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The purpose of this book is to document from basic Soviet sources the development of Soviet military doctrine and its impact upon the Soviet Armed Forces. Soviet military doctrine is defined as the military policy of the Communist Party. In one way or another, this policy affects the lives of all of us-as a possible threat to free institutions and political processes as well as to our economic life and well-being. Generally we approach Soviet military policy in terms of military balances and weapons: comparisons in the number of men under arms, the speed of aircraft of the Soviet bloc versus that of NATO aircraft, the number of ballistic missiles and their throw-weights. Studying such balances is of critical importance in defining, to some degree, existing forces. But it is only through a deep and thorough study of the military policy of the Communist Party, which translates directly into military doctrine, that we can obtain the background that might aid in negotiating with the Soviets on arms control matters or in making decisions that will enable those nations outside of the Soviet bloc to deter future Kremlin military moves.
Yost suggests that the challenges for Western policy posed by Soviet ballistic missile defense (BMD) programs stem partly from Soviet military programs, Soviet arms control policies, and Soviet public diplomacy campaigns, and partly from the West's own intra-alliance disagreements and lack of consensus about Western security requirements.
This book, first published in 1989, is a comprehensive examination of the profound impact of World War II on Soviet military affairs. It systematically assesses the costs and lessons of the war and their substantial impact on Soviet military and Party leaders in the Cold War era and particularly in the 1980s. Starting with the experiences of the war and its influence on the development of Soviet military thinking, the book addresses the relationship between the military and the Soviet political system, threat perception, decision making, and crisis and risk assessment. Also discussed are the war’s influence on the structure and operations of the military in the 1980s, focusing on doctrine, conventional forces, the defence industry and historiography.
Current thinking on arms control and disarmament has been dominated by the analysis of such "objective" factors as the number of weapons, their characteristics, technological developments and nuclear weapons deployment policies. Yet arms control negotiations have had little success so far. In this volume, Daniel Frei asserts that while such objective analysis is indeed indispensable, it needs to be supplemented by a careful, document-based description of Soviet and U.S. perceptions of one another and of the kind of assumptions that have thus far compelled their leaders to seek security in growing numbers of sophisticated weapons at ever-increasing cost.
Avoiding a nuclear war, or ending one if avoidance fails, is an important but relatively unexplored aspect of nuclear doctrine. Dr. Abt examines the feasibility of antagonists' agreeing to exclude their open cities from nuclear targeting and to replace strategic bombardment with retaliatory invasion to create less of a hair[1]trigger deterrent. Critical net assessments by U.S. strategists and the effects of such a strategy on the Soviet Union and on U.S. allies are considered, along with problems implementation might pose. The author contends that both deterrence and the potential for limiting damage are strengthened by pre-war plans for a nuclear ceasefire and stalemate short of holocaust.
The recent transformations in the USSR are nowhere more evident than in the Soviet military. Top-level military officers have been relieved of their positions, Gorbachev has warned of lean times for the military, the symbolic role of the armed forces has been downgraded, and the concept of "military sufficiency" points to major modifications in Soviet force structure. Contrary to some who see Gorbachev as a Sir Galahad out to slay the evil military high command, Dale Herspring concludes that the relationship between the highest Soviet political and military leaders is at the moment more symbiotic than conflictual. In this first in-depth study of the evolution of civil-military relations in the Soviet Union from 1967 to the present, he shows how the views of senior military officers have varied over time: currently, even if the members of the high command do not like all Gorbachev's changes, they understand the need for them and are prepared to live with them. As Herspring looks at the personalities and politics of eight top military figures, he reveals that the most important of them, Ogarkov, was the first senior Soviet military officer to understand the value of working with the political leadership. Ogarkov believed that the arms control and dtente processes, if carefully managed, could enhance the national security of the USSR. In Gorbachev, the Soviet military has found the type of individual that Ogarkov was seeking. Originally published in 1990. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.