Download Free Skepticism Causality And Skepticism About Causality Volume 10 Book in PDF and EPUB Free Download. You can read online Skepticism Causality And Skepticism About Causality Volume 10 and write the review.

Skepticism, Causality and Skepticism about Causality studies the interrelated themes of causality and skepticism in contemporary, early modern and medieval philosophy. Thomas Aquinas’s celebrated proofs of the existence of God (the Five Ways of the Summa Theologica) rely in part on an Aristotelian notion of synchronous causality, wherein the things that exist and persist require an accounting that ultimately terminates in the ongoing activity of a first mover, as the existence and persistence of an ecosystem is traceable to the sun. By contrast, in David Hume’s early modern account, causality consists in the regularity of successive events (a rolling billiard ball’s collision with a stationary one is always followed by the movement of the latter). Moreover, Newtonian and Einsteinian accounts respectively suggest that motion, once initiated, requires no explanation. In light of these developments, the first set of essays in this volume re-evaluates the Aristotelian paradigm and its relation to modern science, contending that in some fields (such as ecology, thermodynamics or information theory) contemporary science still preserves some intuitions about causality that support Aquinas’s deliberations. Hume’s skepticism about causality is heir to late medieval and early modern development that transformed not only the notion of causality in general, but also the idea of the causal connections between our cognitive faculties, God, and the world in particular, giving rise to extreme, solipsistic forms of skepticism, such as Descartes’ Demon skepticism. The second set of essays considers whether Aquinas’s thought would be susceptible in some ways to this form of skepticism, and what motivated, just a couple of generations later, the turn to epistemology already involving this sort of skepticism.
This work, first published in 1985, offers a general interpretation of Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature. Most Hume scholarship has either neglected or downplayed an important aspect of Hume’s position – his scepticism. This book puts that right, examining in close detail the sceptical arguments in Hume’s philosophy.
This volume considers the contemporary relevance of Aquinas’ thought and what parameters should influence its reception. It discusses the reception of Aquinas on creation ex nihilo and offers guidelines for reception in the fields of metaphysics and natural theology. Chapters on physics and philosophy of mind intersect with key modern debates. Contributions interpret Aquinas’ physics in light of contemporary findings and discuss his account of human self-awareness.
This is the first volume of essays devoted to Aristotelian formal causation and its relevance for contemporary metaphysics and philosophy of science. The essays trace the historical development of formal causation and demonstrate its relevance for contemporary issues, such as causation, explanation, laws of nature, functions, essence, modality, and metaphysical grounding. The introduction to the volume covers the history of theories of formal causation and points out why we need a theory of formal causation in contemporary philosophy. Part I is concerned with scholastic approaches to formal causation, while Part II presents four contemporary approaches to formal causation. The three chapters in Part III explore various notions of dependence and their relevance to formal causation. Part IV, finally, discusses formal causation in biology and cognitive sciences. Neo-Aristotelian Perspectives on Formal Causation will be of interest to advanced graduate students and researchers working on contemporary Aristotelian approaches to metaphysics and philosophy of science. This volume includes contributions by José Tomás Alvarado, Christopher J. Austin, Giacomo Giannini, Jani Hakkarainen, Ludger Jansen, Markku Keinänen, Gyula Klima, James G. Lennox, Stephen Mumford, David S. Oderberg, Michele Paolini Paoletti, Sandeep Prasada, Petter Sandstad, Wolfgang Sattler, Benjamin Schnieder, Matthew Tugby, and Jonas Werner.
This volume considers the Aristotelian virtue-ethics tradition as it develops in the writings of Thomas Aquinas. Part One studies the types of virtues Aquinas believes are held by Christians in a state of grace. Aquinas’s intriguing account is apparently fraught with inconsistencies, which have split contemporary interpreters over not only how to understand Aquinas on this matter, but also as to whether it is even possible to provide a consistent interpretation of his doctrine. This book brings together scholarship that reflects the various sides of the debate. Part Two explores a Thomistic synthesis regarding Aquinas’s account of the good as telos or end that emerges in the seventeenth century, as well as what promise his virtue ethics holds today, arguing that Aquinas’ hylomorphic understanding of human beings as matter-form composites furnishes a robust moral accounting that seems unavailable to alternative, reductive materialist accounts.
Metaphysical Themes, Medieval and Modern presents three sets of essays that engage the metaphysics of substance through a study of thought on this theme over the last eight centuries, shedding light on contemporary disputes as well as the history of thought leading into the modern era. Part I grows out of an author-meets-critics panel on Robert Pasnau’s Metaphysical Themes: 1274–1671 (OUP, 2011). Pasnau’s rich study delves into the four centuries wherein later medieval thought gives way to the modern period. Andrew Arlig reflects on Pasnau’s discussion of holenmers, entities such as God and the human soul, that are thought to exist as wholes in more or less disparate things. Paul Symington, on the other hand, treats the substance ontology of Thomas Aquinas in particular through a reflection on Aquinas’s understanding of the ontological status of the various modes or accidents of Aristotelian substances. Part II, “Substance Ontology, Medieval and Modern”, transitions to contemporary substance ontology. Travis Dumsday canvasses the field of debate over what is the substratum of change, contending that the Aristotelian, hylomorphic account of substance that views substances as matter-form composites remains the most robust. Gyula Klima, while agreeing with Dumsday’s conclusion, strengthens his argument with reference to the development of this bundle of problems within the recent history of analytic philosophy. Dumsday concludes with reflections on the relevance of substance ontology to natural theology, which, in turn, is the theme of Part III, “The Natural Theology of Thomas Aquinas”, wherein Alexander Hall and Michael Sirilla consider how Aquinas’s understanding of the divine substance bears on the logic of demonstration in his natural theology, concluding that contemporary Radical Orthodoxy readings that have Aquinas forfeit demonstrative proof that God exists misconstrue him on this point.
Moses Maimonides and John Duns Scotus are key figures as regards the thirteenth-century philosophical tradition that developed out of the Western Christian reception of the Neo-Platonized Aristotelianism of Islamic and Jewish thinkers. Whereas the writings of Maimonides count among the received works that inaugurate and shape this span, the variety of conceptual instruments developed by Scotus arguably signal its end, preparing the way for the emergence of diverse fourteenth-century philosophical worldviews. Maimonides on God and Duns Scotus on Logic and Metaphysics explores the eponymous thinkers’ work across a variety of fields. In the domain of natural theology, Maimonides presses for creation de novo, adapting from the Islamic Kalām tradition what has come to be known as the Argument from Particularity, which deduces intelligent design when science seems, in principle, unable to account for states of affairs that conceivably needn’t obtain (to take an example from modern physics, the strength of the four fundamental forces). Part one of this volume contrasts Maimonides’s and Aquinas’s parallel treatments of this and other proof strategies still employed by contemporary philosophers. Part two, on Scotus, includes discussion of the authenticity of the logical writings attributed to him, the evolution of his thought in this field against the backdrop of various thirteenth-century developments, the types of Aristotelian universals theorized by Scotus, his semantics of theological discourse and ontology of possible entities.
Mereology is the metaphysical theory of parts and wholes, including their conditions of identity and persistence through change. Hylomorphism is the metaphysical doctrine according to which all natural substances, including living organisms, consist of matter and form as their essential parts, where the substantial form of living organisms is identified as their soul. The theories date to Plato and Aristotle and figure prominently in the history of philosophy up until the seventeenth century, where their influence wanes relative to a reductive materialism that culminates with deflationary accounts of objects and persons, where mere conglomerates constitute things and we are left to account for mental phenomena in terms of the powers of physical materials. In view of such difficulties, there is a renewed interest in hylomorphism, as its forms structure matter and can account for natural kinds, with their various capacities and powers. This volume presents medieval theories of hylomorphism and mereology, articulating the conceptual framework in which they developed and with an eye on their relevance today.
This volume provides a reading of Hume's Treatise as a whole, foregrounding Hume's understanding of custom and its role in the Treatise. It shows that Hume grounds his understanding of custom in its usage in English legal theory, and that he takes custom to be the foundation for normativity in all of its guises, whether moral, epistemic, or social. The book argues that Hume's project in the Treatise is to provide a socially inflected cognitive science--to understand how persons are constituted through an interaction of individual psychology and their social matrix--and that custom provides the ligature that ties together Hume's naturalism and skepticism. In doing so, it shows that Hume is a consistent Pyrrhonian skeptic, but that he takes the positive part of the skeptical program seriously, showing not only that our practices have no foundation, but that they need none, and that custom alone serves to explain and to justify our practices. (Resumen editorial).
This author-meets-critics volume about Robert Pasnau’s After Certainty treats the history of epistemology, from Aristotle to the present. Pasnau presents this history as a gradual lowering of expectations regarding certain knowledge, the culmination of a sea change dating to the early-modern rejection of Aristotelian essentialism. The result, he concludes, is that contemporary epistemology is, more than any other branch of philosophy, estranged from its tradition. Pasnau’s After Certainty draws conclusions that are not just historical, but also systematic, an effort that led to a 2018 Parisian symposium to evaluate the text, collected here as a volume that stands alone as an intriguing work on the history of epistemology or together with After Certainty as an invaluable companion piece.