are likely to emerge in a society, and why we organize ourselves as we do. In Social and Economic Networks, Matthew Jackson offers a comprehensive introduction to social and economic networks, drawing on the latest findings in economics, sociology, computer science, physics, and mathematics. He provides empirical background on networks and the regularities that they exhibit, and discusses random graph-based models and strategic models of network formation. He helps readers to understand behavior in networked societies, with a detailed analysis of learning and diffusion in networks, decision making by individuals who are influenced by their social neighbors, game theory and markets on networks, and a host of related subjects. Jackson also describes the varied statistical and modeling techniques used to analyze social networks. Each chapter includes exercises to aid students in their analysis of how networks function. This book is an indispensable resource for students and researchers in economics, mathematics, physics, sociology, and business.
The book brings together an overview of standard concepts in cooperative game theory with applications to the analysis of social networks and hierarchical authority organizations. The standard concepts covered include the multi-linear extension, the Core, the Shapley value, and the cooperative potential. Also discussed are the Core for a restricted collection of formable coalitions, various Core covers, the Myerson value, value-based potentials, and share potentials. Within the context of social networks this book discusses the measurement of centrality and power as well as allocation rules such as the Myerson value and hierarchical allocation rules. For hierarchical organizations, two basic approaches to the exercise of authority are explored; for each approach the allocation of the generated output is developed. Each chapter is accompanied by a problem section, allowing this book to be used as a textbook for an advanced graduate course on game theory.
This book analyzes coalitional control schemes by incorporating concepts of cooperative game theory into a distributed control framework. It considers a networked architecture where the nodes are the agents and the edges are their communication links and either the agents or the links are established as the players of cooperative games related to the cost function of the coalitional schemes. The book discusses various cooperative game theory tools that are used to measure/analyze the players’ features, impose constraints on them, provide alternative methods of game computation, detect critical players inside the control scheme, and perform system partitioning of large-scale systems, such as the Barcelona drinking water network, which is described in a case study.
Some of the finest and most recent research in economic and political design is presented. Among the authors are several prominent academics as well as many new and promising researchers. They investigate social choice and electoral systems, auctions, matching, bargaining, coalitional stability and efficiency, regulation, the design of rights, mechanisms, games, hierarchies and information. The book is bound to become a standard reference as a collection displaying where we are and where we are going in a broad spectrum of areas in economic design.
The Encyclopedia of Social Network Analysis and Mining (ESNAM) is the first major reference work to integrate fundamental concepts and research directions in the areas of social networks and applications to data mining. The second edition of ESNAM is a truly outstanding reference appealing to researchers, practitioners, instructors and students (both undergraduate and graduate), as well as the general public. This updated reference integrates all basics concepts and research efforts under one umbrella. Coverage has been expanded to include new emerging topics such as crowdsourcing, opinion mining, and sentiment analysis. Revised content of existing material keeps the encyclopedia current. The second edition is intended for college students as well as public and academic libraries. It is anticipated to continue to stimulate more awareness of social network applications and research efforts. The advent of electronic communication, and in particular on-line communities, have created social networks of hitherto unimaginable sizes. Reflecting the interdisciplinary nature of this unique field, the essential contributions of diverse disciplines, from computer science, mathematics, and statistics to sociology and behavioral science, are described among the 300 authoritative yet highly readable entries. Students will find a world of information and insight behind the familiar façade of the social networks in which they participate. Researchers and practitioners will benefit from a comprehensive perspective on the methodologies for analysis of constructed networks, and the data mining and machine learning techniques that have proved attractive for sophisticated knowledge discovery in complex applications. Also addressed is the application of social network methodologies to other domains, such as web networks and biological networks.
This book presents a systematic overview on partition function form games: a game form in cooperative game theory to integrate externalities for various applications. Cooperative game theory has been immensely useful to study a wide range of issues, but the standard approaches ignore the side effects of cooperation. Recently interest shifted to problems where externalities play the main roles such as models of cooperation in market competition or the shared use of public resources. Such problems require richer models that can explicitly evaluate the side-effects of cooperation. In partition function form games the value of cooperation depends on the outsiders' actions. A recent surge of interest driven by applications has made results very fragmented. This book offers an accessible, yet comprehensive and systematic study of properties, solutions and applications of partition function games surveying both theoretical results and their applications. It assembles a survey of existing research and smaller original results as well as original interpretations and comparisons. The book is self-contained and accessible for readers with little or no knowledge of cooperative game theory.
Drawing upon and extending his inaugural Lipsey Lectures, Debraj Ray looks at coalition formation from the perspective of game theory. Ray brings together developments in both cooperative and noncooperative game theory to study the analytics of coalition formation and binding agreements.
Chapters in Game Theory has been written on the occasion of the 65th birthday of Stef Tijs, who can be regarded as the godfather of game theory in the Netherlands. The contributors all are indebted to Stef Tijs, as former Ph.D. students or otherwise. The book contains fourteen chapters on a wide range of subjects. Some of these can be considered surveys while other chapters present new results: most contributions can be positioned somewhere in between these categories. The topics covered include: cooperative stochastic games; noncooperative stochastic games; sequencing games; games arising form linear (semi-) infinite programming problems; network formation, costs and potential games; potentials and consistency in transferable utility games; the nucleolus and equilibrium prices; population uncertainty and equilibrium selection; cost sharing; centrality in social networks; extreme points of the core; equilibrium sets of bimatrix games; game theory and the market; and transfer procedures for nontransferable utility games. Both editors did their Ph.D with Stef Tijs, while he was affiliated with the mathematics department of the University of Nijmegen.