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Security protocols are widely used to ensure secure communications over insecure networks, such as the internet or airwaves. These protocols use strong cryptography to prevent intruders from reading or modifying the messages. However, using cryptography is not enough to ensure their correctness. Combined with their typical small size, which suggests that one could easily assess their correctness, this often results in incorrectly designed protocols. The authors present a methodology for formally describing security protocols and their environment. This methodology includes a model for describing protocols, their execution model, and the intruder model. The models are extended with a number of well-defined security properties, which capture the notions of correct protocols, and secrecy of data. The methodology can be used to prove that protocols satisfy these properties. Based on the model they have developed a tool set called Scyther that can automatically find attacks on security protocols or prove their correctness. In case studies they show the application of the methodology as well as the effectiveness of the analysis tool. The methodology’s strong mathematical basis, the strong separation of concerns in the model, and the accompanying tool set make it ideally suited both for researchers and graduate students of information security or formal methods and for advanced professionals designing critical security protocols.
Security protocols are communication protocols that are used when agents communicate sensitive information in hostile environments. They are meant to achieve security goals such as the secrecy of a piece of communicated information or the authenticity of an agent's identity. Their two main characteristics are the use of cryptographic operations such as encryption or digital signatures and the assumption that communication takes place in the presence of a malicious intruder. It is therefore necessary to make sure that the protocol design is correct and will thus achieve its security goals even when under attack by the intruder. Design verification for security protocols is no easy task; a successful attack on the Needham-Shroeder authentication protocol was discovered 17 years after the protocol had been published. We present a, framework for the specification and analysis of security protocols. The specification language is close to the standard "arrow" notation used by protocol designers and practitioners, however, we add some constructs to declare persistent and fresh knowledge for agents. The analysis that we conduct consists of two stages: Modeling and verification. The model we use for protocols is based on game-semantics, in which the emphasis is put on interaction. The protocol is modeled as a game between the intruder and agents. Verification amounts to finding successful strategies for either the agent or the intruder. For instance, if the protocol goal is to achieve fairness in exchanges between possibly cheating agents, then the verification algorithm searches the game tree to insure that each non-cheating agent is not put at a disadvantage with respect to other agents. In order to he able to specify a wide range of security properties of strategies, we propose a logic having modal, temporal and linear characteristics. The logic is also equipped with a tableau-based proof system that serves as a basis for a model checking algorithm. To validate our approach, we designed and implemented a software environment that verifies protocol specifications against required properties. We use this environment to conduct case studies.
This Festschrift volume is published in honor of Catherine A. Meadows and contains essays presented at the Catherine Meadows Festschrift Symposium held in Fredericksburg, VA, USA, in May 2019. Catherine A. Meadows has been a pioneer in developing symbolic formal verification methods and tools. Her NRL Protocol Analyzer, a tool and methodology that embodies symbolic model checking techniques, has been fruitfully applied to the analysis of many protocols and protocol standards and has had an enormous influence in the field. She also developed a new temporal logic to specify protocol properties, as well as new methods for analyzing various kinds of properties beyond secrecy such as authentication and resilience under Denial of Service (DoS) attacks and has made important contributions in other areas such as wireless protocol security, intrusion detection, and the relationship between computational and symbolic approaches to cryptography. This volume contains 14 contributions authored by researchers from Europe and North America. They reflect on the long-term evolution and future prospects of research in cryptographic protocol specification and verification.
This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the first International Conference on Principles of Security and Trust, POST 2012, held in Tallinn, Estonia, in March/April 2012, as part of ETAPS 2012, the European Joint Conferences on Theory and Practice of Software. The 20 papers, presented together with the abstract of an invited talk and a joint-ETAPS paper, were selected from a total of 67 submissions. Topics covered by the papers include: foundations of security, authentication, confidentiality, privacy and anonymity, authorization and trust, network security, protocols for security, language-based security, and quantitative security properties.
This book constitutes the thoroughly refereed post-workshop proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Formal Aspects in Security and Trust, FAST 2008, held under the auspices of IFIP WG 1.7 in Malaga, Spain, in October 2008 as a satellite event of 13th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security. The 20 revised papers presented were carefully reviewed and selected from 59 submissions. The papers focus of formal aspects in security, trust and reputation, security protocol design and analysis, logics for security and trust, trust-based reasoning, distributed trust management systems, digital asset protection, data protection, privacy and id management issues, information flow analysis, language-based security, security and trust aspects in ubiquitous computing, validation/analysis tools, Web/grid services security/trust/privacy, security and risk assessment, resource and access control, as well as case studies.
This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 5th International Symposium on Security in Computing and Communications, SSCC 2017, held in Manipal, India, in September 2017. The 21 revised full papers presented together with 13 short papers were carefully reviewed and selected from 84 submissions. The papers focus on topics such as cryptosystems, algorithms, primitives; security and privacy in networked systems; system and network security; steganography, visual cryptography, image forensics; applications security.
This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 6th IFIP WG 11.11 International Conference, IFIPTM 2012, held in Surat, India, in May 2012. The 12 revised full papers presented together with 8 short papers and the abstracts of 4 keynote talks were carefully reviewed and selected from 51 submissions. Building on the traditions inherited from the iTrust and previous IFIPTM conferences, IFIPTM 2012 is a multi-disciplinary conference focusing on areas such as: trust models, social, economic and behavioural aspects of trust, trust in networks, mobile systems and cloud computation, privacy, reputation systems, and identity management.
This book constitutes the thoroughly refereed post-conference proceedings of the Joint Workshop on Theory of Security and Applications (formely known as ARSPA-WITS), TOSCA 2011, held in Saarbrücken, Germany, in March/April 2011, in association with ETAPS 2011. The 9 revised full papers presented together with 3 invited talks were carefully reviewed and selected from 24 submissions. The papers feature topics including various methods in computer security, including the formal specification, analysis and design of security protocols and their applications, the formal definition of various aspects of security such as access control mechanisms, mobile code security and denial-of-service attacks, and the modeling of information flow and its application.