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In order for all applications of airpower -- including counter-air, deep interdiction strike, air landing, and combat search and rescue -- to succeed, they must be informed by comprehensive data on targets. Moreover, it would be helpful if intelligence included the intentions and capabilities of opponents. Getting signals intelligence data to the cockpit and pilots for instantaneous use on the battlefield is the objective. Signals intelligence can provide needed information, but its collection, processing, analysis, and distribution is secretive. Consequently, an operator is slow to get even minimal data. Real-time signals intelligence support to the cockpit is an on-going challenge, but it is not as cosmic or fantasy-based as some believe. Three historical examples illustrate what can be done when operations and intelligence ensure that critical data reach the battlefield in a timely fashion.
A continuing challenge for the operational and intelligence communities, is the quest to get relevant cryptological products to warfighters engaged in combat operations. During World War II both 8th and 9th Air Forces used specialized signals intelligence squadrons (low-grade ciphers or open transmissions) to defeat the Luftwaffe in the air and on air fields. After the surprise of the MiG-15 in Korea the USAFSS established intercept sites to monitor controller to pilot radio links in MiG alley. Data collected was passed to radar sites that helped to place USAF F-86 in optimal intercept position. The Air Force established Teaball at NKP AB, in Thailand which incorporated EC-121 data, highly classified voice intercept data and IFF data to develop a composite air picture. The three case studies examine the balance between operational immediacy and the intelligence communities desire to protect intelligence sources and develop analysis prior to passing intelligence. Linguistic challenges and need to protect operational security are factors in the study.
"This study examines the evolution of near real-time intelligence support to air operations in three wars: Eighth Air Force operations during World War II, support to U.S. aircraft operating in "MiG Alley" over North Korea during the Korean War 1950-1954, and the "Teaball" weapons control center support to U.S. aircraft operating over North Vietnam during Linebacker II in 1972"--Introduction, P. 1.
A file of signals intelligence reports, messages, and correspondence issued by the Government Code and Cypher School and sent by the head ('C') of the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) to the Prime Minister, Winston Churchill. This file includes the following reports on North Africa: of the Tunis Air Corps' combat plans for April 23/24; and the Tunis Air Corps' aircraft return for April 23, counting 115 aircraft as serviceable; from the German Air Ministry: a circular of April 13, that breakdowns in aircraft production had led to certain German Air Force (GAF) fighter types being sent to units without or with only partial armour plating, and that cockpit diagrams would indicate from where armour was missing; on North Africa: of the combat plans for the Tunis Air Corps for the night of April 23/24, that 50-60 aircraft are to attack Allied forces in the vicinity of the front line in the Medjez El Bab area; and that GAF torpedo aircraft are at increased readiness to attack Allied naval forces in the Strait of Sicily, on April 22; and on the Russian Front: of the GAF's combat plans for April 24, including air strikes against the Soviet bridgehead at Novorossijsk and the Black Sea harbour at Batumi.
A file of signals intelligence reports, messages, and correspondence issued by the Government Code and Cypher School and sent by the head ('C') of the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) to the Prime Minister, Winston Churchill. This file contains a message from C to the Prime Minister (PM); and the following reports on Italy: reports for May 16, including that the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division is to give up one battalion to the 94th Infantry Division; that the 90th Panzer Grenadier Division is to defend against superior Allied forces attacking near and north of Piumorola; of the 1st Parachute Division reporting strong Allied tank and infantry attacks; the 2nd Air Fleet's situation report for May 16, giving a summary of Allied air operations and German reconnaissances and patrols; short reports of Allied raids on Northern Italy, on May 13, noting a number of railway installations being damaged in the Po valley and near Venice; a situation report from the Commander in Chief (CinC) South-West (Army Group C) for May 15, stating that the withdrawal of the 71st Infantry Division is proceeding according to plan; that a convoy of landing craft moving south off Vicenza was fired on without success; of Allied ground attacks supported by strong formations of medium and light bombers; that railway installations at Treviso, Ferrara, Padua and Mestre have been heavily damaged; and incomplete details of German defence positions in the Southern Alps, as of May 14, probably from the CinC for the South-West; on Western Europe: the 3rd Air Fleet reports the 9th Air Corps' appreciation of a night operation against Bristol on May 14-15, with the navigational aids CELIBATE, BENITO, TRUHE and KNICKBEANE having problems because of jamming, that the bombing was done by straight navigation, that no effects on the town were observed, that diversionary raids were made on the South Coast, that 11 out of 13 Kettenhund aircraft were lost, and making a reference to switching on apparatus simultaneously with RUFFLE; the 9th Air Corps' appreciation of night air raids against Portsmouth on May 15-16, describing unfavourable weather conditions, that pathfinder Operation 4 (BENITO) was not effective, that TRUHE (BLOWPIPE) was not useable because the Phase-shift operation (CELIBATE) was jammed by the Allies, and making an assumption that 50% of the bombs fell in the target area; of German speculation on possibly a new explosive being used by the Allies in bombs dropped in the Pas de Calais area, on May 13; and the PM's query and General Ismay's response, on May 16; on Eastern Europe: of instructions for aircraft landing at airfields in the Zilistea area, in regard to the lack of aviation fuel, on May 9; Naval Headlines, covering destroyer activities in Norwegian waters; that ships were destroyed in an air raid on Ancona, on May 15; that an operation against Krk island by the police is planned, and that it will need a strong sea patrol; that 1600 Jews are to be transported from Corfu to Piraeus; that there are three weeks' stocks of fuel for the Danube Flotilla, with obtaining supplies from Turnu Severin now impossible; a Japanese assessment of an operation COCKPIT attack by U.S. forces on Sabang, on April 19; and that the Japanese submarine depot ship Urakami Maru, possibly intended as the flag ship of the 6th Submarine Fleet, was destroyed in a U.S. carrier strike on Palao, on March 30; and from the Siamese minister in Berlin, detailing recent day-time air raids on Berlin, and the prospects for an Allied invasion of Europe, on May 10.