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This study analyzes the feasibility of guerrilla warfare as the basis for a strategy of airpower employment for a weak air force confronting an opponent with a stronger air force. The analysis begins with a distillation of the theory of guerrilla warfare into five elements essential to its success: superior intelligence, security, mobility advantage, surprise, and sustainment. The author then compares the ground combat environment of the traditional guerrilla with the airpower environment of the potential air guerrilla and concludes that these five elements can be met in the airpower environment provided the weak force has sufficient ingenuity and the necessary resources. An investigation of recent trends in technology and the prevailing strategic environment indicates that it increasingly possible for a weak force to obtain these resources. The author assesses that air guerrilla warfare is a viable warfighting strategy, but points out that the likelihood of a weak force actually adopting air guerrilla warfare will depend on its regional security needs and its resolve to protract a conflict. The study concludes that air guerrilla warfare is a credible threat to a stronger opponent. To meet this threat, the author recommends that the United States re-examine its intervention strategy, reinforce its policy of strategic engagement, and research both airpower and non-airpower means to neutralize an elusive guerrilla air force.
"This study analyzes the feasibility of guerrilla warfare as the basis for a strategy of airpower employment for a weak air force confronting an opponent with a stronger air force. The analysis begins with a distillation of the theory of guerrilla warfare into five elements essential to its success: superior intelligence, security, mobility advantage, surprise, and sustainment. The author then compares the ground combat environment of the traditional guerrilla with the airpower environment of the potential air guerrilla and concludes that these five elements can be met in the airpower environment provided the weak force has sufficient ingenuity and the necessary resources. An investigation of recent trends in technology and the prevailing strategic environment indicates that it increasingly possible for a weak force to obtain these resources. The author assesses that air guerrilla warfare is a viable warfighting strategy, but points out that the likelihood of a weak force actually adopting air guerrilla warfare will depend on its regional security needs and its resolve to protract a conflict. The study concludes that air guerrilla warfare is a credible threat to a stronger opponent. To meet this threat, the author recommends that the United States re-examine its intervention strategy, reinforce its policy of strategic engagement, and research both airpower and non-airpower means to neutralize an elusive guerrilla air force."--DTIC.
This book evaluates the development of the Rhodesian Air Force during the Second Chimurenga or Bush War (1966-1980). Airpower in irregular conflict is effective at the tactical level because guerrilla warfare is not a purely military conflict. The Rhodesian Air Force was deployed in a war-winning versus a supporting role as a result of the shortage of manpower to deal with insurgency, and almost all units of the Rhodesian Security Forces depended on its tactical effectiveness. Technical challenges faced by the Air Force, combined with the rate of guerrilla infiltration and the misuse of airpower to bomb guerrilla bases in neighboring countries largely negated the success of airpower.
With the development of the “long war,” the U.S. military’s focus has shifted dramatically from its traditional emphasis on conventional operations to irregular and indirect approaches to safeguard America’s vital interests. One of the least understood aspects of Irregular Warfare is Unconventional Warfare (UW), which includes operations conducted through, with or by indigenous forces and provides the U.S. with an indirect means of accomplishing its objectives. This thesis examines the current ability of Special Operations Forces to conduct UW with air support, specifically air support provided by Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC). This thesis examines the questions—Does AFSOC currently have airpower assets with the capability to support UW operations with mobility, resupply, and fires? Three case studies were used to examine airpowers role in UW: Allied support to the French resistance in WWII, United States support to the Hmong during the conflict in Laos and a hypothetical scenario using AFSOC’s current capabilities. The three case studies were examined using the evaluation criteria of effectiveness, efficiency and unity of effort. The analysis found that AFSOC could currently support UW operations, but effectiveness would be limited by a number of factors.
Violent non-state actors (VNSA) often serve a destabilizing role in nearly every humanitarian and political crisis faced by the international community. As non-state armed groups gain greater access to resources and networks through global interconnectivity, they have come to dominate the terrain of illegal trade in drugs, guns, and humans. Warlords Rising arms those confronting the mounting challenge by delivering an innovative, interdisciplinary framework of analysis designed to improve understanding of non-state adversaries in order to affect their development and performance. Examining the utility of traditional theories of deterrence and warfighting in light of the insight gained through this interdisciplinary approach, the authors elevate the powerful role of environmental shaping in group development, recast deterrence in ecological terms, and lay out a strategy to defeat non-state adversaries if necessary. Whether the goal is preventing, coercing, or conquering, the framework of analysis presented here is designed to be universal, allowing for structured analysis across regions, types, and functions of non-state actors and providing the decision maker and policy maker witha variety of modes and methods of intervention.
The first documented, systematic study of a truly revolutionary subject, this 1937 text remains the definitive guide to guerrilla warfare. It concisely explains unorthodox strategies that transform disadvantages into benefits.